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THE UNITY OF BODY AND SOUL

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THE UNITY OF BODY AND SOUL

THE VALUE OF THE BODY IN CHRISTIAN
TEACHING AND MODERN THOUGHT

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ABBREVIATIONS

E.R.E.	=	Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics
J.E.	=	Jewish Encyclopædia
I.C.C.	=	International Critical Commentary
Encl. Bib.	=	Encyclopædia Biblica
H.D.B.	=	Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible
D.C.B.	=	Dictionary of Christian Biography
A.N.C.L.	=	Ante-Nicene Christian Library
E.T.	=	English translation
Migne P.C.	=	J. P. Migne. Patrologiæ Cursus Completus. Latin and Greek series

PREFACE

THE main purpose of this book is indicated by its title. It is the development of a view of human personality which links body and soul together in the varied experience of life. This partnership of body and soul is expressed in the idea of their unity, a unity both of function and value.

Students of human personality usually approach this great question from the angle of the soul, for the spiritual factors in human life provide a natural line of approach to the understanding and estimate of man. In this book, however, as the sub-title indicates, we approach the subject from the angle of the body. The justification for this is set out in the Introduction, but two points may here be emphasized: (*a*) in the Old and New Testaments there is an importance attaching to the body which has not always secured the recognition it deserves; and (*b*) a characteristic feature of much present-day thought is its attention to the biological aspects of human life. It may therefore be of service to relate that special view of human nature which the Christian Scriptures bequeathed to the world to this modern biological emphasis.

The investigations which led the author to this view of personality were submitted, in 1925, to the University of London, and accepted as a thesis for the degree of D.D. The main results of these investigations are here summarized. It may be claimed that they have an immediate and practical interest, in that they relate to the normal life we live in a material world. They have, further, a relation to the social expression of religion which is so prominent in present-day Christian conceptions, and they have their contribution to make to the controversial question of the Sacraments. Accordingly, in the chapters which follow, the Hebrew and Christian idea of the physical life is outlined: we then note how this conception fared in the long and varied ecclesiastical development, and how it stands in the light of modern thought: finally, the Christian position

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thus established is developed in relation to the normal activities of human life.

The author's deep indebtedness to many writers has been acknowledged in the text, but special reference may here be made to H. Wheeler Robinson and E. D. Burton, whose researches into Hebrew and Greek psychological terms and ideas have done so much to bring out the real value of the Christian view of man. Thanks are also due to Seymour J. Price for valuable assistance in the preparation of the Index.

INTRODUCTORY

I

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BODY IN PERSONALITY

1. IT cannot be said that the subject of human personality is neglected by modern writers, for this theme is steadily acquiring a central place in modern thought, and deservedly so. Anyone who is of an inquiring turn of mind will be attracted to many avenues of investigation, but they all have a way of leading back to man himself, who is a being comprising mystery and meaning out of all proportion to his comparatively small place in the physical universe. He is a pygmy, says Carlyle, standing on the outer crust of a small planet; and in spite of all our pride in human achievements we feel like agreeing with this when we watch the scientist placing this globe of ours against the background of immeasurable space and unfolding his story of the myriad activities of teeming forms of life. The sun, we are told, has a diameter one hundred and nine times that of the earth, and is about ninety-three million miles away. This is a great marvel, but here is a greater, that man has been able to find out these things. This, surely, is the real marvel, not the vastness of things but the power of the small being who has been able to comprehend that vastness. Amazing as are the known facts of Nature, they are not yet so amazing as the scientist who investigates them.

Sir Thomas Browne, stirred beyond the ordinary by the ingenious contrivings of Nature, studied, he tells us,¹ to match and parallel them in the cosmography of himself. "We carry with us the wonders we seek without us; there is all Africa and her prodigies in us: we are that bold and adventurous piece of Nature which he that studies wisely learns in a compendium what others labour at in a divided piece and endless volume." This exactly expresses our mood as to turn to examine man himself. The comparatively small area of the human

¹ *Religio Medici*, 27.

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nervous system has, for us, a more important challenge than the planetary marvels. This is because the facts of nervous activity are associated with movements of a higher plane, and lead us to values of a higher order. When we speak of the distances between the planets, we speak in terms of space: if we speak of the *measurer* of these distances, we are compelled to take account of something that cannot be summed up in terms of space. Space, matter, time, energy are categories which are essential for our knowledge of the outer world, but they cannot sum up man himself. There is something in him which transcends these. He thinks, reasons, makes abstractions; he says "this is right", "this is good", "this is beautiful"; he may lift his being to God in prayer; and we know that these activities touch a realm with which our biological and astronomical observations, as such, cannot deal. In a word, he is mind, spirit, touching an order of life which transcends the physical.

It is not necessary, therefore, to preface our study of man by any apologia. Such a study is indeed inevitable, given the impulse to inquire at all. But the special form which our inquiry is to take is determined largely by the tendencies of modern thought. The biological and psychological advances of this century are well known, and they follow a century which will always be famous for its scientific achievements. Our aim is the study not of personality in general, but rather the bodily aspect of it, and this because the history of man's attempt to understand himself shows a tendency to swing to one or other of two extremes. Since the earliest days of speculation, it has been recognized that there are two aspects of human life, the physical and the spiritual (though, as we shall see, the exact differentiation between them so far as it has been attempted is a modern achievement). It has usually happened either that the spiritual nature of man has been emphasized to the disparagement of the material, or the physical make-up has been stressed until the result has been a frank materialism. Neither extreme is true to the facts, and it is the main purpose of this inquiry to show

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that we may do justice to the bodily life of man without forgetting the spiritual nature which makes him a unique term in the evolutionary series. Our main claim is that if we are to do justice to human nature, we are compelled to take account of the important and unique place of the body. The life we live in the flesh is of great significance for the understanding of life in its fulness.

2. But why should we take such careful notice of the body? We may briefly indicate certain points which are clear from human experience, and which make the study of the body not only worth while, but also imperative.

(a) *All human life, in a real sense, is rooted in the body.*

“Although we no longer identify ourselves with the body, it remains for us, throughout life, the centre from which we speak and act and look out on the universe.”¹ The child first becomes conscious of himself as a being possessing limbs which can be moved . . . and in this, as we shall see, the childhood of the individual resembles that of the race. It is true that the development to maturity is marked by an increasing recognition of non-bodily factors, but at no point in the development can the organism be dispensed with. The highest flights of fancy, the noblest aspirations, the most heroic moral decisions are possible, as far as we know, only to the man as organically functioning. Scholasticism, as we shall see, rightly insisted on this. The mediæval psychologists saw that the material universe renders to man a varied service; in addition to supplying the actual organs and tissues of the body, it sustains the body thus formed, feeds the mind, and enables it to set its own processes to work in education and development and provides an instrument for self-expression in the practical and the fine arts.²

(b) *The body is at once our principle of individuality and social relationship.*

Various factors distinguish us from one another, such as ability, point of view, temperament, and so on: but

¹ Pringle Pattison, *Idea of Immortality*, 104.

² See Wicksteed, *Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy*, 370.

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the primary factor in our individuality is the body. I am a physical being distinct from my neighbour, who is also a physical being. I may share with him an outlook, an interest, an attachment, but I cannot in the same sense share my body. In a peculiar sense it is mine, and I cannot make it the property of another. It is also true that by means of the body we are enabled to form social relationships. Thoughts are not physical, but they find expression in gesture and action which involve the body. How, in the first place, could we communicate at all if we had no power of bodily expression? Human life, it need not be said, cannot be comprehended by a scheme of the senses, but it is obvious that without the senses the whole process of learning, which is essentially a social process, would be impossible.

(c) *Many of the higher values of life are based on physical dispositions.*

Without going far into a matter which will later concern us in more detail, we may here mention the important place of instincts in the determination of human life. Many psychologists (like McDougall) bid us beware of regarding instincts as purely physical, and without prejudice to the discussion on this point we may urge the deep and pervasive effect in any human life of such deep-rooted instincts as sex and the herd. We are assured that marriage, that most important element in social organization, is based in a very real sense on the sex instinct; yet on this basis, which is a hunger of a definite physical kind, there may arise a world of beautiful moral values. Similarly the herd instinct serves as a beginning for that exalted scheme of altruistic ethics which is necessary for any advanced society. In recognizing this it is necessary to bear in mind a very important principle, that the question of origin does not determine value.

(d) *The life of the body has a great determining effect on the life of the mind.*

It is only necessary to mention such well-known facts

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as the following: Injury to certain parts of the brain has definite effect on mental life; simulation of gestures can produce the accompanying emotional states; mental power and fitness depend often on such matters as digestion.¹ The glandular secretions of the body, it is well known, have a powerful effect on mental life.

3. What, it will be asked, is the special advantage of this approach to the study of man? It is hoped that this will appear in the chapters that follow, but here three points may be noted. We may claim, at least, that such a study has the virtue of a very close relation to the practical life. Students of the body cannot entirely avoid speculation, but, for the most part, they walk on terra firma. It makes no difference, for our purpose, if we are told that what we regard as stationary matter is not stationary but a vortex of whirling energy; the body has an immediate and practical claim on our attention. Then our study may do something to restore the body to its rightful place in the scheme of personality, a place from which a deep indebtedness to Platonism in the Christian thought of the centuries seems to have ousted it. Finally, we shall see that the modern approach to the study of man is biological, and it is of lasting importance to relate this biological approach to the Biblical doctrine.

Before we proceed to the doctrine of the body as suggested in the Old and New Testaments, we may pass in rapid review some typical views which have characterized early literature.

¹ For further illustration see J. A. Hadfield's essay on "The Mind and the Brain" in *Immortality* (Streeter).

II

EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF THE BODY

1. IT has been usual to classify the earliest forms of religious thought under the general term Animism, the belief in the existence of spiritual beings. But whether we begin here, or seek a still earlier stage in the history of religion where a vague awe of the supernatural prevailed without any attempt to attribute souls to things or personify the elements in nature,¹ we find that where primitive man was interested in his person, that person meant primarily his body.

This is not surprising, for the body is certainly the most obvious thing about us. We cannot ignore it, and the satisfaction of its varied needs demands so much of our attention in modern as in ancient times. The primitive man was not accustomed to make that sharp distinction between soul and body which has become familiar in more advanced thought. It did not take much reflection on his part to convince primitive man that he possessed powers of limbs and organs. Without any idea of the science of optics he knew the value of clear sight; ignorant of the workings of the nervous system, he knew the value of quick action and prompt response to an ever-changing environment. In that comparatively undeveloped stage of social order everything depended on physical soundness. Life's chief prizes were for him who was physically fit and able, for him who (to take examples from a later age) had the stature of a Saul or the muscular strength of a Samson.

Primitive man, in spite of his ignorance of physiology, knew the importance of his body. His body was himself. This is not to say, however, that the body was the only thing he knew. He was observant enough to realize that there is a great difference between a dead body and a living one, and he could not ignore the shapes which he

¹ See R. R. Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, Preface, viii. cf. ch. 1. Cf. W. B. Selbie, *Psychology of Religion*, 28 f.

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often saw in dreams, mysterious and illusive. It was from such observation and such experiences that he began to think of something else in addition to the body which he could see and touch . . . and thus we have the beginnings of the idea of the ghost-soul.

It is incorrect to say that primitive thought regarded the ghost-soul as "spiritual". It was often identified with the breath or the blood. Among the Tongans it was regarded as the finer or more aeriform part of the body, while Greenland seers described it as pale and soft, yet having neither flesh nor bone.¹ Tylor concludes that among primitive races the original conception of the soul was that of etheriality or vaporous materiality.² Further evidence of the importance of material conceptions is seen in the close connection which existed for the primitive thinker between body and soul. Mutilation of the body, for example, was supposed to affect the soul in a corresponding way. There was also a tendency to localize the soul, the Tongans placing it in the heart, while Indians of Guiana considered it to reside in the eye.³ Moreover, physical organs were often credited with psychic powers: "There can be few organs of the body which have not received at some time and among some social group or other credit for psychical activities."⁴ We shall find that many of these Animistic ideas recur in later thought; here it is sufficient to note that in the earliest times of which we have knowledge it was the idea of the body that was prominent, extending its influence even into the first dim conceptions of psychic life.

2. In the more developed thought of Egypt we find an emphasis which is mainly physiological. Much attention has been paid to funeral ritual in Egyptian literature, and nowhere do we find greater prominence given to the life beyond the grave. In this connection the elaborate funeral practices suggest that the future life was thought of under material conceptions. Detailed provision was

¹ E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 6th ed., i. 424.

² *Ibid.*, 457.

³ H. Wheeler Robinson, *E.R.E.*, ii. 755.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 431.

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made for this mysterious life, and sometimes legacies were specifically arranged for the purpose of securing the dead against hunger, thirst, and cold.¹ Breasted has ventured the interesting suggestion that in Egypt the conditions of soil and climate resulted in a remarkable preservation of the body such as is nowhere else found under natural conditions, and that in this we may find one of the reasons for the strong belief in man's continued existence after death.² This bodily nature of the life after death is only in keeping with the general Egyptian view of personality in this life. "What we understand by the body was to the Egyptian simply the last and the heaviest of the material coverings which together form a human being . . . the flesh was neither of a different nature nor of a different texture from the other elements contained within and completing the person."³ A human being was regarded as composed of many elements such as the *ka* or double, the *baibit* or shadow, the *khu* or ghost . . . all different kinds of bodies. As Egyptian thought developed many of these numerous constituents of personality were eliminated, but it is clear that the person was never dissociated from the bodily organs as instruments or vehicles of sensation. Personality was not conceived without the body. Even the *ba*, or soul, was material enough for the dread gods to catch it and feed upon it.⁴

3. In contrast with the Egyptian view we find in Indian thought an emphasis which is mainly spiritualistic, and this in spite of the fact that the subject of anatomy was treated at great length in the medical literature of ancient India. A recent writer on the subject of Indian philosophy declares: "If we can abstract from the variety of opinion and observe the general spirit of Indian thought, we shall find that it has a disposition to interpret life and nature in the way of monistic idealism, though this tendency is so plastic, living, and manifold, that it takes many forms and expresses itself in even mutually

¹ Steindorff, *Religion of Ancient Egypt*, Lects. iv. v.

² *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, Lect. ii. 49.

³ G. Foucart, *E.R.E.*, ii. 763 f.

⁴ Foucart, *op. cit.*

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hostile teachings.”¹ Early Indian views have an Animistic colouring, while the doctrine known as Lokayata is purely materialistic, but the conceptions which found an enduring place in the speculative systems of India emphasized the soul at the expense of the body. In the Upanishads, personality embraces a series of refinements from the outer flesh to the inner core of pure consciousness. On this view it is incorrect to say that the soul is in the body: on the contrary, the body is in the soul, as a lesser force in the greater. Body is really a limitation of soul, a view which found expression in that asceticism which has nowhere been so highly elaborated as in India.² This attitude to the body is not characteristic of every stage of Indian thought; in earlier times it was possible to speak of the body as “the city of Brahman”, and in spite of much in Buddhism which is deeply ascetic, we cannot forget that Gautama taught that the body is to be cared for; ³ yet the philosophic development tended more and more to eliminate the body from its conception of personality, issuing ultimately in the doctrine of the immanence of the individual in the cosmic soul.

It is interesting to notice, however, that even in the later systems of philosophy the claims of the body could not be completely overlooked. The doctrine of transmigration, for example, demanded some form of bodily accompaniment for the soul as it migrated from existence to existence. To meet this need Indian thinkers had recourse to the doctrine of the subtle body. To each person were assigned two bodies: an exterior or “gross” body, and an interior or “subtle” body. This latter was invisible, was composed of the subtle parts which form the seeds of the body. It outlived the gross body and accompanied the soul on its journeys. We have here an interesting example of the difficulty, even in a philosophy which was mainly spiritualistic, of conceiving the life of

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Intro. 24.

² Cf. art. “Asceticism” (Buddhist), *E.R.E.*, ii. 69.

³ See art. “Body” (Buddhist), *E.R.E.*, ii. 759. Cf. Rhys Davids, “Compared with the ascetic excesses, as well as with the imaginative and speculative obsessions of the age, the Buddhist standpoint was markedly hygienic” (*E.R.E.*, ii. 71).

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personality without some form of bodily accompaniment.

4. We may close this survey of Ethnic conceptions with a reference to Greek views, important not merely in themselves, but also by reason of their great influence on the development of Christian thought.

(a) In the Homeric poems all the activities of man are possible only when body and soul are united: in the strictest sense they are bodily functions. The spiritual and psychical faculties were localized in the various organs, especially in the diaphragm. It is clear that, at this stage of Greek thought, the body was all-important. "The souls depicted by Homer have dwindled to pale and ineffective shadows."¹ Even the lifeless body is spoken of as the true self,² while it is significant that Homer has no proper term for the living body, *sōma* always denoting dead body.

(b) The religious movements of Orphism and Pythagoreanism present a complete contrast to the Homeric conceptions of personality. Whereas Homer had attributed to the body all the psychical activities of man, reducing the soul to an ineffective shadow, the Orphic sects regarded the soul as of divine origin, uncreated and eternal, and imprisoned in the body as a punishment for sin and for the expiation of its guilt. Pythagoras and his disciples distinguished the soul from the body as something opposed to its nature. During its sojourn in the body the soul has no real organic relation to it. Its ultimate goal is freedom from the body altogether and a return to the realm of pure souls whence it came. Ascetic practices and purificatory rites gave a practical form to this dualistic doctrine.

(c) Plato carried this distinction between soul and body to such a length that his dualism exerted a great influence on all subsequent thought. "The dualistic mode of thought", says Eucken,³ "finds its most magnificent expression in the philosophy of Plato, with its rigid separation of the world of Ideas from the manifold of

¹ Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, i. 33.

² W. Capelle, *E.R.E.*, ii. 769.

³ *E.R.E.*, v. 100.

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sense." The soul had a divine origin and is an individual being.¹ It has a prior existence in the realm of the Ideas, but an "intellectual" fall resulted in its entry into the realm of matter, with a consequent degradation and a liability to degradation. There is a brilliant account of the pre-existence and heavenly origin of the soul in the *Phædrus*.² Originally enjoying a bodiless existence and the vision of eternal truth, beauty, and goodness, the soul while in the body is to be regarded as an exile from its first home among the gods . . . exiled "to a body which darkens its knowledge and clouds its happiness, in which it is enclosed as a prisoner in his cell or a dead man in his grave".³ To realize his true nature the individual must spurn the world of illusion and illusive values by the mortification of the lower nature, the contemplation of beauty,⁴ and by the pursuit of knowledge. Thus for Plato soul and body belong to two different worlds, and the resultant dualism is fundamental in his philosophy.⁵

(d) In the philosophy of Aristotle we note a departure from this dualistic standpoint and a new presentation of the body in its relation to human life. Treating psychology as a branch of physics, he ascribed soul to all organisms which showed power of spontaneous movement and development (*psuche* in Aristotelian thought having a much wider connotation than the word "soul" enjoys in modern usage). He thought of Nature's processes as moving without a break in an ascending scale from the inanimate world to the most intricate form of animate existence.⁶ Bodily and mental developments he thus regarded as parts of one continuous process; the growth of the higher part of personality is but the continuation of that process whereby the physical part comes into

¹ See on this J. Adam, *Cambridge Prelections*. The doctrine of the celestial origin of the soul from Pindar to Plato. In the *Philebus* Plato derives the soul from the soul of the world. In the *Timæus* the human soul comes direct from the Supreme God, page 52 f.

² Jowett's edition of *Dialogues*, 3rd ed. i. 451 f.

³ Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, iii. 11.

⁴ See the *Symposium*.

⁵ See on this Pringle Pattison, *Idea of Immortality*, 62 f.

⁶ See Hammond, *Aristotle's Psychology*, xviii.

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being and enters into development. Soul and body bear a very close relation to each other. We can separate them in thought, but only in thought, for in actual fact they are inseparably connected. How closely they are connected will be seen from Aristotle's examples of their relation. He regarded the soul as the natural realization of the organic body; it is the form of the body. Put in the form of an equation

embryo : body :: body : soul.

As the embryo grows into an organic body, so the body develops into an organism which exhibits the presence of mind. Aristotle illustrates this by saying that if the body were one vast eye, seeing would be its soul. Body and soul are one as the matter and form of a copper globe are one. A dead body is only matter, for it is the soul which not only produces the movements of the organism and determines the particular form the organism is to take, but also is the end for the sake of which the organism exists; it was with this meaning that Aristotle referred to the soul as the efficient, formal, and final cause of the body.

We search in vain in Aristotle for any disparagement of the body such as we have found in Orphic-Pythagorean religious ideas and in Plato. He placed full reliance on the validity of sense-data, regarding the heart as at once the physiological and psychical centre of man,¹ and insisted on the inseparable synthesis of soul and body. "According to Aristotle's dominant mood and his usual form of statement, the idea of a disembodied or discarnate soul seems almost a contradiction in terms."²

(e) Stoicism found its key to the explanation of the universe in the all-pervading and ultimate Fire. The primal Fire converted itself into the four elements, earth, air, fire, and water, and from these were formed the various orders of living beings. Thus there is in the universe an all-pervading principle or cosmic soul, the inherent law of the universe, its vital principle, and the ground of its

¹ For reasons why he located the life centre in the heart, see Hammond, *op. cit.*, xxiii.

² Pringle Pattison, *op. cit.*, 65.

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unity. Every human soul is a fragment of this universal divine force, and is corporeal. We shall meet in Tertullian the Stoic arguments for the corporeal nature of the soul: here it is sufficient to note that Stoicism in general, by its materialistic monism, gave emphasis to corporeal existence.¹

In spite of this we find among the Stoics a definite leaning towards a dualism of soul and body.² Cleanthes and Posidonius echo the Orphic-Pythagorean disparagement of the body. Seneca can say that the soul is bound in a prison house, weighed down by the heavy burden of the body. This scorn of the body is perhaps most pronounced in Epictetus: The body is by nature dead, mere clay and filth: man is a soul carrying a corpse.³ Marcus Aurelius could welcome death because then the soul is released from the body. Later Stoicism showed a strong ascetic tendency. It has often been argued that there is a resemblance between the language of Paul and Seneca on this point, while a recent writer claims that Paul's use of the term "body" and his conception of human nature are purely Stoic.⁴ It will be necessary to bear such claims in mind when we are estimating the Pauline contribution to the study of man.

(f) Neo-Platonism, coming last of the great Greek philosophies, learned from all the preceding schools and stressed metaphysical and religious interests at the expense of that scientific concern with the world which was such a prominent feature in earlier Greek thought. The soul is an immaterial substance, separable from the body, which it produces. There are two aspects in the soul: one aspect is towards the body, the other towards the *Nous* (of which the soul is the image and product). Thus there is a part of the soul for whose functions the co-operation of the body is unnecessary, an idea which we shall find

¹ Lightfoot states that the basis of Stoic theology is gross materialism, more or less relieved by a vague mysticism (S. Paul and Seneca in *Philippians*, 293). Stoic materialism, however, was something different from what we mean by materialism to-day. While God was corporeal, he was also, according to Zeno, absolute Reason. (See Bevan, *Later Greek Religion*, xiii.)

² See on this *E.R.E.*, ii. art. "Body" (Greek and Roman).

³ *Dissertations*, fragment 23.

⁴ Arnold, *E.R.E.*, art. "Stoics".

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reproduced in Eckhart's doctrine of the *funklein*.¹ It is more correct to say that the body is in the soul than that the soul is in the body (cf. the Indian view above). The soul is diffused throughout the body, but remains pure of all admixture with it.

From this summary it will be evident that Neo-Platonism gave to the body a very insignificant place in the order of things. Indeed, matter has no real being. "It is to Plotinus more than to any other philosopher that we owe the first clear doctrine of spiritual existence. . . . Matter is really a bare abstraction: it is the bare receptacle of forms: the subject of energy, viewed by abstraction as subsisting apart from the energy which alone gives it meaning and existence. Plotinus's matter is not material: it is not to be confounded with that ponderable stuff to which science gives the same name . . . Matter is that intangible, impalpable all-but-nothing which remains when we subtract from an object of thought all that makes it a possible object of thought."² In its upward flight the soul must seek purification from all external stains. Marriage and human love Plotinus regarded as chains which bind the soul to the sensuous life. There can be no resurrection of the body. Resurrection is an awakening from the body, not with it.³

The foregoing survey of typical early conceptions of the body in human personality is necessarily rapid and cursory: a full treatment would take us beyond the limits of our inquiry. But sufficient notice has been taken to indicate how varied were the views, ranging from an exaltation of the body to its complete disparagement, and, in Plotinus, to a doctrine of spiritual existence which reduced matter to a mere abstraction. For our present purpose, the main interest of these views lies in their reproduction in the thought of much later ages. It will be interesting, for example, to note traces of the Animistic conceptions in the thought of the Old Testament, while we shall find that the development of Christian ideas was greatly influenced by the prominent Greek views.

¹ *Infra*, p. 118. ² W. R. Inge, art. "Neo-Platonism" in *E.R.E.*, ix. 310.

³ *Enneades*, iii. 6. 6.

PART I

HOW THE BIBLE REGARDS THE BODY

CHAPTER I

THE OLD TESTAMENT CONCEPTION OF THE BODY

INTRODUCTION

THE study of the Hebrew conception of the body does not, at the first approach, possess the fascination of other Old Testament studies. Casual readers of Hebrew literature might be pardoned if they regarded the whole question as coldly scientific, lacking altogether those moral and spiritual associations which make the Bible a living book for all time. But to regard the matter thus is completely to misunderstand the Hebrew point of view. In the first place, the Old Testament is never coldly scientific: we may not fairly apply the term "scientific" either to its physiology or its psychology. The dominant interest throughout is in salvation: the stress of its writers falls on God rather than on man: and whatever references are made to soul or body are, for the most part, popular, and never scientifically or philosophically conceived.¹ Further, it is a mistake to suppose that the Biblical references to the body and its organs have only a physiological meaning. When Ezekiel in his vision saw the valley of dry bones, or when Elisha, to restore life to a dead child, placed his mouth on the child's mouth and his hands on the child's hands, there is a meaning implied which takes us farther than the "material"; passages such as these, concerned as they are with the body, carry us to a realm where life, in its rich spiritual content, is conceived as having a close relation to the affairs of the flesh. We may begin with a study of the body, but our venture will carry us to a point which yields us more than physiological results; it carries us to the central mystery of personality itself. We shall find that Hebrew thought, like primitive thought in general, saw in the body and its powers an important and fruitful

¹ Cf. Laidlaw, *Biblical Doctrine of Man*, 51.

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approach to the understanding of the full rich life of man. We shall discover that the Hebrew conception is that man is an animated body rather than an incarnate soul.¹ The physical is invested with spiritual power and meaning, though we must beware of giving to "physical" and "spiritual" their developed and rather dualistic connotation of modern usage.

I. THE TERMS

About eighty different parts of the body are mentioned in the Old Testament, but there are several omissions. There is no specific term for "body", Hebrew thought being concerned more with the substance (*bāsār*, flesh) than with its actual form. Nor is there any term for nerve,² diaphragm, lung, or brain.³ Although the blood plays an important part in Hebrew conceptions of life, there is no term for blood vessel, and, of course, no idea of the circulation of the blood such as is familiar to modern physiology. From these omissions we may make two inferences: Hebrew thought did not centralize consciousness in the head,⁴ and it did not connect the peripheral with the central organs of the body.

Far more important than these omissions is the wide use of *bāsār* (flesh), *rechēm* (womb), *caṣāmoṭh* (bones), *lēb lēbāb* (heart), and *dām* (blood).

The great majority of the occurrences of "flesh" have a purely physical reference, but there are about forty-five cases⁵ where the meaning is more or less psychical. "Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one

¹ See on this point H. Wheeler Robinson's various contributions to the study of Hebrew Psychology. He points out (*People and the Book*, 355) that *nepheš* can actually mean "corpse", a curious and late use which suggests that the body is the predominant partner in personality.

² "If any nerve was conspicuous enough to be noticed, it was classed with the sinews and tendons, in accordance with the general opinion of the ancient world" (Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 12).

³ "Perhaps the physical substance of the brain was known in Hebrew, as it is in Syriac, as 'the marrow of the head'," *ibid.*

⁴ Primitive thought naturally regarded the heart as the centre of physical life, as in 1 Sam. xxv. 37.

⁵ Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 24.

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flesh" (Gen. ii. 24) suggests the meaning "kinship", and Burton has pointed out that "flesh" and "bones" are often used together in this connection. He suggests that this use sprang from the fact that it is the body which was thought of as primarily producing and produced by natural generation, as in Gen. xxix. 14. "And Laban said unto him, Surely thou art my bone and my flesh."¹ Gathering together various uses of the word, we find that the "flesh" is represented as sensitive, warm with life, suffering, shuddering, fearing, weary, confident, longing, rejoicing, sinning.² There is a group of cases where the word is used of man in contrast with God or Spirit, to emphasize man's frailty, dependence, or incapacity. So "All flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field: the grass withereth, the flower fadeth" (Isa. lx. 6, 7).³ It is quite clear from these uses that the meaning of "flesh" is sometimes much more than physical, but we must beware of reading into the idea of weakness of the flesh any conception of moral evil. There is no ground for the view that Hebrew thought opposed the soul and the flesh in an ethical dualism. The contrast between frail flesh and the might and goodness of God does not appear before Isa. xxxi. 3, and on some occasions the frailty of the flesh is offered as an explanation or an excuse for human imperfection. So Eliphaz cries

Shall mortal man be more just than God?
 Shall a man be more pure than his Maker?
 Behold, he putteth no trust in his servants:
 And his angels he chargeth with folly;
 How much more them that dwell in houses of clay,
 Whose foundation is in the dust,
 Which are crushed before the moth! (Job iv. 17 f.)

Such explanation or excuse would not be consistent with the idea that the flesh is essentially evil.⁴

¹ E. D. Burton, *Spirit, Soul, and Flesh*, 68 f.

² Job ii. 5, 2 Kings iv. 34, Eccles. xi. 10, Psa. cxix. 120, Eccles. xii. 12, Psa. xvi. 9, Psa. lxxiii. 2, Psa. lxxxiv. 3, Eccles. v. 5. Cf. Wheeler Robinson, *ibid.*

³ Cf. Job x. 4, Jer. xvii. 5.

⁴ See Wheeler Robinson, *op. cit.* Cf. Burton, *op. cit.* Cf. art. "Body in Jewish Thought", in *Jewish Encyclopædia*, iii. 283 f.

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In view of its physiological importance it is natural that the Old Testament should pay special attention to "womb", but certain passages indicate that the womb has an importance which is not merely physical. The wife of Manoah is told that her son Samson shall be a Nazirite from the womb (Judges xiii. 5). It is there that life begins. Job cries, "Did not he that made me in the womb make him, And did not one fashion us in the womb?" (xxxix. 15). "The only stages preparatory to life are the three named in Hos. ix. 11, namely, conception, pregnancy, and delivery."¹ Life not only begins, but may also take its direction there. God says to Jeremiah, "Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee, and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee: I have appointed thee a prophet unto the nations" (Jer. i. 5). The physiological processes of birth are brought into close relation with the workings of the Divine Spirit.

Oesterley has drawn special attention to the Old Testament emphasis on "bones". "Bones and flesh", he says, as a phrase, was often used to express kinship, just as we say "flesh and blood". He suggests that there are passages where "bones" as a term is synonymous with man, and that not merely physically, but as identified with the whole personality. Passages adduced are the account of Eve's creation, where the woman is made out of Adam's bones, and Ps. xxxv. 10, "All my bones shall say, Lord who is like unto thee?"² From certain passages we infer that great attention was paid to the burial of bones;³ Oesterley suggests that the reason for this lay in the current belief that life resided in bones long after death, and even permanently. Wheeler Robinson points out that the ascription of sensation to bones is not a mere figure, but springs from the definite idea of their inherent vitality, and of the quasi-consciousness diffused through them and the whole body.⁴

This extension of meaning from the physical to the

¹ Wheeler Robinson, *op. cit.*, 14.

² *Immortality and the Unseen World*, 20 f.

³ Gen. i. 25, 1 Sam. xxxi. 13.

⁴ *E.R.E.*, art. "Bones", ii. 791. Wheeler Robinson instances cases in other languages where bone and soul are etymologically related.

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psychical realm is still more clearly shown in the case of the term "heart". In addition to the physical and figurative uses of the word, "in the midst" (Jonah ii. 3), we find numerous references which indicate various states of consciousness and mental activity. Thus the heart can rejoice (Judges xviii. 20), sorrow (1 Sam. i. 8), show anxiety (1 Sam. iv. 13), courage (Psa. xxxi. 24), fear (Gen. xlii. 28), or love (2 Sam. xiv. 1). It is capable of attention (Exod. vii. 23) reflection (Deut. vii. 17), memory (Deut. iv. 9), understanding (1 Kings iii. 9), and technical skill (Exod. xxviii. 3). Nearly two hundred times it is used to express volition or purpose: "O Lord", prayed David, "give unto Solomon my son a perfect heart, to keep thy commandments" (1 Chron. xxix. 19, cf. 2 Chron. xii. 14, Psa. x. 17). The *Oxford Hebrew Lexicon* gives, as the main translations of *lēbāb*, inner man, mind, will. Many of the shades of meaning given above are common enough in our modern speech: the point to notice is that whereas we only apply such meanings to "heart" in a figurative sense, the Hebrew actually regarded the heart as the seat of personality, inner life, and character. It was not, for him, a figurative use of a well-known term: it was the actual crediting of a physical organism with psychical powers.

A similar tendency is seen in regard to the use of the term "blood". Like primitive thinkers in general, the early Hebrew writers gave to blood a significance far greater than that attaching to a vital fluid. The dependence of life on the blood, whether in the body of animal or man, was so obvious that it was a natural step to the view that the blood and the life are closely connected. Homer could speak of the soul or the blood passing away through an inflicted wound,¹ and even Empedocles could regard the blood as the seat of thought or perception.² In the Old Testament the word is used mainly with a religious significance, finding its chief reference in the

¹ *Iliad*, xiv. 518; *Iliad*, xvii. 86.

² Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 288. Empedocles held that all things have their share of thought, and knowledge varies with the varying constitution of our bodies.

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idea of sacrifice. We have the distinct statement in Deut. xii. 23 that the blood is the life . . . "Only be sure that thou eat not the blood, for the blood is the life, and thou shalt not eat the life with the flesh."¹ In primitive thought the importance of the blood is seen, further, in the conception of blood as perilous and powerful, in the practice of blood-covenants, blood-revenge, and the sacrificial ritual of organized religion.²

There are a few remaining terms, less important perhaps than those already noted, but still strengthening the conviction to which this survey of Old Testament words has carried us. "Liver" (*kābēd*) is used twice as, a general life-centre of consciousness (Lam. ii. 11, Prov. vii. 23). "Kidneys" (*kelāyoth*) can show joy (Prov. xxiii. 16), discontent (Psa. lxiii. 21), impulse towards right action (Psa. xvi. 7), and desire (Job xix. 27). "Bowels" (*mē'im*) can refer to sexual love (Song of Sol. v. 4), religious affection (Psa. xl. 9), compassion, and pity (Isa. xvi. 11, Jer. xxxi. 20) and distress (Lam. i. 20).³

We have already referred to Elisha's action in his endeavour to restore a dead child to life. When he placed his eyes on the boy's eyes, his mouth on the boy's mouth, his hands on the boy's hands, he was giving practical expression to the view that the life of the various organs could be imparted by such local contact. That this view was held among the Hebrews is shown, for example, by Old Testament references to the eye. This organ could be spoken of as unsatisfied (Prov. xxvii. 20), mocking (Prov. xxx. 17), testifying (Job xxix. 11), covenanting (Job xxxi. 1), proud (Psa. cxxxi. 1), pure (Hab. i. 13), evil (Prov. xxvi. 6), and so on. "It was for the Hebrew an element of personality with psychical and moral life of its own, not a mere condition of sensation and instrument of perception, as with us."⁴

Gathering together the results of the inquiry, we are justified in drawing certain conclusions: (a) If the Hebrew

¹ Cf. Lev. xvii. 14, Gen. iv. 10.

² On this see Wheeler Robinson, in *E.R.E.*, ii. 714 f.

³ Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 23.

⁴ Wheeler Robinson.

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thinker desired to approach the problem of human life, there were various avenues open to him, and of these the approach suggested by the place and function of the body was extremely important. We have already seen that in certain passages there is an identification of the life with the blood; similarly, and in a manner natural to primitive thought, there is an identification of the soul with the breath. This is clear from the Old Testament usage of the terms *nesāmāh* and *nephesh*.¹ The breath, which seemed to mark the difference between a living person and a dead one, which animated the members, enabling them to perform their normal functions, came to be regarded as the centre of conscious life also. The same power which enabled a man to run about, lift his arm, perform the ordinary function of the body, enabled him also to think and pray, was the centre of his emotional and volitional life. At this early stage of reflection we cannot expect to find abstract and philosophical ideas of the soul: the simpler and more obvious explanation is given, that man becomes a living soul because of the breath which has been breathed into his body. There was a further, and even more interesting, way of explanation open to the Hebrew. All through the development of Hebrew literature the word *ruach*² retained its original meaning, "wind", but in the later books we find it applied to the spirit of man, to his soul. The particular value of this term is its reference to the activity of God in the human life. Even when (after the Exile) it comes to be used of the breath-soul in man, it retains this higher association. Just as the Animistic stage of thought reveals the idea of man as open to the influence of demonic agencies, so in the later Hebrew thought we find the same idea, with the important difference that the Spirit of God takes the place of the demonic forces. The Hebrew, then, could regard his life in many ways. He could think of it as animated by the breath, or, in his nobler moments, as inspired by the Divine Spirit, or,

¹ For the main uses of these terms see Burton, *op. cit.*

² Burton, *ibid.*, 53 f.

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to give the third line of approach, he could think of his bodily organs as possessing powers much higher than those of the physical life. The body itself possessed psychical powers, as we have seen above. The conclusion to be drawn is that the Hebrew mind was rich in its variety of approach to the problem of personality: along one or other of the various avenues an explanation might be found. It would be too much to expect any systematic relation of these various explanations in such an early stage of reflection. All the ways were open, and the point to be noticed here is that it was the body which provided one very important approach to the solution of the problem.

(b) Such a view as this gave to the body and its members an added dignity. The relation between body and soul in Hebrew thought is a question which will call for careful examination at a later stage of our inquiry: so far, we may conclude, we have not found any disparagement of the body which might suggest the dualism of Platonic thought. The mind of the Hebrew was ever turned God-wards. It was to God he had to turn to explain the world and himself, and he could never forget that though his body might lose its strength or prove to be frail and weak, yet it was the gift of God to him. He was made in the image of God, and his exalted views both of soul and body were the natural outcome of his belief in such a great origin.

2. HEBREW IDEAS OF LIFE AND DEATH

From the study of terms we pass to an examination of the Hebrew attitude to human experiences. At every stage the question of the body is forced upon us, from the story of the Creation in its majestic grandeur to the dim forebodings and tentative speculations concerning the life beyond the grave. Whether life is coming into being or ebbing away, there is always the body to be considered; whence comes it, and what happens to it when the breath has departed, leaving it cold and forbidding? We must

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not expect to find in the Old Testament the scientific attitude either of the obstetrician or the undertaker. In all religious literature life, in its beginnings and endings, is seen to be a thing of mystery, and writers find their way more easily into poetry than into prose. For the Hebrew everything pointed back to God: all experience had a religious significance. In the mystery of Creation there is revealed the goodness and the power of God; in the gloom and disappointment of death there emerges the hope, sometimes faint, sometimes stronger, that the God who sustains our being will see that things are right on the Other Side.

(a) *Creation*.—All things were divinely created. According to Gen. ii. 7 man is made up of two constituents, both owing their existence to God. Thus the clay¹ is fashioned, and man becomes a living *nephesh* by the inbreathing of God. The first man is a product of two factors, the clay and the vital principle within the body, i.e. the breath of God. There is no room in this narrative for the theory of pre-existence.² Outside the Canon there are traces of the idea, while in later Judaism the doctrine came to be developed (due to Persian and Greek influences),³ but it is clear that early Hebrew thought was not acutely concerned with origins: it was enough that man, as a synthesis of two factors, owed his being to God, and both factors were honourable as due for their existence to God. There is no idea here of the body as something unfortunately assumed by the soul (as in Greek thought). Man is a body which is animated by the breath from God. In the case of each individual, birth is a miracle of creation due to God, and the stages are conception, pregnancy, and delivery.⁴ As yet there is no taint attaching to physical generation as such.

(b) *The normal activity of personality*.—How did this inbreathed vital principle operate in the life of man? Our

¹ From v. 6 we infer that the dust had become moistened. So Bennett in *Century Bible*, T. H. Robinson in *Genesis in Colloquial English* renders "earth".

² See Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, 145.

³ E.g. Wisdom, viii. 19, xv. 8; Slav Enoch, xxiii. 5.

⁴ So Hos. ix. ii. Cf. Psa. cxxxix. 13-16.

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study of the Hebrew term *lēb* has prepared us for the idea (which Hebrew thinkers shared with many others) that the heart is the centre of conscious life. But each separate organ contained its own vitality, and could impart that vitality in physical contact.¹ This diffusion of consciousness is characteristic of Hebrew thought, and we shall find it carried over into the New Testament, and catch echoes of it in the Patristic development. This view lacks the value possessed by our modern conception of the nervous system, centred in the brain: but it does ennoble the various bodily members by investing them all with a power which is more than physical.

(c) *Death*.—Modern thought treats of death from the purely physiological point of view, as part of “the organic cycle of growth and decay which links birth and death together as equally natural incidents in a single process”.² From the Hebrew point of view death had a religious significance. Hebrew writers could have no sympathy with such views as that underlying Byron’s phrase “Heaven gives its favourites early death”. Death in the prime of life, or at an early age, or under distressing circumstances, was regarded as an act of God. Among many primitive peoples the idea was current that death was unnatural:³ perhaps there are traces of such a view in the Old Testament,⁴ and we certainly find it later in Biblical and in the Patristic development, when the phenomenon of death had become interwoven with theological conceptions. However this may be, it is clear that for the Hebrew, death as a melancholy fact of experience was the separation of the two factors which together make up personality. The process of dying is described in two ways: as the pouring

¹ 2 Kings iv. 34.

² Pringle Pattison, *Idea of Immortality*, 5.

³ This is shown by Sir James Frazer, *Belief in Immortality*, 55.

⁴ Oesterley compares the Old Testament story of the Garden of Eden with Babylonian parallels, and concludes that the emphasis on the tree of life suggests that death was regarded as abnormal. “Death is not thought of, and therefore not mentioned, until an abnormal state of affairs has been brought about through the instrumentality of the serpent: so that it is evident that immortality, and not the existence of death, was regarded as man’s normal state” (*Immortality and the Unseen World*, 195 f.).

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out of the blood (Deut. xii. 23, 24), and as the going out of the *nephesh* (Gen. xxxv. 18; Jer. xv. 9). What remains when the *nephesh* has left the body is neither body nor soul, an indication that both factors are needed in a unity of operation before we can speak of real life in personality.

(d) *Life beyond Death*.—Hebrew literature presents a very fruitful field of study in regard to conceptions of life after death. In addition to the well-known conceptions of *Sheol*, resurrection, and suggestions of the idea of immortality, there are certain customs connected with death which throw a clear light on the Hebrew attitude to the body. These we may take first. Noteworthy in the Old Testament is the general horror of cremation. Such a treatment of the dead body was reserved for criminals of the worst type.¹ Amos shows the hatefulness of the idea to the Hebrew . . . the burning of the bones of the king of Edom calls forth on Edom an inevitable doom.² In 1 Sam. xxxi. 12 we read that the men of Jabesh Gilead burned the bodies of Saul and his sons. In 1 Chron. x. 12, however, we note that the account of the burning is omitted, while according to Josephus, the bodies were buried. May we not infer from this that to later Judaism cremation was abhorrent? Possibly here we have a vague undefined idea that the soul was connected with the body even after death. A second point of interest is the great fear among the Hebrews of an unburied corpse. It is regarded as one great punishment of the wicked that they will have no one to bury them.³ Great care was taken in the burial of the dead.⁴ Further, there are suggestions that in primitive Hebrew times provision was made for the dead. It is true that there is little definite reference to this in the Old Testament; Deut. xxvi. 14 may suggest that food, etc., was provided for the departed. "I have not eaten thereof in my mourning, neither have I put away thereof being unclean, nor given thereof for the dead".⁵

¹ Lev. xx. 14, xxi. 9; Joshua vii. 25.

² Amos ii. 1.

³ Jer. xiv. 6, 2 Kings ix. 10, Ezek. xxix. 5.

⁴ See *E.R.E.*, iv. 498.

⁵ The exact sense of this passage, says Driver (*J.C.C. Deut.*, 291 f.) is uncertain. The last part may be rendered "for the dead" or "to the dead". In the latter case the passage would support the idea of material provision for the departed.

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But outside the Canon there are references which appear to suggest material provision for the dead. So Tobit iv. 17: "Pour out thy bread and thy wine on the tomb of the just".¹ The idea appears to be ridiculed in Sirach, xxxix. 18 f., but we find confirmation for our view in the fact that excavations in Palestine have revealed food and vessels in the tombs.² In the same connection we may mention the accounts of the translation of Enoch and Elijah. Oesterley regards it as conceivable that here we have a faint recollection of an early belief that even the body itself continued to live indefinitely, at least in special cases.³

Sheol.⁴—The Hebrews thought of *sheol* as the abode of the departed under the earth. Death, as we have seen, separates the two factors which compose personality, but the inhabitants of this gloomy underworld are neither souls nor bodies, but shades (*rephaim*).⁵ The life of these beings is pale and colourless; their relation with the world of the living and also with God is broken; they inhabit a realm where there is no distinction of good and evil. There are, however, certain strands of teaching in the Old Testament which do not appear to harmonize with this view. Traces of necromancy⁶ and possibly ancestor worship⁷ connote activities on the part of the shades which are not quite consistent with the description of *Sheol* already given. We are probably to think, therefore, of an older and more popular belief which gave to the departed in *Sheol* an activity greater than that which they had enjoyed on earth. The *rephaim* could be consulted for help and counsel, could come back and hover round the grave. Oesterley thinks that some of the mourning

¹ Cf. "Acceptable is a gift to every living man, and also from the dead withhold not kindness", Wisdom of Ben Sirach (commonly called Ecclesiasticus) vii. 33.

² See Vincent Canaan d' après l'exploration récente, 207 f., and Palestine Exploration Fund, *Quarterly Statement*, 1902, 4. 5. ³ Op. cit., 199.

⁴ Root meaning doubtful, place of inquiry, or place of hollowness or emptiness. For references see *Oxford Heb. Lex.*, 982.

⁵ Job. xxvi. 5.

⁶ See H. P. Smith, *Religion of Israel*, ch. 2.

⁷ Maintained by Smith, *ibid.*, and R. H. Charles, *Encl. Bib.*, 1335 f., but disputed by Kautzsch (*H.D.B.*).

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customs could be reconciled only with this earlier view.¹ It is not unusual to note, in any primitive religion, the persistence of older with more advanced views. Probably the older view of *Sheol* was modified by the growth of Yahweh worship, with which the ideas of necromancy were felt to be inconsistent.

But however we may regard this life in *Sheol*, it is so gloomy and hopeless that we may wonder why the Hebrews were content with it for so long. The reason is that their hopes lay in the future of the family and the nation, a future to be realized on earth. It was only with the failure of national expectations, and the gradual emergence of the idea that the individual was important, that brighter views of the future came to an expression. Such views, when they did emerge, took the form of the doctrine of bodily resurrection, rather than the more spiritual conception of the immortality of the soul.

Immortality.—Although we cannot speak of a general belief in immortality of the soul, there are Old Testament references which must be regarded as glimpses of faith, individual attempts to pierce the veil. Such strivings and yearnings are found in Psa. xvi, xlix, lxxiii, and Job xiv. 14 f. We may quote Burney's rendering of Psa. lxxiii. 23 f.

Yet I am continually with Thee:
Thou holdest my right hand.
Thou shalt guide me with Thy counsel,
And afterward shalt take me with glory.
Whom have I in heaven?
And having Thee there is nought that I desire upon earth.
Though my flesh and my heart should have wasted away,
God would be the Rock of my heart and my Portion for ever.

Burney regards the last verse as "perhaps the highest venture of faith contained in the pages of the Old Testament".² It is interesting to notice that the idea of communion with God, to which this passage rises, has so

¹ H. P. Smith regards these as survivals from the animistic stage, and suggests that the demonic nature of the spirits has left its mark on Deuteronomic prohibitions like Deut. xiv. 1, Lev. xix. 16 f., and on positive regulations like Num. xix.

² *Outlines of Old Testament Theology*, 128 f.

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impressed a recent philosophical writer, that he remarks "we may find . . . that this is the only fruitful way of approaching the question of immortality".¹

Resurrection.—For the characteristic Hebrew idea of the future life we turn to the doctrine of the resurrection. "If the Hebrew was to acquire any idea of life after death which possessed a real vitality, according to his native conceptions of life, there would have to be a resurrection of the dead body for the recovered soul to animate it."² In the Old Testament itself there is but a bare hint of such resurrection, but, as we shall see, Palestinian Judaism developed the idea and often vividly expressed it. The Old Testament passages are both connected with the Messianic hope of Judaism (Isa. xxvi. 19 f.):

Thy dead shall live,
Their corpses shall arise;
They that dwell in the dust shall awake and give a ringing cry.
For the dew of (lights?) is thy dew
And the earth shall give birth to shades.³

The Jews who have died will not share the common lot of man, but will rise from their graves: not as the spirits of the dead, but bodily, to resume with gladness life in the vast new territory of the Jews. The resurrection is to be limited to Jews and to be realized in Palestine. Buchanan Gray remarks: "This remarkable expression of what must have been already a well-defined and clear belief in a bodily resurrection of Jews who had died before the New Age began forms an abrupt but effective close to the poem," and suggests that we are dealing here with an idea well established in the circle to which the writer belonged, though not necessarily, nor probably, throughout the entire nation.⁴ The other passage is in Dan. xii. 2: "Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to reproaches and everlasting abhorrence." This goes beyond the

¹ Pringle Pattison, *Idea of Immortality*, 19.

² Wheeler Robinson, *Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*, 97.

³ Buchanan Gray, *I.C.C. Isa.* 446.

⁴ *Ibid.*

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former passage in allowing a resurrection to the wicked, but both agree in the idea of a bodily resurrection.

3. THE BODY AND PERSONALITY

Gathering together the various suggestions which have emerged in our survey of terms and ideas, we may fairly say that the Old Testament has a very important contribution to make to our understanding of human personality. It takes a conspicuous place in early literature both on account of what it emphasizes and what it avoids. It takes account of man's essential spiritual nature without becoming entangled in the metaphysical speculations which were characteristic of Indian thought. It gives to physical considerations an important place without becoming merely physiological, as was the case with so much Egyptian thought on the subject. Both aspects were safeguarded because the Hebrew was so conscious of the reality of God. Both in spirit and body he was linked to God, in whose hand both Nature and human life are held, and by whose power they follow their appointed courses.

(a) There is an ennoblement of the body which has never been excelled in any religious literature. From his reverent thoughts about the beginning of life, to his hopes and yearnings for the life that is to come, the Hebrew was always conscious that his physical frame was a very real part of himself. Without it, he could not think of life at all. Others might spurn the body, and blame it for the evils which attend human life; he conceived it to be his solemn duty to preserve it from defilement. How meticulously and carefully this was done is seen from the detailed injunctions in the Old Testament.¹ Later Jewish thought and practice continued this respectful attention to the body. The marvellous construction of the human frame was regarded as evidence of the Creator's wisdom. The authorized daily Prayer Book of the Hebrew congregations of the British Empire contains

¹ E.g. the Levitical Code.

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a benediction, recited daily in morning prayers and after the normal functions of the body: "Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who hast formed man in wisdom and created in him many orifices and vessels. It is revealed and known before the throne of Thy glory that if one of these be opened, or one of those be closed, it would be impossible to exist and to stand before Thee. Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who healest all flesh and doest wondrously." A little earlier in the same liturgy occurs the benediction, "Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who hast sanctified us by Thy commandments, and given us commands concerning the washing of hands".¹ This illustrates the Hebrew emphasis on bodily cleanliness. From the middle of the second century A.D. hand-washing before meals became general, while special communal baths have always been provided in Jewish settlements.² Rabbinic thought regarded it as a religious duty to provide food, drink, and dress in proper quantity and becoming style,³ while even after death the body was regarded as demanding most respectful treatment. From these illustrative ideas it will be seen how far Jewish religious thought has always been from a disparagement of the body. A keen appreciation of physical beauty⁴ is evident in Rabbinic literature. Although in Reform Judaism some of the earlier Hebrew conceptions have been abandoned (such as the doctrine of the resurrection of the body), care is taken to avoid any idea of the inherent sinfulness of the flesh. "The catechisms and prayer books of the modern synagogue teach that the body is intended by the Creator to be the servant of the immortal soul, and, as such, it is not congenitally depraved."⁵ This appears from such a passage as the following: "This very body . . . woven of dust . . . Thou hast dignified to be a dwelling place of Thine, a minister unto Thy Spirit. Even it issued pure

¹ Singer's translation, 9th ed. Cf. the dietary restrictions and prescribed ablutions in the *Law of Holiness*.

² Cf. I. Abrahams, *E.R.E.*, ii. 772 f.

³ *Jewish Encyclopædia*, iii. 283 f.

⁴ E.g. the stature of Judas Maccabæus was glorified, and mediæval Hebrew poetry contains many eulogies of physical beauty.

⁵ *Jew. Encl.*, iii. 283 f.

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from Thine hand. Thou hast implanted in it the capacity for sin, but not sin itself".¹ This genial attitude to the physical life is seen in present-day Judaism, which refuses to regard marriage as evil and does not approve of asceticism.² The importance of this attitude to the flesh will appear below in our examination of the Pauline doctrine.

(b) Further, it is important to notice that the personality, in which body plays such an important part, is to be regarded as a unity. In popular speech we are apt to refer to body, soul, and spirit as if they were three distinct elements in man: this popular conception has taken definite form in the theory of trichotomy.³ This theory is based upon the idea that body, soul, and spirit represent three distinct parts of man, but it is impossible to adopt this view without doing violence to Hebrew usage.⁴ The terms *nephesh* and *ruach* represent different aspects of the same personality. If we trace them back to the animistic ideas of which they are developments, we find that soul (*nephesh*) connotes the inner side of man as it exists as the principle of life animating the body; *ruach* (spirit) connotes the inner side of man regarded as divinely inspired and sustained. Man has not a soul and a spirit, but an inner spiritual nature which may be looked at from two different angles. This reduces the elements in human nature to two, body and soul-spirit. These two, however, are not to be regarded as ultimately antagonistic. There is as little justification for a strictly dichotomous as for a trichotomous view of human nature according to Hebrew thought. Soul is not set

¹ David Einhorn's Prayer Book, 2nd English ed., 1896, part ii. 207.

² See E.R.E., "Judaism", vii. 607. No Rabbi may be a celibate.

³ So J. T. Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 38. J. B. Heard, *Tripartite Nature of Man*, 10.

⁴ *Ruach* is not used with a psychical connotation in any pre-Exilic passage, nor of the breath-soul in man in any pre-Exilic passage. From the earliest period of the Old Testament, *nephesh* is a psychological and vital term, whereas *ruach* is never in the earlier period hypostatized save in reference to God. There is a parallelism of meaning in post-Exilic writings (e.g. Isa. xxvi. 9), but in the parallelism we can detect difference of emphasis. *Nephesh* often connotes the emotional side of human personality, *ruach* the intellectual and volitional. The main reference of *ruach* is Godward, denoting personality as open to the influence of the Divine Spirit.

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over against body in final antagonism, as so many Greek thinkers were fond of asserting. It is true, as we have seen, that the Old Testament sometimes speaks of the body as weak, but even this does not occur until later Hebrew times, and it is a mistake to read ethical dualism in the Hebrew attitude to man. It is to the body as organized in the womb that the soul comes, while the completeness of the future life demands the resurrection of the body that the whole man may be restored. "From this first great text (Gen. ii. 7) which describes man's original constitution, through those passages which speak of his dominion over earth and the creatures, in all those which represent work done through the agency of the body as divine service and human victory, onward to those which represent the redemption of the body as the climax of salvation, it is evident that the Bible system of religion is based upon the unity of man's nature."¹ "Man's body was of the dust, whilst the breath of God was the principle of life within him: but man himself was the single product of these two factors."² In a picturesque way this unity is expressed in the parable of the Blind and the Lame. A human king had a fine garden in which were some fine early figs. He set in it two watchmen, one lame and the other blind. Said the lame man to the blind: "I see some fine figs: carry me on your shoulders and we will get the fruit and eat it." After a time the owner of the garden came and asked after his figs. The lame man protested that he could not walk, the blind that he could not see. So the master put the lame man on the blind man's back and judged them both together. So God brings the soul and casts it in the body (after death) and judges them together.³

(c) It has often been observed that the Hebrews related their being and their powers to God. We may note here a special aspect of this God-ward relationship which provides an important and characteristic Old Testa-

¹ Laidlaw, *Biblical Doctrine of Man*, 57 f.

² F. C. Porter, *Yale Biblical and Semitic Studies*, 91 f.

³ Quoted by Abrahams, *E.R.E.*, ii. 772.

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ment contribution to the understanding of personality. As we have seen, man is a unity of body and soul-spirit, but he is not to be regarded as an altogether independent unity. He is closely related, on the one hand, to the social group: in Hebrew as in much ancient thought the sense of corporate personality was strong;¹ on the other hand, he is closely related to his Creator. These relations are connected, for "the relation of man to God, like the relation of God to man, was mediated through the corporate personality of the nation".² The study of Hebrew terminology suggests how closely the Hebrew was related to and dependent on God. The term *ruach* is applied both to the Spirit of God and to the spirit of man, and the higher associations of the word link man on to God as the inspirer and sustainer of his activities. The Divine Spirit may come upon a man like a rushing wind,³ may operate within him producing strength or prophetic power,⁴ may operate both in the life of the individual and of the community, guiding, instructing, redeeming.⁵ When we say, therefore, that the Old Testament regards man as a unity, we are not to think of man as self-contained, or standing in proud and individual isolation. On the contrary, his nature, so far from being closed and independent, is open to and dependent on the inflowing of the Divine Spirit. It is this power that makes him what he is, that first animated his dust, sustains his activity from the simplest acts of daily life to the highest flights of prophetic inspiration, and will restore to him after death the body that is needed for the full life. This openness constitutes the really significant feature of his personality, and we shall see how important is the conception when we come to the consideration of the Pauline doctrine of the Spirit.

(d) There is a great deal in this conception of man that

¹ Illustrated by the practice of blood-revenge, 2 Sam. xxi. 1 f., Joshua vii. 24 f.

² Wheeler Robinson, *R.I.O.T.*, 87.

³ 2 Kings ii. 16.

⁴ Ezek. ii. 2, Judges iii. 10, Isa. lxi. 1.

⁵ Isa. xlv. 3, Psa. cxxxix. 7. The development of the idea of individualism may be seen in the implications of eighth-century prophetic teaching, in the Deuteronomic Law, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel.

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is challenging, especially to those whose attitude to man has been influenced by Platonism. The exaltation of the body, for example, which is so marked in Hebrew thought, might suggest an attitude perilously inclined to materialism. In a well-known passage in Maccabees ¹ we read of one Razis, an elder of Jerusalem, "standing upon a steep rock, when, as his blood was well-nigh spent, he drew forth his bowels through the wound, and taking them in both hands he shook them at the crowds, and calling upon him who is Lord of life and the spirit to restore him these again, he died". Such vivid realism as this illustrates not merely the strength of the later Jewish belief in the resurrection of the body, but also the materialistic dangers to which such a doctrine was prone. It would be unfair, however, to the Old Testament writers to criticize their view as "materialistic"; actually the distinction connoted by the terms spiritualistic and materialistic cannot be said to have existed for them, and whatever might be said about their exaltation of the body, it must not be forgotten that by their continual emphasis on God they removed their conceptions of human life far from the merely material sphere. We may begin our study of Old Testament teaching with the term *bāsār* but we can never fully understand it until we have comprehended the meaning of that great term *ruach*.

On the other hand, we shall find that the Hebrew idea of man has much to commend it to thinkers of the present day. Our modern approach to the study of personality is biological: this is the marked feature of modern psychology. To show, as Hebrew thought did, that we have to take careful account of the body in estimating man, is to fall into line with much of the best scientific thought of our time. To set man forth as open in his unified nature to spiritual influences is definitely to enlarge our conception of personality, and anyone who deepens and enriches our view of man is in line with the trend of much present-day psychology. In making these

¹ 2 Macc. xiv. 6.

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claims, we are anticipating a little, and we must first note how the Hebrew view fared in later Judaism, and how, modified, it passed into the Christian conception and thence into the stream of Christian development. But our survey of the Old Testament writers justifies the conclusion that the Hebrew had a definite contribution to make to the question. Owing something to Animism, he developed far beyond that level of thought, and by his own special emphasis he provided a conception of the body which may stand side by side with the Greek. These two, the Hebrew and the Greek, were the two poles around which ecclesiastical thought waged battle for centuries. Each, of course, has its special value for religion, and in asserting the fundamental value of the Hebrew approach, we must beware of minimizing the vital services rendered to the study of man by the disciples of Plato.

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OUR inquiry into the Biblical conception of the body now carries us from the Old Testament to the New. This transition, however, is much more involved and complex than would be suggested by a mere turn of the page from Malachi to Matthew. The characteristic idea of man which we have found in Hebrew writings passed over into New Testament times, but the intervening period was a time of intellectual conflict in which there emerged the two rival theories of human nature, Hebrew and Greek, which were mentioned at the close of the last chapter. It is this conflict which makes later Judaism so important for our purpose: it illustrates the gathering strength of two attitudes to man which still persist in the Christian thought of to-day. There is, of course, a danger in generalizing when the period concerned is so complex as that of later Judaism, but the main lines of thought may be clearly seen.

I. PREPARATORY TENDENCIES IN LATER JUDAISM

The speculation of this period introduced elements which are alien to the thought of the Old Testament. There are traces of the idea of pre-existence,¹ and of the idea of the creation of the world out of formless matter.² More important for our special purpose are the passages which suggest a disparagement of the body. The body is regarded as something which oppresses the soul.

For a corruptible body weigheth down the soul
And the earthly frame lieth heavy on a mind that is full of cares
(Wisdom ix. 15 f.).

¹ Oesterley finds this doctrine in Wisdom, viii. 19, 20. "Now I was a child good by nature, and a good soul fell to my lot. Nay, rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled." Cf. xv. 8, 11. F. C. Porter (*Internat. Jour. of Apoc.*, 1912, April, 33 f.) denies the doctrine in the former passage, but the general consensus of opinion is that pre-existence is found in Wisdom. So Charles (*Encl. Bib.*, col. 1368) and Fairweather ("Develt. of Doc. in the Apoc. Period", *H.D.B.* v., 291 f.).

² So Wisdom, xi. 17.

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Practically all commentators are agreed, says Oesterley,¹ that this passage is based on a passage in Plato's *Phædo*. Ascetic practices are apparently regarded as meritorious in Ethiopic Enoch cviii. 7, Assumption of Moses ix. 6.² In line with this disparagement of the body is the abandonment of the Hebrew idea of resurrection in favour of a more spiritual view: examples are Psalms of Solomon iii. 16, Wisdom iii. 1-9, iv. 19, v. 2, xvii. 21; 2 Macc. vi. 26, xii. 43 f.; Enoch 91-104. In this divergence from the Old Testament we may probably see two factors at work. On the one hand, when it became usual to think of the Messianic Kingdom as having its only fitting manifestation in a new heaven and a new earth, it was an easy step to regard the resurrection as something purely spiritual. On the other hand, we note the influence of Pythagoreanism and Platonism at work, especially in Wisdom. Thus there is a distinct Greek tendency in some later Jewish writings; we may say that this tendency is broadly characteristic of Alexandrian Judaism.

The main tendency of Old Testament thought, however, was far too strong to be submerged in any Hellenistic flood of ideas, and we find that in Palestinian Judaism there are views which directly continue the Hebrew tradition. There is, for example, a continuance of the Hebrew conception of the unity of personality. Even Wisdom, which in so many respects shows Greek influence, does not countenance the tripartite view. R. H. Charles claims that in four passages there are trichotomous suggestions, viz, Sirach xxxviii. 23, 1 Baruch ii. 17, Tobit iii. 6, Judith x. 13,³ but Fairweather is assured that there is no trichotomy,⁴ while Oesterley remarks, "according to the ordinary Jewish belief there was no clear conception of any difference between soul and spirit".⁵ *Psyche* and *pneuma* are often used as equivalents, as Charles admits in reference to the literature of the second and first centuries B.C., and the first century

¹ Op. cit., 85.

² Ibid., 101.

³ *A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, 241.
H.D.B., v. 291 f.

⁵ *Books of the Apocrypha*, 81.

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A.D.¹ A further emphasis in keeping with that of the Old Testament is that on the resurrection of the body: so 2 Macc. vii. 11, xvi. 46; Ethiopic Enoch 37-70. In regard to the last passage Charles points out that the body of the resurrection will be a body of light. A similar reference is found in the Apoc. of Baruch, which teaches that although the dead will be raised with the earthly bodies, these will be changed into a more suitable form. The writer declares that the dead will be raised with bodies absolutely unchanged, so that they may be recognized by those who know them; this completed, the bodies of the righteous will be transformed with a view to unending spiritual existence.² Charles suggests that the Pauline view of a spiritual body is a development of ideas already present in Judaism.³

In the anthropology of this preparatory period, therefore, we note the persistence of the Hebrew view of man, but it is clear that this view was called upon to maintain itself in face of speculations of a Greek order. Both points of view found their exponents in the New Testament: the Old Testament conception was, in its fundamentals, incorporated into the Christian view, while in the teaching of the Essenes (immortality of the soul, denial of the resurrection, dualistic ethics) we find an echo of that conception of human nature which was so dear to the Greek mind. By the time that the Hebrew ideas had been transplanted to the soil of the New Testament certain changes had been effected. No one can read the non-Canonical literature of later Judaism without realizing that the emphasis becomes more and more eschatological. It was natural that, as national hopes appeared less and less likely of fulfilment, the mind of the pious Jew should find hope in glorious pictures of future blessedness: and in this blessed future the hope of the individual found a clearer pronouncement. This was a development which culminated in the Christian

¹ *Encl. Bib.*, cols. 1360, 1364, 1370. A recent writer concludes, "this common-sense division (i.e. of man as body and spirit) is practically the only division which concerns our writers" (Walker, *Teaching of Jesus*, 188 f.).

² See *Encl. Bib.*, 1369.

³ *Ibid.*

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teaching on the worth of the individual, while the change of emphasis from this world to the next had its effect in the eschatological background which must always be taken into account in the study of the Gospels. A further development in this period is an attention to the question of moral evil. Evil as a fact is connected with the origin of mankind (Sirach xxv. 24; Wis. ii. 24), while we have the assertion of human freedom (Apoc. of Baruch liv. 19; Sirach xv. 11), a doctrine which runs all through the Old Testament and the New.¹ It is important to notice that, save in the teaching of Hellenistic Judaism (e.g. Wis. ix. 15) the tendency to evil is not conceived dualistically. An important omission in this period is its lack of attention to the idea of the Spirit of God . . . an omission which the New Testament, and especially Pauline literature, was to remedy.

On the threshold of the New Testament we find the legacy of Hebraism. It has already proved its strength in its conflict with Hellenistic ideas, and is now to be taken up and enriched not only in the teaching of Jesus, but more particularly in reference to His Person. This, indeed, is the new feature which gives to New Testament ideas their distinctive character. Ideas of man are to be tested not by this or that theory, but now in the light of the unique and ultimate significance of the Incarnation. A new factor has entered into human experience with the Appearing of Jesus, and whatever Hebrew or Greek might think about the body, the true view must take account of the astonishing fact that God, to express His greatest truth, has used the medium of personality.

2. THE BODY IN SYNOPTIC TEACHING

(a) *The Terms*.—In the main, the New Testament terms used to express the physical side of human personality carry the connotation with which we are already familiar from our survey of the Hebrew terms. This is seen, for example, in a comparison of the Hebrew *leb*

¹ Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 73 f.

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and the Greek *kardia*. *Kardia* occurs forty-nine times in the Synoptics. "So shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth" (Matt. xii. 40) is an example of the figurative use; "For from within, out of the heart of men, evil thoughts proceed . . ." (Mk. vii. 21) illustrates the use of the term to indicate the inner life; examples may easily be found of its use as indicating the emotional life (Lk. xxiv. 32), intellectual life (Mk. ii. 6), volitional life (Matt. v. 28). The general conclusion is that *kardia* has nothing distinctive as compared with *lēb*, except an emphasis on the inner life as opposed to the outer. This emphasis we naturally expect in a record dominated by the spiritual emphasis of Christ's teaching. We note, however, that the New Testament has a term for "body" (*sōma*), whereas there is no Hebrew term for the bodily organism considered by itself. Probably the influence of the LXX is to be seen here, for in that version we find *sōma* as a rendering for *bāsār*.¹ The introduction of *sōma* gives us two terms for body; the other, *sarx*, in general carries the connotation of the Hebrew *bāsār*. There are occurrences of *sōma* and *sarx* in the New Testament which suggest that they are practically synonymous;² if a distinction be desired, it will be apparent from the use of *sōma* to indicate the organism, the skilful combination of related parts, and the use of *sarx* to indicate the material or substance of the body.³ As in the Old Testament there is the suggestion of bodily weakness and limitation . . . "the spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak" (Mk. xiv. 38); but this is the worst that can be said from the Synoptic point of view. It is important to notice this, for we shall find the exact interpretation of the Pauline doctrine of the flesh a matter of acute controversy.

(b) *The Attitude of Jesus*.—The reading of the Gospels suggests that Jesus was very far from any disparagement of the body as something inherently sinful. No religious

¹ Grimm-Thayer, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, 611.

² Lambert, *E.R.E.*, ii. 760. Cf. 1 Cor. v. 3 with Col. ii. 5.

³ Grimm-Thayer, 611. 570. Cf. Pfeiderer, *Paulinism*, E.T., i. 48.

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teacher ever gave to the world a clearer indication of the supremacy of the spiritual. The killing of the soul, he said, is worse than the killing of the body (Matt. x. 28), and the external world with all its attractions fades into insignificance before the spiritual interests and values which give to life its real content (Matt. xvi. 26, Lk. xii. 15 ff.). This is surely the meaning of those startling words of Jesus where He speaks about cutting off the hand and plucking out the eye (Matt. v. 29 f.). Yet, in spite of this continual spiritual emphasis in His teaching, we do not find any dualism. He showed concern for the physical needs of men . . . if He dismisses them unfed to their homes they may drop by the way (Mk. viii. 2). As He looked out on the world, He saw everywhere tokens of the goodness of God. There was nothing in His way of life to suggest that bitter attitude which sees nothing in beauty but a snare and nothing in the attractions of life but a pitfall for the unwary. He could attend a wedding, or take children on His knee, because marriage and parenthood were part of God's appointed order of human society (Matt. xix. 4 f., John ii. 1 f.). His ministry of healing, regarded by Harnack as the characteristic work of Jesus,¹ shows the importance He placed on bodily health, and in this connection Scott Fletcher's suggestion is worthy of note, that Jesus' healing ministry witnesses to the unification of personality which He effected in others.²

It is not only in the teaching that the body is exalted: the same idea emerges when we consider His Person. The greatest exaltation that can be conceived for the body occurred when the Word became flesh. The union of the *Logos* with the body gave to that body a glory which Christ's sinlessness served to emphasize. The Incarnation means that at least on one occasion in history the world witnessed the perfect blending of spirit and body in such harmonious combination that the Person of the Son of Man could be a perfect instrument for the expression of God's will. It is clear that as far as Jesus

¹ *Sayings of Jesus*, 216.

² *Psychology of the New Testament*, 159, note.

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is concerned there is no justification for that asceticism which is based on a dualistic attitude to man.

It is necessary at this point to pay some attention to the question of the resurrection as it is set forth in the Synoptic writings, for conceptions of the resurrection life are always illuminating on the relation of the body to the complete life. Did Jesus continue the Palestinian tradition on this point, or is there anything in His teaching which approaches the Hellenistic attitude adopted, for example, by His contemporaries the Sadducees and the Essenes? In a recent study, by Dr. Walker, it has been suggested that Jesus had no interest in the resurrection of the body. Jesus, we are told, never mentions the body in His references to the resurrection, and displays no interest in empty tombs. His conception seems to be entirely spiritual.¹

Now it is clear that Jesus spiritualized the traditional view by His emphasis on the heavenly character of the Kingdom. In the world to come men will have outgrown their lower propensities, such as the sex appetite (Matt. xxii. 30, cf. Mk. xii. 25, Lk. xx. 35). Allusions to feasting in the next life are to be understood symbolically (Matt. xxvi. 29). To this extent Dr. Walker's point is valuable, inasmuch as it points to the absurdity of supposing that the present body figures in the life to come. From the general tone of Christ's teaching we should expect a spiritual emphasis, but does such a spiritual emphasis necessarily rule out the idea of some form of bodily life as essential to the complete life?

There are certain points in Christ's teaching which suggest that the future life is not to be thought of as purely incorporeal. He seems to assume the resurrection of the dead (Matt. xxii. 31 f.), while for our ideas as to the nature of the body we are left with Christ's answer to the Sadducees (Mk. xii. 18 f.; cf. Matt. xxii. 23 f., Lk. xx. 27 f.). In this passage, common to the three Synoptic writers, Jesus compares the risen with the angels. This state is obviously different from the normal earthly

¹ T. Walker, *The Teaching of Jesus and the Jewish Teaching of His Age*, 339 f. 350.

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condition, but does it necessarily mean a bodiless state? There is an important factor which suggests that it does not; angels were not regarded by the Jews as incorporeal, but as invested with spiritual bodies.¹ They are spoken of as appearing in human form and having human characteristics (Gen. xviii. 8, xxxii. 1; 1 Kings xix. 5); on the other hand, they can become invisible (2 Kings vi. 17). In any case, such a passage as this can be interpreted only in the light of Jesus' general teaching, and we accordingly take the reference to angels to mean that in the resurrection life the conditions will be far removed from those of change and decay inseparable from life on the earthly level.² The continuance of body after death seems to be implied in passages like Matt. v. 30: "It is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish and not thy whole body go into hell" (cf. Matt. x. 28). Walker remarks that when Jesus refers to the resurrection, it is the *person* rather than the body that is spoken of as rising and being raised. This confirms our contention, for we cannot conceive a Hebrew, speaking in a Hebrew atmosphere, giving to "person" a connotation less than that of the Old Testament, and it has already been shown that when a Hebrew thought about a person he included the body.

Clearer light is thrown on this difficult subject by the record of the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus. From this record we infer that when Jesus appeared after the Resurrection it was in some kind of physical condition. His risen body was in some sense continuous with the body which the disciples had known (cf. John xx. 20, xxix. 27). On the other hand, it is equally clear that the conditions of His existence had undergone some modification: physical limitations of time and place did not exist for Him (Matt. xxviii. 2; Lk. xxiv. 15, 31; cf. John xx. 19). On occasion Jesus seems to have remained unrecognized until some characteristic gesture revealed Him (Lk. xxiv. 16 f.; cf. John xx. 14 f.). "The spiritual had so interpenetrated the natural and subdued

¹ E.R.E., xi. 834, art. "State of the Dead".

² Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, 268.

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it to its own uses that the natural body of Jesus had become a spiritual body. It was only when Jesus chose to 'materialize' Himself . . . that the disciples were able to perceive him by the senses."¹ This conclusion, that the resurrection body of Jesus was in some way spiritualized, yet continuous with the old body, fits in well with the reference to the angels already considered.

There are many difficult problems in this subject, but our main concern here is to show that in the teaching of Jesus it is essentially the Hebrew tradition that is carried on and spiritualized. "He never speaks in terms of an Essene or Hellenic immortality of soul . . . in harmony with the Old Testament conception of man. He does not think of a purely incorporeal existence as real life in man's case."² The Synoptic conception of human personality, therefore, is in its basis Hebrew. There is neither trichotomy nor dichotomy. The outlook on human life is genial. The value and claims of the physical life are constantly recognized, while at the same time the supremacy of spiritual ideals and values is asserted.

3. THE PAULINE CONCEPTION OF THE BODY

In turning to the Pauline literature we enter a field that is exceptionally rich in anthropological material. In his teaching, the Apostle ranges over a wide area. His lofty conception of God, setting in contrast human imperfections: his consciousness of the struggle between good and evil, which can be surmounted by fellowship with the Divine: his emphasis on the supremacy of the spiritual, suggest affinities with Hellenism.³ Paul's early training brought him into contact with Greek culture . . . "it would have been difficult for him to find teachers who were not influenced by Greek ideas, even if he had wished to find them"⁴ . . . and he was no stranger to Greek literature.⁵

¹ Lambert, *E.R.E.*, ii. 761.

² Salmond, *op. cit.*, 268.

³ Kennedy, *S. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*, 350.

⁴ Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, 21.

⁵ E.g. Acts xvii. 28, which includes a fragment from Epimenides and a fragment from the *Phænomena* of Aratus. See Smith, *Life and Letters of S. Paul*, 24.

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Here and there are found passages suggestive of Stoic parallels.¹ With all this there are trains of ideas which bear out his claim before the hostile council in Jerusalem that he was a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee (Acts xxiii. 6). In consequence of this richness and fertility of thought it has been a matter of acute controversy as to whether Paul's teaching owes more to the Greek or the Hebrew tradition. On this point various positions have been adopted: Schweitzer, for example, contends that the Hellenistic influences on Paul were practically negligible:² Pfeleiderer claims that the Hebrew and the Greek in Paul are like two streams which meet in one bed without coalescing.³ This discussion is important for our special purpose, although we shall be concerned only with that part of it which relates to Paul's conception of the conflict, in human life, between the spirit and the body. An inquiry into Paul's conception of spirit, soul, and body in human personality will prepare the way for an estimate of his views on the body and human conflicts.

(a) *Spirit, Soul, and Body, in Paul.*—In our survey of the Hebrew terms we found that it is quite foreign to Hebrew usage to regard "soul" and "spirit" as different elements in personality: the view of man is that of a unity of soul-body. Neither trichotomy nor dichotomy can be found in the Old Testament. To what extent does the Pauline teaching, in this particular, carry on the Hebrew tradition? In older works it was commonly asserted that for Paul spirit, soul, and body represented three elements in human nature, his doctrine being, therefore, a theory of trichotomy.⁴ A recent writer, whose affinities with Platonism are well known, finds in Paul a psychology of body, soul, and spirit, in which, as in the

¹ See Lightfoot, appendix to Philippians. Clemen, *Primitive Christianity and Its Non-Jewish Elements*, 366 f. For a good discussion of Stoic parallels see Glover, *ibid.*, 19 f.; and *infra* for a discussion of Clemen's claim that Paul's contrast between soul and body (2 Cor.-v. 1) is the "clearest instance of his debt to Greek philosophy".

² *Paul and his Interpreters*, e.g. "Paulinism and Hellenism have in common their religious terminology, but in respect of ideas, nothing", p. 238.

³ *Primitive Christianity*, i. 436.

⁴ So J. T. Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, 38. J. B. Heard, *Tripartite Nature of Man*, 10.

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Platonists, soul holds the middle place, and spirit is nearly identical with the Platonic *nous*.¹ The way to the clear understanding of Paul's position is obviously a careful study of the terms, and for this we are greatly indebted to H. Wheeler Robinson² and E. D. Burton.³ The investigations of these scholars have shown that Paul's indebtedness is Hebrew rather than Greek, or, as Scott Fletcher puts it, "the path of approach to Christian truth is not through the Porch or the Academy, but through the Temple."⁴ The New Testament term *psuche*, corresponding to the Hebrew *nephesh*, is not of very frequent occurrence in the Pauline writings. In six cases it denotes "life" without psychological content (Phil. ii. 30; cf. 2 Cor. i. 23). In three cases it gives the sense of the strong personal pronoun, or the individual (Rom. ii. 9, 2 Cor. xii. 15; cf. the Old Testament use of *nephesh*). In three cases the Hebrew sense of "desire" appears (Phil. i. 27, cf. Eph. vi. 6, R.V. marg.).⁵ Burton sums up, "The Pauline use of *psuche* is, formally at least, almost identical with that of the LXX, itself largely a reproduction of the Hebrew *nephesh*. None of the Hebrew senses is lacking, and none of the senses found in later Greek, but not in Hebrew, is present".⁶

Far more important is the term *pneuma*. There are certain cases in which *pneuma* differs from the Old Testament use of *ruach*. It is never used, for example, of "wind" (for which Paul uses *anemos*, Eph. iv. 14) and there is only one use for "breath" (2 Thess. ii. 8).⁷ On the other hand, there is weighty evidence which suggests that Paul's use of the term is fundamentally Hebraic. As in the post-Exilic use of *ruach*, we have a use of *pneuma* in a

¹ W. R. Inge, *Philosophy of Plotinus*, i. 11. Cf. *Outspoken Essays*, ii. 39. Cf. *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought*, 13. Canon Raven suggests that Paul adopted a tripartite division of man's nature into body, soul, and spirit (*The Creator Spirit*, 75 note).

² Mansfield College Essays, *Hebrew Psychology in Relation to Pauline Anthropology*.

³ *Spirit, Soul, and Flesh*.

⁴ *Psychology of the New Testament*, 108.

⁵ Wheeler Robinson, 280.

⁶ p. 109.

⁷ An important point, for Burton has shown that in contemporary Greek writers *pneuma* was most frequently used of wind and breath.

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double sense, as denoting both a supernatural influence and a normal element in human nature. The former is the more important and, indeed, leads us to Paul's characteristic contribution to anthropology. We find him using *pneuma* of the spirit of God viewed as the cause of extraordinary phenomena in human nature (1 Cor. xii. 4); of the spirit of God conceived as operating in the human spirit for the production of ethical results (Rom. viii. 9; cf. 1 Cor. ii. 4, Eph. i. 13); of the mind of God (1 Cor. ii. 11); and generically, without any specific reference to the form of the activity (Gal. iii. 14; cf. Eph. iv. 4, Rom. viii. 11). So definite and emphatic is this use of *pneuma* to indicate the spirit of God that it has led some to deny that there is any such thing as a human *pneuma*.¹ This view, however, does not fit in with certain Pauline uses of the word in what we may call a psychical sense. Out of thirty such cases fourteen refer to the higher nature of a Christian man, hardly to be distinguished from the result of the divine *pneuma* (Rom. i. 9), while sixteen denote a normal element in human nature (Rom. viii. 16).² It is not always easy to separate exactly between these two uses of the word, the supernatural and the normal, but it is instructive to note that a similar ambiguity is found in the Old Testament use of *ruach*. On the whole question Burton declares, "The Apostle Paul's use of *pneuma* is plainly kindred with, and almost beyond doubt, directly or indirectly influenced by the Old Testament (post-Exilic) use of *ruach*".³ From a study of the two terms, therefore, we are predisposed to think of Paul as approaching the question of man from the Hebrew angle. There are other terms in Paul's psychological vocabulary which have reference to the inner side of human nature, notably *nous* and *suneidesis*, and in regard to the latter Sanday and Headlam remark: "The usage of S. Paul corresponds accurately to that of his Stoic contemporaries," and "it is one of the few technical

¹ E.g. Holsten, *Bedeutung des Wortes sarx im Neuen Testament*. See below, p. 60.

² Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 110.

³ Op. cit., 187.

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terms in S. Paul which seem to have Greek rather than Jewish affinities.”¹ But even here—to borrow a sentence which Glover writes in another connection ²—one cannot feel that it was absolutely necessary for Paul to attend Stoic lectures to manage such matters. In fact it is possible to group Paul’s use of *nous* and *suneidesis* in the wide connotation of the Old Testament *lēb*. Wheeler Robinson’s verdict is that these two terms are really specializations from the psychological use of “heart” in the Old Testament, and are not used with a Greek connotation.³

Paul’s psychological vocabulary, then, does not encourage us to distinguish between *psuche* and *pneuma* as two different elements in human personality. How then shall we describe the difference between them? There is undoubtedly a contrast between *psuche* and *psuchikos* on the one hand, and *pneuma* and *pneumatikos* on the other. “The natural man (*psuchikos*) receiveth not the things of the spirit of God . . . but he that is spiritual (*pneumatikos*) judgeth all things” (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). Again, speaking of the resurrection body, Paul says: “It is sown a natural (*psuchikon*) body, it is raised a spiritual (*pneumatikon*) body” (1 Cor. xv. 44, 45). The contrast in connotation between these two terms may be expressed from two points of view: when both terms are used psychically, they carry the distinction of emphasis we have seen in *nephesh* and *ruach*—*psuche* marks the emotional side of consciousness, while *pneuma* marks the higher side, the volitional and intellectual: when both terms are used in reference to the body, the body may be regarded as conditioned by the lower forces which operate in human life, or as conditioned by the divine life, and thus the body is *psuchikos* or *pneumatikos* respectively. The inner nature is one, regarded from two points of view. As Scott Fletcher says, the soul is spirit, bodily conditioned.⁴ A favourite passage for the holders of the theory of trichotomy is 1 Thess. v. 23: “And the God of peace Himself sanctify you wholly: and may your *pneuma* and

¹ I.C.C., Romans, 60, 61.

³ E.R.E., xi. 733, art. “Soul”.

² Paul of Tarsus, 21.

⁴ Op. cit., 69.

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psuche and *sōma* be preserved entire, without blame, at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." We may not fairly regard this as Paul's "fullest scientific psychology".¹ Paul does not engage in a scientific dissection of personality anywhere, and the Thessalonians passage is no more a scientific dissection than is Deut. vi. 5 in the Old Testament. Paul is not writing a treatise on the soul, says Jowett,² but pouring forth from the fulness of his heart a prayer for his converts, and his prayer is that his converts may have their complete personality preserved, in all its aspects, at the Lord's coming.

So the Pauline teaching on the inner nature of man owes much to the Hebrew tradition we have seen in the use of *nephesh* and *ruach*. Soul and spirit cannot be ranged side by side as two distinct elements, to form with the body a threefold division of human personality. The possibility of three elements is now reduced to two, soul-spirit and body, and it now remains to inquire whether Paul sets these two in ultimate antagonism, or whether he is still faithful to the Old Testament idea and regards man as a psychological unity.

(b) *Paul and Human Conflicts*.—It is a sound principle in the interpretation of Paul that the basis of his theology is to be found in his experience. No one who reads the Epistles can doubt that that experience was very rich, and Paul does not hesitate to describe it. He is particularly definite on the conflicts which went on within himself. He had first-hand experience of warfare within himself,³ and again and again he associates sin with the flesh as its dwelling-place and point of attack. He can even say: "For I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing."⁴ At first glance this appears to be a complete condemnation of the body, an equation of it with soul-destructive forces. If this is what Paul meant when he referred to the body, we might feel inclined to agree with those who assert that, on this point, the Pauline anthropology has forsaken the Old

¹ As, e.g., in Ellicott's Commentary.

³ See, e.g., Rom. vii. 14 f.

² *Epistles of S. Paul*, i. p. 94.

⁴ Rom. vii. 18.

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Testament and passed over to the dualistic view of the world so common in Hellenistic philosophy. This interpretation of the Pauline anthropology has found, and finds,¹ strong advocates. Pfeiderer states that it is the merit of Holsten to have been the first to work out energetically the dualistic idea of the Pauline *sarx*.² Holsten's view was set forth (1855) in his *Bedeutung des Wortes Sarx im Neuen Testament*, and may be summarized as follows: *Sōma* denotes the body as an organism under the category of form, while *sarx* has as its characteristic the idea of substance. This earthly material substance of the *sōma* is distinguished from other forms of matter by the element of life, of which the cause is the *psuche*. *Pneuma* also belongs to the category of substance, but substance which transcends the earthly. *Pneuma* is to be regarded as the principle of absolute truth and absolute holiness. It is divine only: there is no such thing as human *pneuma*. The only elements in human nature are *sarx*, *psuche*, *nous*. *Pneuma* is absolute truth and life, while *sarx* is perishableness, error, folly. All evil has its principle in the *sarx*, and all sins are derived from it. Thus the Pauline contrast between *pneuma* and *sarx* is metaphysical.³ Pfeiderer agreed with Holsten in regarding the material *sarx* as the principle of sin, an anti-spiritual causality,⁴ though apparently in the second edition of his *Paulinism*, he modified this view somewhat, attributing whatever in Paul goes beyond the Old Testament not to Hellenic influence, but to the later Jewish doctrine of the Fall. This dualistic point of view has also received support from Sokolowski,⁵ while we can see the influence of this conception in statements like that of Prof. Percy Gardner: "Put in the form in which it appears in Romans, the doctrine of the evil flesh is one familiar to students of

¹ Though Sanday and Headlam state that the controversy may be regarded as practically closed. "Romans", I.C.C., 181. ² *Paulinism*, i. 48.

³ *Die sarx also steht in absolutem Gegensatz zum pneuma, dem Wesen Gottes. Sie ist das Endliche Princip der Vergänglichkeit, des Irrthums, des Bösen*, p. 20.

⁴ 46. 61 f.

⁵ *Die Begriffe von Geist und Leben bei Paulus*. See the section "Sarx als sündliches Princip", 127 f.

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ancient religion as one of the main tenets of the mysteries of later Greece".¹

In considering this issue we may here pass over the uses of *sarx* to denote physical structure (Rom. ii. 28, Eph. ii. 15), and "kinship" (Rom. i. 3, 1 Cor. x. 18), and the sphere or condition of present existence (2 Cor. x. 3; Col. ii. 1, 5), and even those instances where the word clearly denotes no more than fleshly weakness—physical, intellectual, limitation in value (Eph. vi. 12; Rom. vi. 19; Phil. iii. 3, 4),² and proceed to those instances where there is an implication of ethical experience. Wheeler Robinson finds thirty-five cases where there is a more or less distinct ethical reference. "For when we were in the flesh . . . the sinful passions . . . wrought in our members to bring forth fruit unto death" (Rom. vii. 5; cf. viii. 8, 9; Gal. iv. 29) implies a general relation between sin and the flesh. "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh, for these are contrary, the one to the other" (Gal. v. 17; cf. Rom. xiii. 14, Col. ii. 23), implies the activity of the flesh in the production of evil.³ From all this it is clear that Paul does speak of the body and its members as instruments of sin. Sin dwells in the flesh. There is a law in the body which wars against the mind. But this is not necessarily to say he regarded the flesh as inherently sinful. Paul does not give us a systematic account of the origin of sin, but in Rom. v. sin is described as an act of will, the contrast here being ethical rather than metaphysical. If he regarded the body as the principle of evil, it is difficult to see how he could regard it as a Temple of the Holy Spirit, or have believed that Christ had a real and sinless human body. Nothing is more clear in his teaching than that he regarded the body as open to the gracious influence of the Divine *pneuma*. The Corinthian Christians had fallen into the error of thinking that the body is not a true part of man's personality, and Paul had to tell them that "the life of the human spirit is linked on to Christ Himself and

¹ *Historic View of Christianity*, 224.

² See Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 113 f.

³ *Ibid.*

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to the Spirit of God, is joined indissolubly to that physical life which finds its manifestation in the bodily members".¹

The body is not a prison of the soul, but a temple of the spirit (1 Cor. iii. 16, 17; vi. 19). Further evidence, as we shall see below, is supplied by Paul's conception of death and the life to come, and we are justified in concluding that Paul's sense of inner conflict is not to be carried to a metaphysical dualism between spirit and body. Admittedly his contrast went far beyond that of the Old Testament, but this was natural when it is remembered that Paul could add to his Hebrew traditional view a very deep moral experience. It was natural that, labouring under a strong sense of conflict, he should identify the evil power with the well-known weakness of the body. Sabatier has pointed out that there is an analogy between the relation of sin to the flesh and the relation of the Divine power to the soul of the Christian. In each case there is an actual immanence, but an immanence which presupposes an objective transcendence. As the divine *pneuma* operates in the higher side of man, so the power of evil finds a basis of operations in the flesh. The final enemy of the higher life is not the flesh, but that which uses the flesh as an instrument.² So we conclude with Moffatt that Paul "never regarded the flesh as inherently evil. His language is often tinged with the practical dualism of earnest piety, but he did not share the Hellenistic tendency to view the flesh or material constitution of man as inherently or hopelessly corrupt".³ Fundamentally, Paul is faithful to the Old Testament view of man as a psychological unity.

(c) *The Body and the Future Life*.—In popular speech we are apt to refer to death as deliverance from the corporeal conditions which oppress the soul . . . an indication of the extent to which the Platonic view has entered into popular thought. But this idea is absent from the Pauline teaching, at least in the sense of a belief in the future of personality as the life of disembodied spirit.

¹ Lambert, *E.R.E.*, ii. 762.

² *The Apostle Paul*, 288.

³ *Paul and Paulinism*, 51.

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It is true that Paul occasionally speaks of the life in the body in a pessimistic manner: "O wretched man that I am!" he cries, "who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Rom. vii. 24), and he describes the body as a tabernacle in which men groan (2 Cor. v. 4). But in this latter case he at once goes on to say that he does not desire to be unclothed, but to be clothed upon with a heavenly habitation. His longing is not for an incorporeal state, but for a condition in which the power of evil, so acutely associated with the flesh, shall no longer be able to operate. There is a sense in which, for Paul, death was unnatural. "It was not part of the divine purpose in creation that the solidarity of soul and body should ever be dissolved."¹ But the entry of sin into life had shattered the ideal, had marred the plan, and the result of this shattering of the Divine intention is death. This gloomy consequence of sin could be abrogated only by the operation within men of the Divine Spirit, mediated through Christ. Paul, therefore, in his vision of the power of Christ, looks forward in hope beyond the grave. By faith he sees the abrogation of this consequence, death, and looks to the redemption, transfiguration, and adaptation of the body.

We have already noticed the logical outcome of the Hebrew conception of man, a doctrine of the resurrection of the body, found in two passages in the Old Testament and continued in the thought of Palestinian Judaism. With this, of course, Paul was familiar, and he makes an advance on the Old Testament view, an advance which had been foreshadowed in the Synoptic presentation of the risen body of Christ. As Paul makes the resurrection of Christ the foundation of his own certainty, it is not too much to claim that the nature of Christ's risen body had a determining effect on Paul's own view. There is a clear contrast between his view and that current among the Pharisees, according to whom "the bodies of the saints were thought of as passing underground from their graves to the place of resurrection, and there rising in the

¹ Lambert, *E.R.E.*

same condition in which death found them".¹ Charles has argued for a development in the Pauline conception of the resurrection. In his earlier period, represented by the Thessalonian epistles, Paul moved in the orbit of current apocalyptic expectation. Christ will soon descend, and the Christian dead will be raised to live with the living and with Him for ever. But in 1 Cor. there is apparently a development. Paul is here concerned to meet those among the Corinthians who denied the resurrection of the body while accepting the resurrection of Christ. The two, he says, cannot be separated. To deny the resurrection of the dead is to deny the resurrection of Christ, and thus to undermine the very basis of the Christian hope. As in Adam mankind had its source of death, so in the risen Christ it has a new source of life (1 Cor. xv. 12 f.). He goes on to point out the contrast between the natural mortal body and the risen spiritual body, and makes clear his point by a series of contrasts. As the animal body is marked by corruption, dishonour, weakness, and is physical, so the risen body is marked by incorruption, glory, strength, and is pneumatic. It is interesting to note that parallels to this spiritual view may be found in the Apocalyptic literature.² When Paul speaks of a spiritual body we need to be careful not to attribute to him anything like the conception of spiritual substance (which we shall find in the ecclesiastical development). His concern is not philosophical, but practical. He is thinking not so much of the actual constituents of the new body as of the fact that it owes its existence and power to its relation to the Spirit of God. Dean Inge regards Paul's view as having affinities with Platonism: ³ he speaks of Paul's theory of the resurrection from which flesh and blood are excluded, since gross matter cannot inherit the kingdom of God. Now it is quite true that a correct interpretation of Pauline teach-

¹ Robertson and Plummer, *I.C.C.*, 1 Cor. xxxvii.

² See St. John Thackeray, *The Relation of S. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, 114 f. Such parallels are found in Baruch xlix. li: allusions to the transformation of the body in the resurrection are found in 4 Macc. ix. 22; Ethiopic Enoch li. 4, lxii. 15, cviii. 11-12.

³ *Philosophy of Plotinus*, i. 11.

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ing does not countenance any of the materialistic conceptions of resurrection which have sometimes been accepted as the New Testament view, but we must beware of reading into the Pauline language a contrast which is not really there. The essence of his contrast lies in that between the body as enlivened by the *psuche* and the body as infused by the divine *pneuma*. "Here we see most clearly Paul's characteristic differences from both Greek and Jewish thought: a true Jew, he shrinks from the idea of a disembodied spirit; yet, as a Christian, he looks forward to a new body, no longer of flesh, and no longer, therefore, open to the invasion of sin".¹

It does not fall within our province to consider in detail the many disputed points in the Pauline eschatology, but two matters may with advantage be mentioned. Do Paul's references to the resurrection refer to the just only, or to all men? Charles has argued that according to Paul there could not be any resurrection of the wicked.² The important passage, 1 Cor. xv., suggests that the horizon of Paul's thought does not extend beyond the just. There are other New Testament passages which might be adduced to show that there is the idea of resurrection for all. John v. 28 f. speaks of the evil rising to the resurrection of judgment, while Rev. xx. 12 records the vision of judgment of all men according to their works. Charles, however, regards this latter passage as hardly admissible evidence for Christian doctrine, while the Johannine reference, he thinks, is contradictory to the drift of the Gospel. There is a passage in Acts xxiv. 15 which suggests a resurrection both of the just and the unjust. Charles thinks that this is not an accurate report, but Robertson and Plummer, on the basis of this reference, together with Rom. xiv. 10 f. ("for we shall all stand before the judgment seat of God") consider that Paul certainly believed in the resurrection of the wicked.³ It would seem to be a fair conclusion that Paul did not deal with the question in any deliberate way, as his interest is

¹ Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 131.

² Art. "Eschatology", *Encl. Bib.*

³ Op. cit., xxxvii.

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dominated by the Christian hope, but probably he left some room for a doctrine of general resurrection.¹ A second point of importance is raised by Charles in his contention that there is development in Pauline teaching with regard to the time of the resurrection. In his earlier period, following Jewish tradition, he places the resurrection after the Parousia. But the "seed" passage in 1 Cor. is hardly consistent with this view, and this, together with the statement in 2 Cor. v. 1 f. ("For we know that if the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands . . ."), suggests the time of resurrection as immediately upon death. This view is shared by Pfeiderer, Reuss, Holtzmann, and others, but is opposed by Kennedy, who complains that many commentators forget that Paul would often overleap wide distances of time and space, ignoring definite and prosaic detail.² Charles's view, however, has many advantages, and it is certainly more helpful to the modern mind to think of the soul as immediately obtaining an appropriate organism for its new life when death has taken away the vitality of the earthly body. On the whole question it needs to be said that Paul never scientifically and philosophically attempted a complete doctrine. His treatment is dominated by his main concern, to link the future of the believer with the power of the risen Christ. And when we come to estimate the value of the New Testament attitude to these points we shall find that it is the underlying value, rather than the specific conception, that is of permanence.

4. NOTE ON JOHANNINE AND OTHER NEW TESTAMENT WRITING

In general it is fair to say that when we have considered the Synoptic and the Pauline contributions to our subject we have covered the main psychological ground of the New Testament. But a passing glance may be given

¹ So Kennedy, *S. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*, 275 f.

² *Ibid.*, 262 f.

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to other writings to see whether there is any fundamental departure from that attitude to the body which marks the teaching of Jesus and Paul.

In the Johannine writings the use of *kardia* follows that of the Synoptics. *Sarx* is used fourteen times in the Gospel and the First Epistle, but of these eight refer to Christ. John insists that Jesus has come in the flesh, and he believes in the sinlessness of Jesus. As in the Pauline writings there is a general antithesis of *pneuma* and *sarx*, but "the idea of evil attaches to the flesh not in virtue of what it is essentially, but from the undue preponderance given to it . . . it does not include the idea of sinfulness, but it describes human personality on the side which tends to sin, and on which we have actually sinned".¹ The Johannine theology presents a series of contrasts, but we cannot deduce a metaphysical dualism from the use of the psychological terms.²

The psychology of Acts shows a general continuance of Old Testament ideas, but we note one use of *pneuma* denoting disembodied spirit ("for the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit . . ." xxiii. 8).

The Epistle of James follows the Old Testament usage.

In the Epistle to the Hebrews one passage is often brought forward as evidence of trichotomy in New Testament teaching: "for the word of God is living and active, and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit, of both joints and marrow, and quick to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart" (iv. 12). But the dividing here referred to is not the dividing of soul from spirit, but a division within soul and within spirit, not a separating power, but a dissecting power.³ Bruce remarks that the endeavour to find trichotomy here savours of pedantry, and interprets the passage as meaning that the word penetrates into the innermost recesses of our spiritual being.⁴

¹ Westcott, *Epistle of John*, 134. Cf. Burton, *Spirit, Soul, and Flesh*, 202.

² See the treatment in Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 136 f.

³ So Westcott, *Hebrews*, 104. Peake, *Hebrews*, 128. Davidson, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 187. Bruce, *Hebrews*, 187.

⁴ Ibid.

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1 Peter presents a use of terms which in some ways is in contrast to the Pauline use. Here *psuche* denotes the whole personality, including the higher aspects of it (1 Pet. i. 22, ii. 11). *Pneuma* never appears to denote a normal element in human nature. It is used of soul or spirit after death (iii. 18 f; cf. iv. 6), and in one case denotes a meek or gentle disposition as imparted by the Holy Spirit. The use of *kardia* follows the Old Testament, but *sarx* presents an interesting contrast to Pauline usage, for it is used in a sense purely physical and non-ethical (iv. 1 f.).

5. THE NEW TESTAMENT CONCEPTIONS IN THEIR PRACTICAL EXPRESSION

So far, our survey of New Testament teaching has been concerned with the psychological terms, and more especially with those which relate to the bodily nature of man. From the usage of terms we have drawn certain inferences as to the Biblical conception of personality. It now remains to gather up these results into a summary and test them by reference to Christian life and worship as these are revealed in the literature. Much of the earliest Christian literature arose out of pressing practical needs, and if we can gather the New Testament attitude to such matters as ascetic practices, social life, and what we may call the sacramental side of Christian worship, we shall be in a position to state the practical as well as the speculative doctrine of the body.

(a) First, a summary of the main conclusions. The New Testament writers do not treat of the issues of soul and body in any scientific fashion: their interest is always practical and religious, and man is considered not so much in himself as in the light of his relation to God. The question of the origin of human personality does not concern these writers. Jesus said nothing about the biological origin of man. The view so often met with in Greek writers that the soul existed before it took to itself a body is foreign to the New as well as to the Old

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Testament.¹ Man's spiritual origin is God, and even this is assumed rather than set forth in any scientific or philosophical way. The New Testament reproduces the main Hebrew conceptions, but gives to them its own emphasis. The ideas of the New Testament are focused upon a new centre, the Person of Christ, and two factors, viz. the fact that Jesus had a real and sinless body, and the emphatic spiritual emphasis in His teaching, clearly influence apostolic conceptions of personality. Man is a unity of spirit-soul and body, and the distinction between the inner and the outer aspects of human nature receives an added emphasis because of the tone of Jesus' teaching, and also because of the clear recognition of ethical problems which marked the post-Canonical developments of Judaism. On the one hand, human nature is viewed in its native elements; on the other, it is viewed as influenced by the Divine Spirit. This broad contrast, never sharpened into a metaphysical dualism, runs through all the New Testament ideas on the subject. The principle of life in man is God-given, the result of divine inbreathing. Man shares this principle with other animals, but he is distinguished from them by higher capacities. Man is more valuable than bird or beast, said Jesus, and this higher value consists in his capacity for higher aspiration, for fellowship both human and divine. We cannot understand the life of man in terms of sense, but only if we think of him as linked to God, open to the inflowing of God's Spirit, and realizing his true life only through that Divine influence. Within this unity of personality the body occupies an important place. Consciousness is diffused through the body. Paul can playfully suppose the foot or the ear to complain about their place in the bodily scheme.² Personality is the scene of sharp conflicts. Professor Alexander declares: "At the core of the Christian religion there is a dogma which cuts deep to the truth of human nature. It is the dogma of the antithesis and struggle of the flesh and the

¹ See *E.R.E.*, x, 238, "Pre-existence". Cf. Salmond, *op. cit.*, 140 f.

² 1 Cor. xii. 14 f.

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spirit, of the World and the Word, the dogma of the suffering and striving man, which is nowhere so vividly expressed as in the terrible image of S. Paul: "the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world".¹ All true Christian experience attests the truth of this, but we have found that we misinterpret Paul if we press this opposition into an ultimate dualism. The blame is not laid ultimately at the door of the body, and the remedy is not to be sought in a disparagement of the body. It is the power of sin which works in and through the bodily members, and it is the power of the Divine Spirit which can sanctify the whole personality, body as well, and in the life to come the fulness of personality is conceived as needing a redeemed body as the appropriate organ for the redeemed spirit.

(b) We have now to inquire how this general attitude to the personality of man found expression in the practical life. Was there any attempt to encourage ascetic practices, or can we say that in practice the body was given that high and important place which in theory the New Testament conceptions gave to it? The literature of classical antiquity illustrates the wide vogue of ascetic practices. In the Schools of the Stoics and the Cynics, and among the later Platonists, a very high value was set upon the ascetic life.² By the time of Philo Judæus the connotation of the terms "philosopher" and "ascetic" had come to be very much the same thing.³ We shall have occasion to note how this conception influenced many of the Christian Fathers, but as far as the Biblical writings are concerned, it is necessary to point out the limits of asceticism. No one who reads the Bible can fail to note, here and there, elements of the ascetic life. In the Old Testament there are references to fasting: certain forms of abstinence are imposed upon the priestly orders: the vow of the Nazirites included lifelong abstinence from wine. In the New Testament, similarly, there are references to renunciation of earthly possessions, to sexual

¹ *Philosophical Review*, xxix, 119.

³ See *E.R.E.*, art. "Asceticism", ii. 73.

² See above, p. 21 f.

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continence, and to acts of discipline which suggest that the necessity for the curbing of bodily appetites was well known and recognized. Paul knows how needful it is to keep the body under. But we cannot infer from these references that asceticism was an essential part of the religious practice of the New Testament. Paul, for instance, is never tired of insisting on the true freedom of the Christian. "S. Paul appears in some measure to have made stricter demands than even the stern legalist James: but an injustice is done to him when the attempt is made to read into his Epistles anything like a commendation of monastic withdrawal from the world or of fanatical maintenance of virginity. He was and continues to be the preacher of true evangelical freedom. . . ." ¹ In New Testament times (as now) the true Christian practice demanded constant watchfulness lest the body became too easy a prey to evil forces: it demanded the constant assertion of the spirit, the continual opening of the life to the Divine Spirit. But we are unjust to the New Testament teaching if we assume that there was any hatred of the flesh as such, or emphasis on the mortification of the body so common in Oriental dualism. To follow Christ was to adopt a positive attitude towards godliness, to go in for exercises, as Paul said, and the true life was not sought in disparagement of this or that, but rather in the consecration of the whole man. In the first century asceticism was very much in the air, and the fact that it never became an essential and primary element in the Christian life of that century is an indication of the essential difference between the Christian and dualistic attitudes to man.

(c) We note, further, a social emphasis in the New Testament, which is interesting inasmuch as any conception of the body must have an effect in those realms of human life where the very possibility of corporate life depends on bodily factors. As we have already seen,² the human body is a factor in our individuality, and at the same time a factor in our social relationships, and as

¹ See *E.R.E.*, art. "Asceticism", ii. 73.

² P. 11.

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far as these are revealed in the New Testament they suggest an ideal of corporate life which can only be described as sane and genial. It is no disparagement of the first Christian preaching to the individual to suggest that Jesus came preaching the Gospel of a Kingdom. His dealings with individuals are nowhere surpassed in directness and seriousness, but the Mission on which He was engaged was directed towards a spiritual commonwealth. We cannot do justice to the New Testament religion if we ignore or minimize its social implications. In the apostolic teaching much attention was given to the right ordering of the Christian life. Church members were to be most careful not only in their private lives, but also in their public witness. In home life, in the disputes which inevitably arise in any virile Christian society, in their relations with non-Christians, the followers of Jesus are always to remember the great ideal of conduct. Some of the finest writing in the New Testament is concerned with the outward ordering of the Christian life as the necessary expression of its inner spirit. Work was to be regarded as a noble thing: the Rabbis always insisted on this, and Christians had before them the additional example of the Divine Carpenter. Paul was rather proud of his independence, and felt no shame because his hands were marked with toil. The home, too, was a means of grace. In the life of Israel it was always a blessing to marry and have a family: even the Pharisees, rigorous in some other respects, maintained a strong suspicion of celibacy; while the spirit of the New Testament undoubtedly gives a high place of honour to the love of husband and wife. Occasional remarks of Paul which seem to discountenance this must be interpreted in the light of their background, the near approach of the Parousia. There was no room for laxity in the marriage arrangement. Man and wife are no longer two, but one—one flesh: their physical union proceeds from something deeper, and it is this deeper conception which permits us to speak, as the mediæval theologians were so fond of speaking, of marriage as a sacrament. Thus we are to regard

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the complete life of man, in all the social relationships which are made possible by the physical basis of life, as playing a noble part in the perfecting of human character.

(*d*) This exalted idea of the body had its effect, also, in the conceptions of worship. Paul's three pictures for the Church, the family, the human body, the temple, would hardly have been possible to a thoroughgoing dualist. Further, and without prejudice to a discussion which must later concern us, we cannot ignore the place assigned to baptism and the communion of the Lord's Supper in the New Testament Church. Here we note that the two outstanding features in the practice of early Christian sacramentalism are both examples of the employment of words, acts, and things for the attainment of spiritual ends. The sacramental principle in general will call for attention later in this book, but for the moment we note that the New Testament in its central acts of confession and communion moves on a plane where the things that pertain to the body are not as such despised.

This is the more remarkable inasmuch as the highest thought of the New Testament moves on the plane of divine activity. The writings of Paul and John, for example, are seen to gather more and more around the conception of life in the Spirit. Everywhere the dominant factor is the Spirit of God. Faith in Christ, the experience of newness of life, the fruits of consecration, the certain hope for the future are all to be explained, ultimately, in terms of the Divine Life graciously operative on the human plane. Writers dominated by such a spiritual idea might have been pardoned if they had dwelt altogether with the Life in the Spirit, relegating all things physical to a very subordinate position. The fact that New Testament writers ennoble and dignify the body, while recognizing its manifest weaknesses, is valuable as showing (*a*) the strength of the Hebrew conception of human personality, (*b*) the wide range of the Power that sanctifies. When God is allowed to work His work of grace in a human life, that grace is adequate for all the needs embraced within the full personality of man.

PART II

THE IDEA OF THE BODY IN THE ECCLE-
SIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT. A CONFLICT
BETWEEN HEBREW AND GREEK CON-
CEPTIONS.

THE POST-APOSTOLIC AGE

WE are now to follow the fortunes of the New Testament conceptions as they emerge into the wider sphere of the Roman Empire. The field which we enter is exceedingly broad, and it is by no means easy, in a rapid summary, to thread our way through the intricacies of the Patristic and Mediæval Christian developments. Fortunately, for our purpose, the story of this development is largely that of a struggle between Hebrew and Greek conceptions of human nature, and although we shall consider only great and typical writers, it is possible to keep the main issue clearly before us without wandering into the many interesting by-paths of Church history.

When the ideas of the New Testament faced the challenge of the Roman Empire, they were called upon to maintain their life in an atmosphere far different from that of the thought-circles of Palestine. The new atmosphere was distinctly and strongly Greek. "The first Christian communities of any considerable size had their home in the great Greek cities on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean . . . the Church grew up on Greek soil . . . no religion could establish itself in the Greek-speaking world without coming to a reckoning with Greek philosophy."¹ In the following chapters we shall consider the conflict between Hebrew and Greek ideas as it is apparent in typical Christian thinkers and as it concerns our special interest in the doctrine of the body. Here, by way of introduction, we may well briefly survey the Post-Apostolic age: the writers of this period perform a double service: they bridge the gulf between the New Testament and outstanding writers like Tertullian and the Alexandrians: they focus the

¹ Burkitt, *Early Christianity Outside the Roman Empire*, Introduction. For an excellent summary of the difference between the Hebrew and Greek attitudes, see Wheeler Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man*, 151 f., and Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie*, ii. 359.

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main problems with which we shall be concerned all through our survey.

It was in Egypt, as Bigg remarks,¹ that the first systematic attempts were made to harmonize the tradition of faith with the free conclusions of human intellect, but although the problems were brought into prominence in Alexandria by virtue of the peculiar circumstances which prevailed there, they were more or less present to most of the early Christian writers. Their training made them familiar with Greek thought, and their presentation of the Gospel was conditioned largely by the Greek character of their audience. The earliest Apologists were drawn into the field largely through the activities of the Gnostics, and Gnosticism, as we shall see, owed much of its characteristic influence to Greek speculations. Harnack has emphasized the importance of Greek thought in the development of dogma, calling that development the working of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel.² It is clear that he regards this as a perversion of the original Gospel: at this stage all we are concerned to do is to note the operation of the two traditions as they affect the Christian ideas of the body in human personality.

1. *The Apostolic Fathers*.—The literary remains of this period are scanty, and, in any case, men like Clement, Ignatius and Polycarp are not so much great writers as great characters,³ their importance lying in their contribution to our knowledge of Church life, the Sacraments, and the Ministry. We note, however, a general reference to the resurrection of the body.⁴ Ignatius presents eternal life in the ethical fulness characteristic of the Johannine writings, while the resurrection is treated after the Pauline fashion. Christ Himself rose both in spirit and flesh, and the resurrection of the Christian is related to that of Christ. To illustrate the

¹ *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, 25.

² *History of Dogma*, E.T., i. 21, 46, 47.

³ See E. De Pressensé, *Trois Premiers Siècles*, iii. 451.

⁴ Clement of Rome, cc. 24, 29. Epistle of Barnabas, cc. 5, 6. Didache, end of last chapter. Ignatius, *Ad Smyr*, 3, 6, 12, ii. Clement to Corinth, 6, 7.

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resurrection of the body Clement uses the analogies of day and night, and the seed,¹ and gives the fable of the phoenix as an emblem of resurrection.²

2. *Gnosticism*.—Gnosticism is important by reason of its fundamental dualism, which appears to have had a Persian origin, but under the influence of Greek speculation the contrast between light and darkness became that between spirit and matter, between the higher world of pure being and the lower world of sense. This dualism found expression in various Gnostic tenets: the separation of the highest God from the Old Testament Creator: the separation of the real Christ from the historic Jesus: the division of men into classes (such as the theory of Valentinus who divided beings into spiritual, psychic, and hylic). It was recognized that spirit and matter, though irreconcilable, have actually become mingled, and the result is the evil and misery of human life.³ The predestined soul, the divine element which has strayed into human nature, has no solidarity with the flesh which oppresses it, and its redemption (ever the primary interest in Gnosticism) demands either that the flesh be spurned by asceticism or that the responsibility of the soul for bodily weaknesses must be denied.⁴ This disparagement of the body is seen in the Gnostic Docetism, for neither the Passion nor the Resurrection of Jesus was considered real. Gnosticism attacked the entire Christian eschatology, having no place at all for the resurrection of the body. Whatever designation we may give to the Gnostics of the first century, whether with Harnack we call them the first theologians of the first century who tried to capture the Gospel for Hellenic culture,⁵ or with Bigg we call them the first Freemasons,⁶ it is clear that their emphasis is anti-Hebrew. If on the one side Gnosticism failed to do justice to the Old Testament conception of God,

¹ 1 Cor. ch. 24.

² 1 Cor. ch. 25. Cf. Tertullian, below.

³ E. F. Scott, *E.R.E.*, vi. 234.

⁴ L. Duchesne, *Early History of the Church*, i. 128.

⁵ *History of Dogma*, i. 227.

⁶ *Christian Platonists*, 56.

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on the other it failed to do justice to those values which underlie the Hebrew idea of personality.

3. *The attack on Gnosticism—Irenæus and Hippolytus.*—Irenæus and his pupil Hippolytus are conspicuous for their attack on the Gnostic position. The former, by virtue of his knowledge of Polycarp, an interesting link between the Apostolic age and subsequent thought, made an important contribution to the question of Apostolic Succession, the question of the interpretation of truth (*Regula Fidei*), and the doctrine of the Incarnation and Death of Christ (*Recapitulatio*). For our purpose it is important to notice that Irenæus starts from the position that there is a real kinship between the Creator and the world He created. God made matter. . . . Scripture does not exactly say how, and we ought not to indulge in conjecture¹ . . . and matter cannot be evil. Man is *temperatio animæ et carnis*. The soul teaches the body, imparts to it spiritual vision: body is to soul as instrument to workman.² Both spirit and flesh are needed for the complete man.³ Irenæus is very emphatic on the reality of the resurrection, his argument having quite a Pauline flavour. To deny the salvation of the flesh were to deny the reality of the Death of Christ and the efficacy of the Eucharist. Christ united himself with human nature so that by adoption he might deify it and guarantee to it the inheritance of life.⁴ Statements like these indicate that Irenæus was concerned to protect the Biblical view of man against the Gnostic disparagement of the flesh. In general he speaks of man as composed of soul and body, but occasionally he refers to three divisions—spirit, soul, and body.⁵

In Hippolytus we find substantially the same emphasis, but with an admixture which reminds us of the Greek

¹ *Contra Hæreses*, ii. 28. 7. These references are taken from Migne, *Ser. Græ.*, tome 7.

² *Con. Hær.*, ii. 33. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, v. 6. 1.

⁴ *Con. Hær.*, v. 2. 2 f. Cf. Bethune Baker, *Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine*, 131.

⁵ *Con. Hær.*, v. 9. 1. The highest element in the soul is found only in the complete man: the incomplete man consists only of the (lower) soul and body. Possibly we have here a further type of Patristic psychology.

physicists. His theory of the universe is that all consists of the four elements—earth, air, fire, and water. Things composed of one element (such as angels, who are fire) are indissoluble and therefore immortal. Things composed of more than one element are subject to death by the dissolution of their component parts. Man comes within this category, for he is composed of all four elements, his soul being air. Divine and immortal life is not man's by nature, but comes to him by the gift of God. That Hippolytus believed in the resurrection is seen from his description of Hades. It is an underground place where souls remain until the Day of Judgment. The good are conducted to a place called Abraham's bosom, while the bad are led to a place of darkness and a lake of fire. The bodies of the righteous will rise glorified and renewed, while those of the wicked will rise with all the decay and disease in which they died. The righteous will possess an immortal body, placed beyond the possibility of corruption, just like the soul.¹ Passages such as these make it easy for us to understand the taunt of Celsus, that the Christian view is materialistic, and as we proceed we shall see how the idea of the resurrection body came to be increasingly spiritualized.

4. *The Apologists*.—The works of the Apologists are more or less Greek versions of Christianity. Whether they write in Latin (as Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Arnobius, Lactantius) or in Greek (Aristides, Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria), they are all disciples of Greek culture, as Gwatkin remarks,² and in the main defenders of it: the one prominent exception is Tatian the Assyrian. In general their concern was to prove to the "outsider" that Christianity was the highest wisdom and the absolute religion.

Justin Martyr is an excellent example of the combination of Greek and Hebrew ideas. Very sympathetic to

¹ *Refutation of All Heresies*, x. 28, 30. A.N.C.L. Book I of the *Refutations* was formerly known as the *Philosophoumena* of Origen.

² *Early Church History*, i. 180.

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Greek philosophy, he could still urge that the soul is not by nature immortal. Its immortality depends on the will of God who created it, and includes as its essential requisite the resurrection of the body without which justice cannot be fulfilled¹ . . . an argument often met with in ecclesiastical writings. Like Paul, Justin believed that the hope of resurrection consecrated the whole man to eternal holiness. God will raise and endow with incorruptibility the dead bodies now dissolved and scattered like seed over the earth.² This is clearly a Hebrew tendency, but we may note a leaning to the Greek view in Justin's description of the triple nature of human personality. The passage, though somewhat obscure, refers to Christ who, appearing for our sakes, became the whole rational being, body and reason and soul.³

By way of contrast we may quote Tatian, conspicuous for the way in which he views Greek philosophy with disfavour. He appears to recognize three parts in man—spirit, soul, and body. At the Fall man lost the spirit or higher nature, which had in it immortality,⁴ and in this world, which is a world of probation, man must aim at the recovery of his former estate. We note a Hebrew emphasis in the statement that the soul cannot appear without a body, neither can the flesh rise without the Soul.⁵ The power of God to effect resurrection is vividly expressed.⁶

This idea of the resurrection of the body is general in the second-century Apologists, though we cannot fail to notice the mingling of Greek and Hebrew conceptions. Athenagoras is worthy of special notice. In the Platonic manner he refers to the soul as immortal in its own right, and to sin and misery as due to entanglement with matter.⁷ On the other hand, rational judgment is to be assigned to the whole compound being man,

¹ *Dialogue with Trypho*, cc. 5, 6.

² *Apology*, i. 18, 19. Cf. i. 52.

³ ii. *Apology*, c. 10. It is conceivable that only a dual division is meant. See art. "Justin", *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iii. 570.

⁴ *Oratio adv. Græc.* viii.

⁵ See art. "Tatian", *D.C.B.*, iv. 793.

⁶ *Orat. adv. Græc.* vi. fin.

⁷ *Plea for the Christians*, 27.

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and not to soul only . . . implying that body shares with soul the activities of personality.¹ The passage where this suggestion occurs forms part of one of the earliest extant treatises on the resurrection, written by Athenagoras as a sequel to his *Plea for the Christians*. The argument is as follows: resurrection is demanded by the final cause of man's creation, viz. that he should be a perpetual beholder of God's wisdom.² It is demanded by man's nature, soul without body being imperfect.³ Divine judgment demands a future life of soul and body.⁴ He has no doubts that He who created the body can raise up the dead.⁵ The body of the resurrection will differ from that of the present life, blood and breath and bile contributing nothing to the life of the future.⁶

This broad summary of the Apologists focuses, as we have already claimed, that clash between Hebrew and Greek attitudes which is so important in the development of ecclesiastical thought. On the one hand we note a similarity with well-defined Greek ideas like the conception of God and, in some cases, the tripartite nature of man. The main conception, however, is that man is composed of soul and body, and it is frequently asserted that without the body human life is incomplete. This Hebraism is seen also in the idea that it was the will and power of God that gave the soul its being, in the opposition to pre-existence and transmigration, and in the emphasis on bodily resurrection. The Apologists could not countenance the idea that the body was the prison of the soul: God's purpose in making man embraced his whole being, and in this they are in accord with the essential teaching of the New Testament.

¹ *On the Resurrection of the Dead*, 15.

³ 15.

⁴ 18, 20, 21.

² *Ibid.*, 12, 13.

⁵ 3.

⁶ 10.

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(1) STOICISM

ONE of the first impressions which come to the student of Church History is the extraordinary range and variety of interests opened up in the centuries of Patristic development. A monumental work like Harnack's *History of Dogma* is apt to prove discouraging to all who are not prepared to follow with patience the many wanderings of speculation, and it is no easy task to compress into a summary the discussions which occupied Church leaders for centuries. Our special inquiry in these chapters is made more difficult because the great historians of the period have been concerned more with Soteriology and Christology than with psychological interests. The trend of thought on our subject of the body and personality is to be discovered only by the accumulation of scattered references, and an attempt will here be made to gather these references and arrange them in orderly sequence. Outstanding and typical writers only will be considered, and our plan will take the form of examining the Greek tradition in its three sections, Stoic, Platonic, and Aristotelian, followed by an estimate of the extent to which the Hebrew idea of personality persisted throughout the development.

Of the three forms of Greek influence named, the Platonic and the Aristotelian are of much greater importance than the Stoic, but all three made their contributions. As Edwyn Bevan says,¹ in the end a religion which arose outside the Hellenic tradition, among the Hebrews of Palestine, conquered the Roman Empire and abolished the worship of the Greek gods, but even so Greek religious thought did not cease to have power over men's minds. A great mass of Platonism, Aris-

¹ *Later Greek Religion*, Introduction.

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totelianism, and Stoicism, was taken over by Christianity, and became part of the Christian tradition. As we shall see, this is more true of the two former systems than of the last named: but some attention to Stoicism is necessary if for no other reason than that Tertullian, one of the most influential of Latin writers, shows in his psychology a certain kinship with the Stoic point of view.

E. V. Arnold writes enthusiastically of the effect of Stoicism on the Christian Church.¹ From the third century onwards, he claims, it was rapidly absorbed in Christianity. This is a very broad statement, and needs modification. As far as its conceptions of personality are concerned, we shall find that its influence was restricted and soon gave way to ideas of another school. There is no doubt that the main influence of Stoicism on the thinkers of the Church was by virtue of its moral earnestness. Similarity, of language as well as thought, has been found in the writings of Paul and Seneca, but Lightfoot has conclusively shown the essential differences between the two systems.² It is not difficult to understand why Tertullian should speak of Seneca as "often our own",³ or why from the age of S. Jerome "Seneca was commonly regarded as standing on the very threshold of the Christian Church".⁴ The fine moral tone of much of his writing, like that of Epictetus in the *Discourses* and the *De Officiis*, commends itself to those whose outlook is dominated by the Christian ethic, and, indeed, is natural to writers who insisted, as the later Stoics did, on the life of Reason and conformity with Nature. But in the special question of personality we shall be wise if we refrain from sweeping statements about Stoic influence. We shall see that this form of Hellenic culture claimed only one great Christian writer, and that even in his case the Hebrew point of view was too strong to be completely merged.

Two important points concern us—the Stoic con-

¹ E.R.E., art. "Stoics".

³ Ibid.

² S. Paul and Seneca in *Philippians*

⁴ Ibid.

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ception of the soul and a certain dualism in some Stoic writers.

1. Fundamental in the Stoic system was its monism, the doctrine of the one elemental stuff or "body". A fragment of Zeno, quoted by Galen,¹ declares that God is a bodily substance (*sōma*). The history of the universe starts with the elemental or all-pervasive fire, which is also the Deity and the First Cause. The primal fire converts itself into the four elements, and these in turn into the various orders of living things. Body is combined with soul in its varying grades by the principle of pervasive mixture. Nowhere is there an absolute line of demarcation, and as all beings have proceeded from God, so they will be absorbed in deity at the general conflagration with which the history of the universe ends. During each stage the universe is controlled by the divine principle of order. Man is the universe on a small scale, and each human soul is a fragment of the universal divine force.² Varro quotes a fragment of Zeno which states that "the seed of living beings is that fire which is soul (*psuche*), while Diogenes Lærtius quotes another saying, "the soul is a hot, gaseous substance" (*pneuma enthermon*).³ The corporeal character of the soul is revealed in the Stoic paradox, "soul is body".

Tertullian's constant citation of Nature, the stress he lays on natural law, and his insistence on the rationality and order of the universe,⁴ reveal his Stoic sympathies, and they are shown also in his psychology. "I call upon the Stoics to help me," he says,⁵ "who, while declaring almost in our own terms that the soul is a spiritual essence (inasmuch as breath and spirit are in their nature very near akin to each other) will yet have no difficulty in persuading us that the soul is a corporeal substance." We may notice some of Tertullian's arguments:

The soul is itself set in motion by external action (as, e.g. under the influence of prophetic inspiration),

¹ Bevan, *Later Greek Religion*, 1.

² Arnold, *E.R.E.*, xi. 862.

³ Bevan, 5.

⁴ See Glover, *Conflict of Religions*, 314 f.

⁵ *De Anima*, chap. v.

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and it sets bodies in motion. It could not do this if it were not a body.¹

It is by means of corporeal senses that we become aware of such incorporeal things as sounds, colours, smells. A fair conclusion is that the soul itself is corporeal.²

Although soul and body have their peculiar sustenance (wisdom and learning on the one hand, food and drink on the other), he can quote the medical authority of Soranus that corporeal food is necessary for the well-being of soul.³

He finds support in Biblical passages which speak of the suffering of the soul when in separation from the body. The parable of the rich man and Lazarus shows the rich man suffering agonies of thirst in Hell.⁴

He goes on to describe more fully the corporeal nature of the soul. It has a body "propriæ qualitatis et sui generis"⁵ He ascribes to soul the more usual characteristics of body, such as length, breadth, height, limitation, figure (*habitus*). The soul has eyes and ears of its own. In a striking passage he adduces the evidence of a Montanist sister (important as suggesting that Tertullian believed that the Paraclete had given this vision to the sister). She told him that a spirit was in the habit of appearing to her, not an empty illusion but capable of being grasped by the hand, soft, transparent, and of an ethereal colour.⁶

We need not further reproduce his psychological sympathies with Stoic doctrine: his very definite acceptance of their corporeal conception of soul indicates that however far he may have strayed from the traditional Biblical spiritual conception, he was in no danger of disparaging the corporeal as such. This Stoic point of

¹ *De An.*, 5.

² *Ibid.*

³ *De An.*, 6. Many passages show that he had dipped into medicine, *De An.*, 2, 10, 25, 43.

⁴ *De Resurrectione Carnis*, 17. Tertullian is not always consistent on this point. *Apology*, 48, and *De Testimonia Anima*, 4, suggest that soul is incapable of suffering without the flesh.

⁵ *De An.*, 9.

⁶ *Ibid.*

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view was destined soon to give way to a Platonic view, which, through exponents like the Alexandrians and Augustine, was to hold sway in the Church for many centuries.

(2) An interesting development in Stoic teaching is seen in its dualism, which, though surprising in view of the fundamental monism of the system, is clearly and definitely shown in many writers.¹ "Experience and reflection drove Seneca more and more into an acceptance of the Platonic opposition of reason and passion, an unceasing struggle of the flesh and spirit, in which the old Stoic theory of the oneness of the rational soul tended to disappear."² So to Seneca, as to the Orphics and to Plato, the body is a prison and life a long imprisonment.³ Not that this is always his theme, but it is too clear and definite to be avoided. Later Stoicism showed a definite ascetic tendency.⁴

Suggestions of this attitude are not wanting in Tertullian. As is well known, in his later period he shared certain Montanist sympathies, and the followers of Montanus were decidedly rigorous in their attitude to life. In his attitude to fasting,⁵ to second marriage,⁶ and the exaggerated value he set on voluntary virginity,⁷ some have found a disparagement of the flesh. But two points need to be noted. First, we are probably not to attribute this rigorism, such as it is, to Montanist influence. It appears before his Montanist period . . . his opposition to second marriages, e.g. is shown in the pre-Montanist treatise *Ad Uxorem*.⁸ He was attracted to Montanism by "the assurance the new Prophecy seemed to give that the Holy Spirit was still teaching in the Church".⁹ Possibly the current Gnostic teaching influenced him towards setting a high value on voluntary virginity, but these elements in his teaching are more

¹ See above in Introduction.

² S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, 308.

³ Epistle, 120, para. 14. Cf. 65, para. 16.

⁴ See E.R.E., xi. 85.

⁵ E.g. in *De Jejuniis adversus Psychicos*.

⁶ *De exhortatione castitatis. De Monogamia*.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ See E.R.E., art. "Montanism".

⁹ Swete. *Holy Spirit*, 79.

than overbalanced by a very vigorous insistence on the true dignity of the flesh.¹ He saw how important it was to preserve the true Biblical regard for the body. The flesh was created by God. Christ partook of it. Christianity in its fastings and observances provides for honourable offerings of service which are connected with the body. Moreover, Tertullian wrote very strongly about the resurrection of the flesh. Shall men perish when even the birds of Arabia are secured a resurrection? Looking round on Nature, as Stoicism taught him to do, he felt that all the revolving order of things bore witness to the resurrection of the dead.² He had no doubts concerning the raising of the flesh . . . "*ita restitutionem carnis faciliorem credas institutione*". We need not reproduce here all his arguments for the resurrection. It is enough to mention those which bear on the importance of the body. It is needed in the future life for the exact apportioning of reward or punishment. The body is to be raised in its perfect integrity, the blind, lame, and palsied having all their imperfections made perfect.³ This means, of course, a cycle of change, but within the change the identity is to be preserved.⁴ Tertullian was not unaware of the many objections to his view, but he felt that Scripture supported him, and he quoted the Old Testament, the Gospels, and especially Paul. To the objection that the future life will have no need of limbs and organs, he replied cleverly "*licet officiis liberentur sed iusticiis retinentur*".⁵ If you regard the soul as a bride, he said, then the body will follow her as her dowry.⁶

These statements, in Tertullian, so far from reading like a fundamental dualism, suggest a Biblical regard for the body, and this is confirmed by other references. The experience of human life shows a close connection between body and soul. In the individual they are inseparable in their origin. They are conceived, formed,

¹ He regarded Gnosticism as the embodiment of theological corruption, and fought it with great vehemence.

² *De Res. Carnis*, 12 (cf. *Apol.*, 48).

³ 57.

⁴ 59.

⁵ 60.

⁶ 63.

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perfected in their substance simultaneously.¹ Growth and maturity in soul are analogous to growth and maturity in body.² While the soul is the principle of life and activity³, the body is the channel of sensation, and it is required to translate the thoughts of the soul into action. Soul and body, then, are associates and coheirs, both on this plane and in eternity. The soul shares the body's pain, while the body is affected by the soul's anxiety.⁴ Tertullian reveals his view of the very close connection between the spiritual and the material in his rather frank discussion of conception and birth: in the exercise of sexual function, soul and body discharge a duty together.⁵ The only thing that does separate soul and body is death, and even this is overcome by the power of God in the resurrection.

In his remarks on the function of body in human life Tertullian anticipated many questions which proved to be matters of controversy in the Patristic development. From the above quotations it will be realized that he favoured Traducianism, a theory of the origin of the soul which gained general acceptance in the West, was represented in the East by writers like Gregory of Nyssa, but later fell into disrepute. We shall see how this theory has much to commend it, in the light of the pronouncements of biology and psychology. We need not follow Tertullian further in his speculations. The citations already made indicate clearly enough how powerful was the Stoic influence upon him, and, on the other hand, how tenaciously he held to those values of the body which were the Hebrew, as distinct from the Greek, contribution to the understanding of man.

¹ *De An.*, 27.

² *Ibid.*, 36.

³ "Tertullian upheld the corporeal nature of the soul as against Plato, but that did not prevent him from decrying mechanism in biology" (Needham, in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, 227).

⁴ *De An.*, 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

CHAPTER V

THE GREEK TRADITION

2. PLATONISM

PLATONISM must be given a high place among those influences which determined the trend of Christian thought. For good or ill the teaching of the Academy made a considerable difference as far as the Reformation, passed into modern philosophy, and is still vigorous to-day. There are those who, like Dean Inge, find in this influence all that is permanent and valuable: but it is necessary to examine the Platonic tradition as it made itself felt in the Church, for there can be no doubt that in some points, at least, it has succeeded in obscuring the conception of man which the New Testament bequeathed to the world.

For the real significance of this tradition we look not to Athens but to Alexandria. The followers of Plato, while professing loyalty to their master, succeeded in drawing attention away from his idealism: that fell into the background, and "a speculation, at once arid and timorous, on epistemology, led the school, under Arcesilaus and Carneades, to deny the possibility of knowledge, asserting that probability is enough for practical purposes. . . . The New Academy followed, given up to quibbling disputations. . . . Greek thought was now entering upon a long period of comparative barrenness".¹ There was, however, a vigorous revival which occurred in the rise of Neo-Platonism, itself a legitimate development of Greek thought and of Plato's own speculations. In the important city of Alexandria there grew together two movements which must both be considered in this survey. On the one hand, there was the Catechetical School, distinguished by its attempt to interpret Hellenism by stretching it on a framework of Jewish orthodoxy:² on the other, there was the

¹ Inge, *E.R.E.*, ix. 306, art. "Neo-Platonism".

² See Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, ch. 1.

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emergence of Plotinus, the conspicuous exponent of Neo-Platonism. Origen was an older contemporary of Plotinus, and we cannot therefore speak of Neo-Platonic influence in his case,¹ but for the rest the power of Plotinus is seen down the ages as far as the great mystic, Eckhart. The Cappadocians, Augustine, mediæval Scholasticism, all show traces of his influence—so deeply did the Platonic tradition enter into the thought of the developing Church.

A brief reference has already been made both to Platonic and Neo-Platonic teaching, but we may here review the main views which could be considered likely to affect conceptions of human personality. We have seen how important was Plato's dualism with its scorn of the body. Inge admits that popularized Platonism often takes a dualistic form, but "neither in Plato nor in Plotinus is there any justification for the notion that there are two world-principles and two worlds".² Whatever may be the verdict on this issue as far as metaphysics are concerned, it cannot be doubted that both in Plato and Plotinus there is an ethical dualism, a dualism which in practice works out to the disparagement of the body. Inge admits that Plotinus regarded marriage and human love as chains which bind men and women to the sensuous life. One of the strongest features of Neo-Platonism was its ethical tendency, and from the *Enneades* we gather that the upward movement of the soul is one of increasing freedom from the attractions of sense: it leads to a beatific state that has no pleasure in earthly things.³ The soul is to be constantly purified from external stains. This, clearly, is far short of the Biblical attitude which can see in the normal life something wholesome, however fine it may be in its spiritual emphasis. Plotinus does not clearly declare himself on the question of the relation between matter and evil. Some statements lead Zeller to conclude that Plotinus makes matter the evil principle.⁴ Inge, however, thinks that he leans to a negative view—the opposition

¹ Inge, *E.R.E.*, ix. 318.

² *Ibid.*, 309.

³ E.g. *Enneades*, vi. 9, 11.

⁴ *Grundriss der Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie*, para. 97 and 98.

between good and evil is merely relative.¹ But if we take the Neo-Platonic system as a whole, there is no doubt that its mystical enthusiasm, its intense spiritual emphasis, its objection to materialism in all its forms, were calculated rather to obscure the Hebrew witness to the body. Before our birth, according to Plotinus, we existed as pure souls and spirits, attached to the universal soul. "It is permissible to say that God sent down the souls to earth, for the operation of the highest principle, even though there are many stages between, can be traced down to the end of the process. And yet the soul commits two faults, one in coming down, the other in entering into bodies. It does so by choice, and because it desires to bring order into what is below. If it returns quickly, it has suffered no hurt . . . the soul learns its own good by the experience of contraries, though the strongest souls may understand evil without the experience of it."² Admitting the want of consistency in Plotinus' teaching on this, there is a clear reverence for Plato, and the general impression is one of disparagement of bodily existence. There is the same suggestion in Plotinus' remarks on the resurrection . . . it is an awakening from the body, not with it.³ Ueberweg sums up the teaching of Plotinus on soul and body as follows: "The body is in the soul, and depends on it: but the soul, on the contrary, is absolutely separable from the body, not only in respect of its thinking power, but also in its lower faculties, memory, and sensuous perception, and even in the formative force through which it moulds and builds up its material environment. It precedes and survives the body."⁴

The strength of this Platonic tradition may now be examined by reference to five main points, all of which have a direct bearing on the question of personality and the part played by the body in it.

1. The beginning of personality.
2. The unity of personality.
3. Dualism and its practical expression in asceticism.

¹ *E.R.E.*, ix. 210.

³ *Enn.*, iii. vi. 3.

² Inge, quoting *Enneades*, iv. viii.

⁴ *History of Philosophy*, i. 241.

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4. Personality beyond death.

5. The mystical note.

On each of these points Platonism had something to say, and although to cover the whole ground would carry us beyond our immediate purpose, we may summarize the effect of the Platonic trend wherever we find it, keeping in mind our special concern, the fortunes of the Christian view of the body as it struggled for existence among the various currents in the stream.

I. THE BEGINNING OF PERSONALITY.

We have already seen that Tertullian was a strong exponent of Traducianism. "The first man bore within him the germ of all mankind; his soul was the fountain head of all human souls . . . as the body is derived from the bodies of the parents, so the soul is derived from the souls of the parents, body and soul together being formed by natural generation."¹ Such a view of the origin of life in the individual enables us to preserve the idea of body-soul unity: at least they come into being together. But great prominence was given in the ecclesiastical development to another view, due to Platonism, which revealed the body in a different light. The theory of pre-existence had made its appearance in Gnosticism and Manichæism, and it is not difficult to understand its presence in systems which contained theories of emanation and the inherent sinfulness of matter. As early as the middle of the second century it was taught by Justin Martyr,² and came into special prominence in the writings of the Christian Platonists of Alexandria. It is not quite certain whether Clement adopted the view. There are passages where it seems to be denied (*Stromateis*, iii. 13. 93; iv. 26. 127), yet it seems to be implied in *Stromateis*, vii. 2. 9.³ There

¹ Bethune Baker, *Early History of Christian Doctrine*, 303.

² See art. "Justin M." in *D.C.B.*, iii. 579.

³ Fairweather (*Origen and Greek Patristic Theology*, 27) thinks that Clement rejects it, while Inge (*E.R.E.*, i. 314) thinks he was inclined to accept the doctrine without, however, accepting the Platonic doctrine of metempsychosis.

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is no doubt, however, about Origen's acceptance of the theory. Creation, as we understand it, was not for Origen the absolute beginning of human history, but rather an intermediate stage.¹ Æons rolled away before this world was made, and there will be untold ages when the world has ceased to be. In the beginning of this intermediate stage God peopled the world with intelligences: some of these remained faithful to their first estate, or even rose higher: others declined, and were turned into souls, better or worse, according to their degree of declension, i.e. the extent to which sense and desire gained supremacy over intelligence. It is from this point of view that Origen considered *Katabole* to be a very expressive term as applied to the creation of the world. Matter was created after, and in consequence of the fall of the intelligences by their wrong exercise of freedom. So life in the body means a descent from the higher to the lower.² Origen found support for his view in Scripture. In this way he interpreted the Fall in Gen. iii.³ He explained the choice of Jacob in preference to Esau as the result of merit acquired in a previous life.⁴ We may note, however, that Origen does not follow Plato in the doctrines of metempsychosis and reminiscence.

The corollary of pre-existence is the conception of the body as the prison of the soul. Plato, Philo, and Plotinus all proceeded to this corollary, and there are certain passages in Origen which have the same colour about them; but in spite of this, and Origen's personal acts of asceticism, we shall find that he can stress the necessary connection of soul and body in the future life . . . an indication that if he has one eye on Plato, he has the other on the Christian tradition.

The doctrine of pre-existence had varied fortunes in the period subsequent to Origen. It had a strong opponent in Methodius of Tyre, in the last decade of the third century. Even granting pre-existence, he said, how

¹ *De Principiis*, ii. 3. 5.
Ibid., iv. 1. 16.

² Ibid., iii. 5. 4.

⁴ Ibid., ii. 9. 7.

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could the addition of a body to a sinful spirit be a remedy for sin: it would rather be a greater possibility for sin. Salvation implies the union, not the separation, of soul and body.¹ The Cappadocians, whose general devotion to Origen is very marked, also rejected the doctrine, Gregory of Nazianzus adopting the Creationist view, while Gregory of Nyssa used language suggestive of Traducianism.² Among the Latin writers, Lactantius rejected the theory,³ preferring the creationist view: indeed, it is in this writer that we find the first explicit statement of creationism. Augustine gave considerable attention to all three theories of the origin of the soul. Pre-existence he criticized on three main grounds. The Alexandrian view, he said, implies that creation did not spring from God's desire to make everything good, but from His desire to repress the evil that has come into the world of intelligences.⁴ This objection, however, is hardly conclusive against Origen, who could properly reply that the creation was really an evidence of God's goodness, inasmuch as the world is a pathway of restoration as well as a scene of discipline. The second objection is that on the Alexandrian theory devils ought to have the worst bodies, whereas in Origen's teaching the worst devils possess an etherial body. His third objection is that since, on the pre-existence hypothesis, it is God who sends the soul into its body, is not He really responsible for the ignorance and infirmity which the soul experiences in the bodily sphere? In reply to which the Alexandrians could rightly refer to their strong emphasis on freedom in the intelligences, and followers of Plotinus could refer to his conception that the soul has a generative power which enables it to produce and fashion its material environment.⁵ In his positive attitude to the question of the soul's origin Augustine shows signs of wavering. In a letter to Jerome he suggests that he could wish

¹ See *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iii., art. "Methodius".

² *De Hominis Opificio*, 28. 29.

³ *De Opificio Dei*, xix.

⁴ *De Civitate Dei*, xi. 23, where he discusses Origen's view.

⁵ For Augustine's discussion of the question, see *De Genesi ad Litteram*, vii. 25. *De Libero Arbitrio*, iii. 20.

that creationism were true,¹ and this theory is discussed not without sympathy in *De Genesi ad Litteram*, vii. 35. 36. But he is well aware of the difficulties:² he cannot find any texts for the view: moreover, it is clear that it would not fit in very well with his general theory . . . and it was held by Pelagius. The theory which best suits his views of sin and concupiscentia is, of course, Traducianism, yet he nowhere definitely teaches it. He had too acute a mind to ignore the difficulties of the view as it was expressed in Tertullian, and possibly it was his great desire to preserve the spirituality of the soul that prevented his definite acceptance of Traducianism.³ In the end he refused to pronounce definitely on the subject.⁴ It is interesting to note that Augustine was followed in this "open" position by Melancthon, to whose influence it was mainly due that the question was left an open one in the Protestant confessions. Among Greek writers subsequent to Augustine we find pre-existence accepted by Synesius⁵ and Nemesius,⁶ but rejected by Æneas of Gaza. The existence of the soul before its life in the body would be useless, superfluous, for man is one, and without body active soul life is possible.⁷ It is clear that Augustine's wavering on the subject had awakened echoes as far down as the twelfth century, and we find that from the commencement of the thirteenth the scholastics taught that the direct and daily intervention of the Creator alone can call into existence souls destined to animate human bodies. Aquinas was definite enough on the matter. He referred to those who professed Catholic doctrines but were imbued with Platonic doctrines, clearly a reference to Origen and Augustine. He criticized Origen in *Summa Theologica*, Book I, quæst 47, art. 2, and *Contra Gentiles*, ii. 83 f. In *Con. Gen.* ii. 86 he confuted the view

¹ Epis. clxvi.

² Epis. clxvi. 4. Cf. *De Anima et ejus Origine*.

³ See Ferraz, *De la Psychologie de Saint Augustin*, 36, and *De Gen. ad Lit.*, x. 24.

⁴ See *Retractiones*, ch. 56.

⁵ See *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iv. 769, and text in *Migne Ser. Græ.*, 66.

⁶ See his refutation of creationism and traducianism in *Migne P.C.*, vol. 40, ch. iii. p. 600, and ch. ii. p. 572 f.

⁷ *Migne Ser. Græ.*, 85, p. 947 f.

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that the soul was transmitted by generation. His conclusion is that it is to suit the body, as organized in the womb, that God creates the soul (*Sum. Theol.* i. 90. 2. 3; *Con. Gen.* ii. 83 f.).

From these references we gather that the Platonic idea of pre-existence, although influencing prominent writers, never succeeded in establishing itself in the councils of the Church. In the East creationism proved a powerful rival,¹ while in the West traducianism obtained such a hold that Leo could assert it to be part of the Catholic faith.² Traducianism, however, fell into disrepute in the Middle Ages, "as conflicting with the soul's immortality and materializing it, and not being needed by the form of anthropology which then prevailed".³ When the Council of Constantinople in 540⁴ condemned pre-existence, an important step was taken towards the preservation of those values of personality which the Hebrew scriptures had given to the Church: for not only did pre-existence exalt the soul at the expense of the body, but also, by its extreme individualism, it tended to obscure the idea of the solidarity of mankind.

2. THE UNITY OF PERSONALITY

In describing the system of Plotinus, Inge refers to his tripartite division of man into soul, spirit, and body, and remarks that such a triadic schematism was almost obligatory on a Greek philosopher. "In their objective aspects body, soul, and spirit are respectively the world as perceived by the senses, the world interpreted by the soul as a spatial and temporal order, and the spiritual world. The organs which perceive the world under these three aspects are the bodily senses, the discursive reason, and spiritual perception or intuitive knowledge. It is only when we exercise this last . . . that we are ourselves completely real and in contact with reality."⁵ In one form or another this trichotomy was characteristic

¹ E.g. Jerome and Hilary.

² *Epis.* xv.

³ Bethune Baker, 304.

⁴ See Hefele, *History of the Councils of the Church*, E.T., iv. 225. 336.

⁵ *E.R.E.*, ix. 309 f.

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of Greek anthropology, whereas it is the merit of the Hebrew view to have conceived man as a body-soul unity. To what extent did the Platonic tradition on this point influence ecclesiastical writers?

Tertullian was definitely against the trichotomous view. He would not accept any substantial difference between anima and spiritus. Spirit he declared to be merely an act or operation of the soul, expressive not of its nature but of its operation.¹ It is true that he sets the unity of the soul (with *nous* as its highest function) over against the body, but there are certain features in his teaching which suggest that we are not to regard the division as absolute. The soul pervades the body,² and in the education of the body we are not to disparage the bodily factor.³ The close connection between soul and body (which has been mentioned above⁴) suggests that, in spite of his sensitiveness to Greek influence in many ways, Tertullian was still anxious to conserve some elements in the Biblical tradition.

Among the Alexandrians we may mention Origen, who has been generally held to have accepted the tripartite view. He speaks of the spirit as having, through the Fall, become a soul. There are passages which suggest a tripartite view,⁵ and this is accepted as the Origenistic view by Harnack,⁶ and Fairweather, who suggests that soul stands midway between willing spirit and weak flesh, and constitutes the peculiar individuality of the man.⁷ But is spirit really something different from soul in Origen's teaching? Harnack points out an ambiguity of language here. "It is true that we also find in Origen the view that the spirit in man has itself been cooled into a soul, has been, as it were, trans-

¹ *De An.*, ii., if we want to call soul "spirit", then we must do so "non status nomine sed actus, nec substantiæ titulo sed operæ".

² *De An.*, 15, the manifold usage of "heart" in Scripture led him to the view that the soul resides particularly in the heart.

³ *De An.*, 18, where he attacks the Platonic view that as long as it is attached to the body the soul cannot attain truth.

⁴ Chapter IV.

⁵ *De Prin.*, iii. 4. 1. In *Evangelium Joannis*, xxxii. 11 (Brooke's ed. ii. 182). In *Levit. hom.*, ii. 2.

⁶ *History of Dogma*, E.T., ii. 363.

⁷ Origen and *Gk. Pat. Theol.*, 172.

formed into a soul: but there is necessarily an ambiguity here, because on the one hand the spirit of man is said to have chosen a course opposed to God, and, on the other, that which is rational and free in man must be shown to be something remaining intact. Man's struggle consists in the endeavour of the two factors forming his constitution to gain control of his sphere of action."¹ An important passage which bears on the point is found in *De Prin.*, ii. 8. 3, where Origen sums up: "From all which this appears to be made out, that the understanding, falling away from its status and dignity, was made or named soul; and that, if repaired and corrected, it returns to the condition of the understanding." As Origen puts it, soul is simply spirit grown cold, and if we couple with this his view that ultimately through piety and virtue soul will again become spirit, there seems ground for the contention of Denis² that for Origen spirit and soul are really one. Denis goes on to say that if Origen had not respected a division in terminology which came to him from Paul, he might well have suppressed one of the terms and thus have avoided a certain ambiguity. We have the same conclusion in Inge, who suggests that "in reality his psychology is dichotomic, though out of respect for S. Paul he preserves in words the distinction between soul and spirit".³

Yet we must notice, as in Tertullian, a close connection between soul and body. Soul is never found without bodily envelope of some kind. Origen's view, mentioned again and again, is that only the Holy Trinity can exist without bodily adjunct.⁴ When the spirits fell, they became souls and had appropriate coverings. Beyond the grave souls make use of a body after the kind they use in this life,⁵ while the resurrection will restore the spiritualized body. We shall return to Origen's idea of the resurrection later: meanwhile

¹ Op. cit.

² M. J. Denis, *Philosophie d'Origène*, 237.

³ E.R.E., i. 317. Cf. a similar conclusion in Brett, *History of Psychology*, i. 277 f.

⁴ *De Prin.*, i. 6. 4, ii. 2. 2.

⁵ See a fragment, *De Resurrectione*, quoted by Methodius, *Migne P.C. Ser. Græ.*, tome 11, col. 95.

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we may note that with all his emphasis on the spirituality of the soul, he cannot conceive it without some form of body. Harnack refers to his masterly way of reconciling opposites, and he is at times led into inconsistencies which are not always solved. Altogether, the Alexandrian is an excellent example of both Hebrew and Hellenic influences.

Gregory of Nyssa, a thoroughgoing student of Origen, was more definite in his attitude to the tripartite division of man than his master. He reduced man to a simple division between what is visible and what is invisible. Man is a microcosm, the meeting-point of two worlds, the sensible and the intelligible. Soul and body are most closely connected. God established man upon two constituents that he might feel at home both in his intercourse with God and in his enjoyment of earthly blessings.¹ The body is compared to a musical instrument over the whole of which the soul passes, touching each of the parts in a manner appropriate to its activities.² The soul is to be thought of as dynamically present in the body, and the exercise of mind depends on a sound state of the sense and the bodily organs. The spiritual and bodily parts of man are distinct, yet they are closely connected in a unity of experience. Possibly this wholesome attitude to the body was due to Gregory's wide observation and the influence of Galen. Yet we must notice a certain inconsistency. On the one hand, he speaks of the importance of the physical life, while, on the other, there are passages which remind us of Berkeley. In some passages Gregory reduces matter to a concourse of qualities. The several qualifications which constitute the body are grasped by thought alone, the body itself not being real substance.³ This, of course, is a departure from the teaching of Origen, who had declared that God created not merely the form and the qualities of

¹ *De Opific Hom.*, ch. 2.

² *Ibid.*, 12, where he criticizes the location of soul in heart, cerebrum, liver, etc.

³ *Ibid.*, 25. That the body itself is not a real substance is seen from *Contra Fatum*, 67.

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matter, but also that which underlies the form and qualities.¹ This opposition to the threefold division was continued in Lactantius,² but we shall notice that in many other respects Lactantius echoes the Greek conception of the body.

Augustine, the psychological genius of the Patristic period,³ shows a remarkable power of psychological analysis. There is no doubt that he went further than any writer of his time both in the appreciation of psychological difficulties⁴ and in suggestions for their solution. Although occasionally he spoke of spirit, soul, and body in a trichotomous sense,⁵ it is clear that on the whole he linked spirit and soul together: for all practical purposes, the distinction between spiritus and anima may be ignored.⁶ On the question of the soul, his outstanding contribution was his completion of the work of Origen in definitely asserting the spirituality of the soul. He would have nothing to do with the tendency to regard the soul as corporeal. Such a tendency arose, he said, naturally enough from the love which the soul had for the body, and from their entanglement in the familiarity of daily life.⁷ He appears to have been the first of the Fathers to insist on the conception of soul as spiritual substance,⁸ and also to apply the term "extension" to matter as indicating its distinctive attribute.⁹ His emphasis on the spirituality of the soul resulted in a distinction between two classes of existents, spiritual and material, though we must beware of attributing to him anything in the way of a cosmological dualism such as is found in Manichæism. His distinction between soul and body as two independent substances was a departure from the

¹ See *De Prin.*, ii. 1. On Gregory's anticipation of Berkeley's idealism, see Wicksteed, *Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy*, 400 f.

² *Institutiones Divinæ*, iii. 12. Cf. vii. 5.

³ Harnack, *H.D.*, v. 106.

⁴ *De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 10.

⁵ *De An. et ejus Orig.*, iv. 2. 3.

⁶ *De Fid. et Sym.*, para. 23. Epis. iii. para. 4. *De An. et ejus Orig.*, iv. ch. 20 para. 32.

⁷ *De Prin.*, x. 5. 6, and see *De Quantitate Animæ*, where he discusses the matter at length.

⁸ See his famous definition of the soul in *De Quant. An.*, xiii. *Nam mihi videtur esse substantia quædam rationis particeps, regendo corporis accommodata.*

⁹ McDougall, *Body and Mind*, 32.

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Hebrew view which was to exert great influence on later writers.

Yet he was acute enough as an observer to realize the close connection between soul and body. Although he saw the difficulty of combining a corporeal and an incorporeal principle,¹ he emphasized the interconnection between them.² The soul is diffused throughout the body,³ its special seat of activity being the brain. It is the continuous support of the body. Death breaks the union of soul and body, but here Augustine follows Paul in a strong emphasis on the resurrection.⁴ One of the most interesting sections of Augustine's discussion is his inquiry: what is the bond of union between soul and body? He disclaims any solution, but offers suggestions. The first is in his reproduction of the Platonic theory of Ideas. The explanation of all knowledge and existence is in the Ideas, or, as he calls them, the Rationes.⁵ The Rationes, themselves eternally existing in the divine intelligence, are the types according to which all existing things are formed. Mind is what it is by participation in these Rationes, and the same is true, in its own degree, of body. Thus this common participation, each in its own degree, in the eternal Rationes constitutes a bond of union between soul and body . . . the union coming from above, not below. A second suggestion occurs in his treatment of sensation and perception. McDougall states⁶ that in order to overcome the difficulty involved in the idea of mutual influence of such diverse things as material body and immaterial soul, Augustine postulates a third substance to serve as a medium of interaction. In *De Gen. ad Lit.* vii. he speaks of messengers by means of which the mind receives whatever material facts are accessible to it. A similar idea is seen in *De Musica*, vi. An effect produced on the sense by a blow is transmitted to this fine

¹ Epis. cxxxvii. para. 11.

² Epis. xi. para. 3.

³ *De Immor. An.*, xvi. 25. It is present in the body "vi et potentia". Cf. *De Quant. An.*, xxxii. para 69. Epis. clxvi. 4.

⁴ *De Civ. Dei*, xxiii. 21. Cf. *De Fid. et Sym.*, para. 23. 24.

⁵ *De Diversis Quæstionibus*, lxxxiii. quæst 46, para. 2.

⁶ *Body and Mind*, 33.

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substance where it produces a disturbance. This is carried further and reaches the soul.¹

We need not dwell further on this save to indicate Augustine's anticipation of a problem which is still very difficult. It is evident that although he shows traces of Greek influence, grasping and at the same time deepening much that came to him from Hellenism, he is not unmindful of those ideas about man which were part of the ecclesiastical tradition. In this way Augustine is typical of the general trend of ecclesiastical writing on this point. There is great respect for Neo-Platonic ideas, but that respect cannot quite submerge the Biblical values of personality. Among the writers subsequent to Augustine the influence of Neo-Platonism is very marked, especially in Synesius, who is in the Greek rather than the Hebrew tradition, and Nemesius, who, however, states the view that soul and body make one whole of such a kind that every soul must conserve the body that belongs to it, and every body must conserve the soul that has been given to it.² Æneas of Gaza shows independence of Neo-Platonic ideas. He declared that man is one: the existence of the soul before its life in the body would be useless, and resurrection is absolutely necessary if there is to be a real life in the future.³ The writers of the post-Augustinian period show the emergence of another type of Greek influence, Aristotelianism, but consideration of this must be left for a later chapter.

3. DUALISM AND ITS PRACTICAL EXPRESSION IN ASCETICISM

"The beginnings of asceticism in the Christian Church, especially as organized in the form of communities, constitute another chapter in the history of that process which is usually spoken of as the Hellenizing of Christianity."⁴ Although we are mainly concerned in this

¹ See Parry, *Augustine's Psychology*, 13.

² For Synesius, see *D.C.B.*, iv. 769 f. Text in *Migne Ser. Græ.*, 66. For Nemesius, see *Migne*, vol. 40, ch. iii. p. 600.

³ See his dialogue *Theophrastus*, *Migne Ser. Græ.*, 85, 947 f.

⁴ O. Zöckler in *E.R.E.*, ii. 74, art. on "Asceticism, Christian".

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chapter with the Platonic tradition, we may note that asceticism was much earlier than Platonism, and was found in many other Greek schools. As far back as the seventh century B.C., anticipations of ascetic practice are found in various religious cults, but, as Capelle points out,¹ these germinal notions could not develop into a genuine asceticism until men had become conscious of an opposition between soul and body. This consciousness rapidly developed on Greek soil. It appeared in Orphism and Pythagoreanism, and may be said to have culminated in the Platonic philosophy. There were traces of it, also, in the Cynic ethic, while, as we have seen, it took a definite form in later Stoicism. Neo-Pythagoreanism was characterized by an absolute dualism, and, as we have noted, Neo-Platonism sought true virtue in the extinction of all that binds to sensuous existence. Asceticism, as a practice, was probably confined to narrow circles in the Greek world, but through its greatest thinkers its influence has been very great. It is significant that Christian asceticism made its appearance in those lands where the civilization was Græco-Roman. Asceticism was richly developed, of course, in other religious systems, in India, Babylonia, and Egypt, but "when the various pre-Christian religious civilizations are pitted against one another, and their share in the result before us examined, none can dispute the palm with Greece".²

We need not enter here into the interesting story of the great spirit of renunciation as it found expression first in individual acts of rigorism and then in organized asceticism which culminated in the great monastic systems.³ Our main interest is to trace its expression in the writings of typical Churchmen, and to relate it to their general conception of personality. Tertullian, we have seen, expressed in some of his treatises a certain rigorism, but he could combine this with a real insistence

¹ *E.R.E.*, ii. 80, art. "Asceticism, Greek".

² Zöckler, *op. cit.*

³ For a fine study of this, see H. B. Workman, *The Evolution of the Monastic Ideal*, and for a brief study the present writer's *The Master and His Men*, ch. 3.

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on the dignity of the flesh. We shall find a similar double attitude to the question in many other writers, indicating once more that if Platonism is strong, it is never left in complete possession of the field.

Philo had a high regard for renunciation. Inge quotes him to the effect: "The soul should cut off its right hand"; "It should shun the whirlpool of life, and not even touch it with the tip of a finger."¹ R. H. Charles sums up Philo's teaching on the body: our present life in the body is death, for the body is the utterly polluted prison of the soul; nay, more, it is its sepulchre.² Clement of Alexandria does not quite follow Philo in this. True, he expressed a rigorous attitude to such things as fine clothes and worldly pleasures, but his attitude to many of the external occupations of life is quite genial. The true Christian may take part in honourable affairs and in public life. There is no virtue in celibacy as such: married life is superior as offering more temptations to be overcome.³ Whereas Philo dispensed with the need for the resurrection of the body, Clement here followed the Pauline teaching. Origen, however, was more definite. He lived with his disciples a life of asceticism, and in his youth went to extremes.⁴ Although later he repented of his youthful rashness, he never ceased to recommend world-renunciation, abstinence, and spiritual discipline. "All true Christians", he declared, "have the eye of the mind sharpened and the eye of sense closed."⁵ In one passage he commends three types of life as "holy and God-pleasing sacrifice", viz. martyrdom, voluntary celibacy, and sexual abstinence by married persons.⁶ Throughout his teaching we note a fine spiritual emphasis: yet we must note also that although he regards the body as sin-stained, he does not trace the origin of evil to matter but to the will. And he cannot conceive the future life without some form

¹ *Christian Mysticism*, 85.

² *A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, 2nd ed., 314.

³ *Strom.*, vii. 12. 70. Cf. *Pæd.*, ii. 10.

⁴ Eusebius, *H.E.*, vi. 8.

⁵ *Con. Cel.*, vii. 39.

⁶ *Comm. on Romans*, 12. 1. Cf. *Con. Cel.*, i. 26, vii. 48.

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of bodily accompaniment. If he is a Platonist, he is a Platonist with very important modifications.

Methodius, in keeping with his general attack upon the Origenistic position, declared that it is absurd to call the body a prison or fetter: it is an instrument for good as well as evil. A similar trend of thought is found in Gregory of Nyssa, who declared that the exercise of mind depends on a sound state of the senses and bodily organs. He was well aware, however, of the power of the body in the moral life, for in his charming *Life of S. Macrina* he speaks of the soul being freed from the body in death and saved from the cares of this life.¹ Lactantius regarded the body quite in the Greek fashion² . . . if anyone sets a high value upon the life of the soul, he must necessarily spurn the life of the body.³ Augustine, although he escaped from the Manichæan dualism, to the end showed his leaning towards an ascetic ideal of holiness: this is seen in his exaltation of virginity and his attitude to marriage. It must be remembered, however, as Harnack has pointed out,⁴ that while Augustine encouraged the ascetic life of the individual (perhaps as a reaction from his own earlier indulgences), he yet held that faith, hope, and charity were alone of decisive importance, and that therefore the worth of the man who possessed these virtues might no longer be determined by his outward performances.

These references in the prominent theologians indicate the very strong effect of the Platonic disparagement of the body, an effect which can be traced in the history of asceticism as an institution. In view of the emphasis we have observed in the Alexandrian school, it is not surprising that the earliest organized asceticism took place in Egypt, where theology and Church stood in close connection with the teaching of Origen. First the

¹ W. K. L. Clarke, *Life of S. Macrina*, 34.

² *Instit. Div.*, vii. 11.

³ *Ibid.*, vii. 5. 12.

⁴ *H. of D.*, v. 138. Hence, continues Harnack, it was Augustine who gave us the Reformation.

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yearning for self-surrender took shape in the lives of individuals like the famous Symeon Stylites, the typical ascetic of the East: then the story of isolated hermits becomes the story of groups of enthusiasts, which, organized into a common life, grew into the rich and powerful monasteries of later Christendom. The whole movement owed much to men like Pachomius, the founder of the Cenobite movement in Egypt, and Anthony, to whose life, together with that of Martin, monasticism in the fourth and fifth centuries owed much. The origin of monasticism lay without the Church: it was "a veritable stampede from the Catholic Church, as though that great creation of Christian energy were no better than the evil world from which escape was sought";¹ but great leaders within the Church, like Athanasius, the two Gregories, Augustine, recognized the purer ideal that lay in this laymen's movement, and, indeed, as we have seen, there was enough of Platonism in the current Church theology to give to organized asceticism a strong sanction. So the ascetic principle remained vigorous in the Middle Ages, and its influence is still felt in the Roman Church which, "along with the celibacy of the clergy, retains almost all the other intensifications of the ascetic principle which the mediæval development added to the Early Church traditions".² To such an extent did the Platonic tradition lead the growing Church away from the Hebrew wholesome attitude to the flesh.

4. PERSONALITY BEYOND DEATH

So far in our brief review of the influence of Platonism we have had occasion to refer again and again to the persistence among Christian writers of some idea of resurrection: it is now necessary to gather together the various strands of teaching on the idea of personality beyond the grave, for on this point the Christian and

¹ A. V. G. Allen, *Church Institutions*, 139.

² Zöckler, *E.R.E.*, ii. 58.

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the Greek conceptions are at variance. We have seen that the Christian view of the life to come demanded an appropriate organism for the full life of the redeemed soul. Platonism, on the other hand, sought the fulness of spiritual life in deliverance from the body. Plato and Plotinus taught the inherent immortality of the soul, and from their vision of the future resurrection in the Christian sense was excluded.¹ Gnosticism attacked the doctrine of the resurrection, and we can readily see that the atmosphere in which the early Christian writers did their thinking was not altogether sympathetic to the traditional conceptions. What was the effect of the Platonic view on the Church?

On the whole, the idea was accepted that the soul is naturally immortal. The only exceptions to this were those suggestions of a conditional immortality which have, in recent times, become so widespread. Perhaps the first instance of a philosophic presentation of the conditionalist idea is found in the Stoic Chrysippus,² but among the Greeks the idea never gained general acceptance. Justin Martyr, although following Plato in many points, declared that the soul is not by nature immortal. It receives immortality by the gift of God . . . but this, it may be noted, included as an essential requisite the resurrection of the body.³ Irenæus, also, believing that man through the Fall became subject to death set forth immortality as the gift of God: again, it is an immortality involving a resurrection.⁴ The outstanding exponent of conditionalist views among Christian writers, however, is the African apologist, Arnobius. He taught that the soul outlives the body, but it depends for its immortality on the gift of God.⁵ Lactantius wrote

¹ Plato founded his doctrine of the soul's immortality on the nature of the soul, as the self-moving principle of all motion (*Phædrus*): on the goodness of God, who cannot will that what has been put together so beautifully should be destroyed (*Timæus*). See also for other arguments the *Phædo* and *Republic*, x. Plotinus' view is summed up in his pointed phrase that resurrection is an awakening from the body (*Enn.*, iii. vi. 6).

² *Diogenes Laertes*, vii. 157 quotes Chrysippus to this effect. See H. W. Fulford, *E.R.E.*, iii. 832.

³ *Dial. with Trypho*, ch. 5. 6.

⁴ *Con. Har.*, ii. 29. 2.

⁵ *Adv. Gentes.*, ii. 14. 15. 16.

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somewhat in the same strain. Man is born mortal, but may attain immortality.¹ A life devoted to bodily pleasures ends in death for the body and eternal death for the soul. A righteous life, however, carries with it, as God's gift, eternal life.² We may note here that whereas Arnobius could not conceive immortality as purely spiritual, Lactantius saw true blessedness in the release of soul from body. Conditionalism never commended itself to the Church, and "from the fourth to the eighteenth century was not taught by anyone claiming to be an orthodox Christian".³

Almost all the great writers we are considering reveal an eagerness to preserve the conception of the resurrection: in many cases this is noteworthy, because of the presence of Platonic elements in their teaching on other points. Perhaps the only prominent exception to this is Synesius, who believed in the immortality of the soul, but regarded resurrection as merely allegorical: at death, he said, the body perishes, while the soul enters on a process of purification. But while we cannot claim that Platonism succeeded in obscuring the idea of the resurrection, it is clear that it did help towards a spiritualizing of the current conceptions. This is well illustrated in the Alexandrians. Philo had dispensed altogether with the idea of resurrection: Clement saw after death a period of spiritual development which needed a spiritualized body . . . there will be no distinction of sex, e.g. in the body of the next life. It was Origen, however, who vigorously attacked the current gross conceptions of the life to come—so vigorously, indeed, that some, like Methodius, quite misunderstood his real position. Current notions such as the rebuilding of the earthly Jerusalem he rejected as based on an incompetent interpretation of Scripture:⁴ from the same standpoint he would have nothing to do with Chiliasm.⁵ He con-

¹ *Instit. Div.*, vii. 5.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 12.

³ Fulford, *ibid.*

⁴ For an excellent treatment of Origen's view, see Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, Lect. VI.

⁵ This doctrine was emphasized in many of the Apostolic Fathers, and a good example of the material forms it took is found in Papias. In one form or

ceived the soul, after death, as passing to an intermediate state where it makes use of a body after the kind of this life.¹ This condition is but the prelude to a great event. There will come the end of this present æon, when Christ will return to judgment. Then will come the resurrection. Origen accepted the idea of resurrection as part of the general belief, but it is clear he had difficulties with it. Celsus had ridiculed the notion, because he did not understand it, Origen said, and because he had learned it from the ignorant.² He took pains to show that neither the Bible nor his own system countenanced any such gross view as Celsus had criticized. The resurrection body will be the same as the present one, and yet not the same. He lays down four principles of difference between the bodies: the resurrection body will be more beautiful, will retain its present type and be recognizable, will be adapted to the requirements of the new environment, and will have no superfluous organs.³ So strong was Origen's insistence on the spirituality of his conception that Gregory of Nyssa, who followed him, could declare that if men's bodies are to be restored to the condition of this life, the resurrection can only be regarded as a calamity.⁴

But how will this resurrection be effected? In answering this question, Origen offers a most interesting suggestion. The soul, he said, has a germanitive principle which lays hold of fitting matter and shapes it into a habitation suited for its needs. The same process by which it repairs the daily waste in the organism in this life will enable it to construct a new tenement for itself.⁵ There is also in Origen the suggestion that the body itself contains an indestructible germ. Death is not to be regarded as the destruction of the flesh in such a

another, the view was shared by Justin, Irenæus, Tertullian, Lactantius, but the Alexandrian theology had no place for it. In criticizing Chiliasm, Origen agreed for once with the Gnostics. By the middle of the fourth century Chiliasm was regarded as heretical. On this see Bethune Baker, 68 f.

¹ See *De Prin.*, ii. 11. 6. In *Lucam Hom.*, 24; and the fragment, *De Resurrectione*, quoted by Methodius, *Migne Ser. Græ.*, tome 11, col. 95.

² See *Con. Cel.*, vii. 32 f.

³ See Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, 272 note.

⁴ *De An. et Resurr.* *Migne*, tome 46, p. 137.

⁵ See Bigg, 271.

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degree that it retains no relic of its former substance. The power and grace of God in the resurrection enable the germ to form the glorious spiritual body.¹ His view therefore is that while at death the actual material of the body is dispersed, there survives in the personality a germanitive principle which, by the power of God, is able to provide an appropriate body in Paradise, the intermediate state, and to restore the body in the resurrection. While the soul is in Paradise, its body is a body of this æon: the resurrection ushers in a new æon, and its body, therefore, is of a different order.² Even this does not conclude Origen's statement of the future. One of his main principles was that the end must be like the beginning, a perfect unity in God.³ Far beyond the resurrection lies the final goal of humanity when the fallen spirit shall recover its former glory.⁴ Even in the end the restored spirit will still be clothed with body. He concludes "another perhaps will say that in the end every bodily substance will be so pure and refined as to be like the ether, and of a celestial purity and clearness. How things will be, however, is known with certainty to God alone, and to those who are His friends through Christ and the Holy Spirit".⁵

On the question of immortality Augustine took his place in the main movement of ecclesiastical thought, conceiving it to be the natural possession of the soul. Plotinus' argument that the soul, possessing knowledge which is eternal must itself be eternal,⁶ evidently appeals to him. The imperishable nature of truth, and the inseparable connection between truth and the soul led him to the conclusion that the soul is imperishable:⁷ it is also immutable.⁸ Death he regarded as unnatural, the just punishment of man's Fall.⁹ The death of the body, however, while it is to be regarded from one angle as a just punishment, may from another be regarded

¹ *De Prin.*, iii. 5. 6. Cf. *Con. Cel.*, v. 22 f. *De Prin.*, ii. 10. 3.

² Cf. Bigg, 271 f.

³ *De Prin.*, i. 6. 2. *De Prin.*, ii. 8. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *De Prin.*, i. 6. 4.

⁶ *Em.*, iv. 7. 12.

⁷ *Solil.*, ii. 13.

⁸ *De Immor. An.*, v. viii.

⁹ *De Civ. Dei*, xiii. 1. 6. 16.

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as an event which, for the good, may work good.¹ Soul and body, he said, were so incommensurate that the soul's release from the body might be regarded as a blessing. This, of course, is another indication of Platonic influence, though we may probably seek its real explanation in Augustine's reaction from his earlier indulgences. Death breaks the union of soul with the corporeal organs, and thus leaves the soul without body. There is no transmigration: Augustine repudiated the Platonic theory of metempsychosis,² and also the Manichæan notion that the soul may migrate into the bodies of animals or plants.³ His own conception of the future is seen in his emphasis on the resurrection, which he discussed in detail in *De Civ. Dei*, xxii. He followed Paul in the idea of a spiritualized resurrection body. All bodily blemishes will be removed: there will be no deformity or want of proportion.⁴ In the resurrection the substance of our bodies, however disintegrated, will be entirely restored, sex being retained while vice is withdrawn.⁵ The bodies of the righteous will become more noble than that of the first man before the Fall.⁶ All this, of course, applies to the good: the bodies of the wicked will be given over to everlasting suffering.⁷

An interesting emphasis on the resurrection, especially notable in a Greek writer, is found in Æneas of Gaza, who held that the body contains a germ, enclosing something of the eternal within itself. Nothing made by the Creator can be absolutely mortal: the body, therefore, though it decays and appears to perish, is destined to be renewed and come to perfection.⁸

We may conclude, therefore, that on the question of life after death, the influence of Platonism was distinctly felt among the Christian writers of the early centuries: yet there is also a strong tendency to conserve the Biblical point of view on the resurrection. The question may be

¹ *De Civ. Dei*, xiii. 1. 6. 16.

³ See *De Gen. ad Litt.*, vii. 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, x. 30.

⁴ *De Civ. Dei*, xxii. 19.

⁶ *Ibid.*, xiii. 2 f.

⁸ *Migne Ser. Græ.*, tome 85 cd. 962.

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further investigated in the later centuries, but is best postponed until our consideration of the influence of Aristotle as seen in the Scholastic writers.

5. THE MYSTICAL NOTE

Our survey of the Platonic tradition would be incomplete without a reference to that development in mysticism which was to become such a powerful and important element in mediæval Christianity. Plotinus, in the *Enneades*, has given us many noble passages which indicate the true life of the spirit, lost in rapturous contemplation of God. "We must believe that God is present when he comes into the house of him who invites him, and gives him life. . . . This is the soul's true goal, to touch that light, and to behold it by means of that light itself, and not by any other light: even as we may not see the sun by any light except its own."¹ The highest life, to which truly blessed men attain even here in their highest moments, is "a release from all else here below, a life that takes no pleasure in earthly things, a flight of the alone to the Alone".² The marks of Plotinian mysticism are a strong mental concentration and discipline: there is little of those excesses . . . that "dark night of the soul" . . . which were so prominent a feature in the lives of Christian mystics. These frequently experienced visions, and, in the earlier centuries, the Pastor of Hermas and the experiences of S. Perpetua show that the ecstatic state was not unknown. It is in the Alexandrian writers, however, that we find what may be termed a mystical theology. Clement of Alexandria set in contrast the two lives, a conception which he found in Philo. The life of the ordinary believer, marked by faith, fear, and hope, is lower than that of the true Gnostic, marked by love, righteousness, and knowledge. The higher must grow out of the lower. The true Gnostic will live in closest union with God,

¹ *Enn.*, v. iii. 17.

² *Ibid.*, vi. ix. 10.

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"touching earth with but one foot".¹ Origen, both by example and precept, encouraged the life of contemplation. One of his complaints against Celsus was that he "depreciates those among us who strive in every way to raise the soul to the Creator of all things, and who show that we ought to despise things sensible and temporal and visible, and do our utmost to reach communion with God, and the contemplation of things that are intelligent and invisible, and a blessed life with God".²

The story of monasticism abounds in examples of mystical contemplation and rapture. Its emphasis on the supremacy of the spiritual life as compared with the evil effect of the world and the flesh naturally produced a type of life which, on the average level, produced remarkable examples of the devotional life, and in special cases, of ecstatic experience. Legend wove many stories around the figure of S. Anthony, but their real basis was a life dedicated to spiritual contemplation, and an experience in which the reality of evil powers assumed objective form. Macarius, if actually the author of certain writings attributed to him, has given us some passages of singular beauty. He describes how grace comes to the soul, sometimes slowly, sometimes as a burning fire: the lamp is always alight, but when it shines brightly it is because it is set aflame by the incoming of the love of God.³ The light of God, coming into the heart, opens the way to a deeper and secret light, so that the whole man is bathed in sweet contemplation. Diadochus, Bishop of Photius in Epirus, wrote in his *Hundred Points Concerning the Spiritual Life* ⁴ that the gifts of the Holy Spirit come to him who will voluntarily release himself from this life and dry up the corporeal appetite. The joy which the soul then receives can be communicated even to the body.

In both Greek and Latin writers this mystical tendency is clearly shown. Gregory of Nyssa declared that in order

¹ *Strom.*, vii. 3. 7. 13. See on this the fine passage in Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, 115 f.

² *Con. Cel.*, iii. 56. Cf. *In Joann.*, xiii. 24.

³ *Migne, P.C.*, xxxiv. Hom. vii. Epis. ii.

⁴ Latin version in *Migne, P.C.*, lxxv.

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to rise to the knowledge of God a man must put away all that enters through the senses;¹ while Augustine's *Confessions* are well known in their emphasis on the beauty and desirability of the spiritual life.² He often wrote as if external conditions were quite indifferent when compared with the inner relation of the soul to God, though it must be remembered that he never lost his joy in life in spite of that note of pessimism which occasionally creeps in—due, perhaps, to his own vivid experience in earlier years, and to the fact that in his own day (when he wrote the *De Civitate Dei*) the entire fabric of civilization seemed to be on the verge of collapse. The outward life might be full of danger and temptation, but he never tired of speaking of creation and the outer world as beautiful, the handiwork of God, and therefore good.³ At the end of the fifth century there appeared a writer who quickly became authoritative both in East and West, the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. . . . He blended the dominant ideas of Neo-Platonism with the Christian dogmatic, being greatly influenced by the Neo-Platonist Proclus.⁴ He believed that the world is an ordered system, a scale of being descending from God. God is above thought, and only to be apprehended in a state that transcends thought . . . an echo of the Plotinian theology of negation. God the end of all things draws all things towards himself, and the deification which results from this return to God extends even to organic and inorganic beings. Man has a spiritual element, his reason, and by virtue of that can strive after direct illumination which God gives to spiritual essences. For man this return to God is realized by raptures of knowledge and transports of love.⁵ In the Eastern Church the influence of Dionysius was seen in John of Damascus, while in the West his writings were introduced in a Latin translation

¹ *Migne, P.C.*, xlv., 372 f.

² E.g. the opening chapter, Bk. I; Bk. X, ch. ix.

³ See Harnack, *History of Dogma*, v. 115 note.

⁴ See *E.R.E.*, ix. 92, art. "Mysticism, Christian, Roman Catholic".

⁵ Cf. De Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, 99.

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of Eriugena. "The elaborate angelology of these writings, their parade of a higher initiation, and a certain strange spiritual beauty that flashes through them, fascinated the teachers and students of the West. The whole collection of the Dionysian writings established itself firmly in the reverent admiration of the Christian world."¹ Dionysius exerted a strong influence on Albertus Magnus and Aquinas, as we shall see below.

The subject is too large to follow in detail, but we may conclude this section by a reference to that great mystic, Meister Eckhart, who is important not only in his relation to the writers who preceded him, but also in his bearing on Reformation thought. The emergence of Reformation thought owed much to the strong undercurrent of personal religion which underlay the work of the great mystics. Scholasticism, for the most part, was practical and psychological in its mysticism, a devotional aid to present union with God. While this is not absent from Eckhart's writings² (indeed he exercised great popular influence by his sermons in the vernacular), we see the attitude of the Churchman and the traditionalist abandoned for a fuller and freer philosophic standpoint. Following Augustine, Eckhart declared that the soul is immaterial in essence, and, as Aquinas had taught, it is the simple form of the body.³ There is no distinction of essence between soul and spirit.⁴ On this plane of existence the soul is found in the category of the finite and imperfect. Depending for knowledge on external impressions, the soul may thus be said to depend on the bodily organs. This, however, is not the real activity of the soul. There is a deeper realm in the soul, a realm where God lives, and in this deeper recess there is no need of bodily organism.⁵ While the soul

¹ Wicksteed, *Reactions*, 29 f.

² For the text, see F. Pfeiffer, *Deutsche Mystiker des Vierzehnten Jahrhunderts*. Zweiter Band, Göttingen, 1914; and Denifle, *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, 1886, ii. 537-546. There is an English translation by C. de B. Evans (John M. Watkins, 1924).

³ Pfeiffer, 530. 4 f.

⁴ 397. 31 f.

⁵ See sermon on Lk. x. 38, on Lk. xiv. 16, and many other passages. Pfeiffer, 221. 7f; 256. 23; 44. 23.

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is in the body its powers may function through bodily organs, but the essential soul, its spark or glimmer, is independent of space and matter . . . the "uncreated essence of the uncreated soul", as Royce calls it.¹ Eckhart's doctrine of the *funkelein* reminds us of a similar idea in Plotinus and Augustine. This central point in the soul is its true *wesen*.²

Eckhart conceived the destiny of the soul as its return to God. While the soul is an efflux from the divine essence, in this phenomenal world it has assumed another essence, so to speak, an activity in contact with matter and time. Prior to its entry into the material world, it possessed unity: its aim now is the reattainment of that unity in God. This return to God is the work of God Himself . . . here the Augustinian conception of grace and the Thomist doctrine of the God-directed will find an echo in the mystic.³ To attain this supremely blessed state the soul must renounce all creature perception and creature reason. Not by the assertion of superior intellectual development will the soul recover its place in God, but rather by sheer passivity. It must pass through a period of absolute unconsciousness as to the phenomenal world. The soul must free itself from the here and now, from matter and manifoldness, renouncing even religious works and observances. "The soul, in being thus absorbed in God, enters at the same time into and dwells in the soul's most proper essence . . . where the soul must be robbed of itself and be God with God . . . into that negation of all determination in which the soul has eternally hovered without truly possessing itself."⁴ This condition Eckhart called *decease*. At this point in the teaching of Eckhart there emerges an interesting suggestion. He insists that the

¹ *Studies of Good and Evil*, 272 f.

² Pfeiffer, 467. 15.

³ In a sermon on John vi. 44 he speaks of the power of Christ to attract men. The power of Christ upon the Cross is the expression of the power of the Holy Trinity. See Pfeiffer, 216-220. So strong is Eckhart's insistence on the power of God in this upward movement of the soul that Jundt concludes that if the mystic were true to himself he could hardly hold the doctrine of the freedom of the will (*Essai sur la mysticisme speculatif de Maître Eckhart*, 104).

⁴ Ueberweg, i. 477.

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whole material creation, and not the soul only, must be restored. The first modification of the original unity, due to sin, resulted in the contingency of things, and so the unification of the soul will result in the restoration of the creatures.¹ The true mystic who by the (paradoxical) exercise of passivity cultivates the soul by submerging it in God, may attain a state in which the body also is completely subservient to the higher life. Light may stream through the body itself: the entire outward man may become obedient to the sanctified will. Even the body itself may thus be detached from the outer world, renouncing all creaturely joys, and using only for its sustenance the absolutely necessary things like bread, water, and clothing.² Thus the dominant idea in Eckhart's teaching is spiritualization: by contact with the soul, and thus with God, the body is gradually spiritualized, and ultimately all things return to their centre, the undisclosed deity. This idea of spiritualization is seen in Eckhart's idea of the resurrection, where the body receives and shares the essence of the soul.³ Hell is a condition of alienation from God⁴ . . . there is little room for conceptions of a material order.

In this Eckhart clearly is at some points in harmony with New Testament teaching, such as in his idea of the diffusion of soul through body, and his refusal to make an essential distinction between soul and spirit. But Platonism has influenced him in his disparagement of body. Although in its process of learning the soul must build on sense data, the world of sense is really phenomenal, and the activity of soul in contact with sense data is not its real activity. We may note, however, that he sometimes speaks as if there is no contradiction between the active and the contemplative life: the former belongs to the faculties of the soul, the latter to its essence. "In commenting on Martha and Mary", says

¹ See Jundt, 120 f.

² See Tractate XIV. Pfeiffer, 527 f.

³ Pfeiffer, 391. 5; and see Jundt, 116 f.

⁴ Pfeiffer, 455. 33 f.

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Inge,¹ "he surprises us by putting Martha first"; Inge sees here a double aspect in Eckhart's teaching. And although his dominant note is that of spiritualization, he appears to preserve the values of the body by his insistence on the gathering up of all in the final unity in God. Although there is some divergence of opinion as to whether Eckhart's view amounts to pantheism,² he does illustrate the danger, to which mystical writers are prone, of insufficiently safeguarding that individuality of personality which is so essential in the Christian view of the soul.

¹ *Christian Mysticism*, 161.

² Jundt describes his system as the monism of the idea of being, and claims that in Eckhart are the roots of Spinoza and Hegel (132 f.). Rufus Jones does not think we have pantheism here (*Studies in Mystical Religion*, 233 f.): a similar view is held by Royce (op. cit., 289 f.), Lasson (in Ueberweg), Inge (op. cit., 154). Xavier de Hornstein thinks that Eckhart's expressions on the subject lend themselves to ambiguity (*Les Grands Mystiques Allemands du XIV^e Siècle*, 136).

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3. ARISTOTELIANISM

I. AUGUSTINIANISM AND THE RISE OF SCHOLASTICISM

THE outstanding figure in the period we have just summarized is Augustine, a Platonist and at the same time much more than a Platonist. Anyone who regards the Church as the divinely ordained guardian and interpreter of Scripture, who emphasizes the will, who links soul and spirit together as against body, who rejects pre-existence, and who sees the future of personality as that of a soul plus a resurrection body, may certainly be reckoned a friend of Hebrew ideas, however much he may here and there lean to Platonism. Augustine may be set down among the spiritual interpreters of personality, and when Siebeck describes him as the first modern man,¹ he indicates the strength of Augustine's influence on subsequent thought. In the realm of dogmatic theology his views became normative, but in the centuries which followed his great work we can discern the rise of another tendency, a point of view which looked rather towards Aristotle than towards Plato. The influence of this later Aristotelianism we have now to examine.

It is in the writings of Thomas Aquinas that Aristotelianism came to its rich development. Between Augustine and the rise of Scholasticism there is a gap of considerable proportions, and although this intervening period was marked by ecclesiastical activity rather than by original psychological research, it is interesting to notice first the power of Augustine's genius, and then the gradual emergence of Aristotelianism. Nemesius, for example, found that Neo-Platonism best fitted in with his conception of Christian revelation, but he showed indebtedness to Aristotle in his discussion of will and

¹ *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik*, 1888, p. 181.

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his acquaintance with the physical side of human life. Interesting in Nemesius is his knowledge of medical works like those of Galen and Hippocrates, and De Wulf remarks, "this homage quietly paid to peripateticism is significant, and heralds an approaching change in the trend of thought".¹ John Philoponus, a sixth-century writer of Alexandria, showed acquaintance with the Aristotelian position, for he took occasion to declare that soul is not form but substance, and the group of functions which Aristotle called the nutritive, sensitive, and rational souls John declared to be three distinct souls, united only by sympathy and co-operation. All three souls are immortal: at death the nutritive and sensitive are united with a finer kind of matter which serves them as a body, while the rational soul becomes entirely free from body, and thus demands a new body created for it at the resurrection. Again, Boëthius, whose Neo-Platonism is apparent in his *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*, did valuable work in the translation of Aristotle, and down to the twelfth century his work was the chief source of Aristotelianism. Gregory the Great, described as "the last of the Fathers and the first of the Schoolmen",² rendered great services to monasticism and ecclesiastical statesmanship, and also perpetuated the Augustinian tradition. But the tradition was no longer so clear or powerful as formerly.³ The two centuries which followed Gregory were almost sterile in their contribution to thought, and we pass to the great period of Scholasticism, and note the fuller emergence of Aristotelianism with its definite contribution to the question of the body and human personality.

Scholasticism in general reproduced ancient philosophy under the control of ecclesiastical doctrine, with an accommodation, in cases of discrepancy between them,

¹ *History of Mediæval Philosophy*, 98.

² Workman, *Christian Thought to the Reformation*, 129.

³ Harnack speaks of his views as "emasculated Augustinianism" (*H. of D.*, v. 223), while Seeberg says, "almost all in Gregory has its roots in Augustine and hardly anything is really Augustinian", *Dogmengeschichte*, ii. 12.

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of the former to the latter.¹ The scholastic system was "not the work of any one day or of any one man. It was not born of the genius of an Albertus Magnus or of a Thomas Aquinas: centuries were needed to build up the vast body of doctrine known as scholasticism. It is a family inheritance which was slowly amassed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, which was consolidated in the thirteenth, and which was wasted and squandered little by little from the end of the fourteenth. The ultimate reason for the existence of such a common intellectual patrimony—not only in the domain of philosophy but also in theology, science, and art—lies in this characteristic mediæval conviction, that truth is not a personal acquisition discovered by each individual by himself, but a great treasure handed down and increased from generation to generation".² This mediæval tendency to conserve the past has already been indicated in the persistence of the Augustinian tradition, and we find that even in the period of the ninth to the twelfth centuries, which De Wulf considers the formative period of scholasticism, it is the Augustinian influence which is normative: where the influence of Aristotle is apparent, it is in the physiological and metaphysical realms. Alcuin in his *De Animæ Ratione* reproduced the Augustinian theory in outline. John Scotus Eriugena, generally considered to be the first of the scholastics,³ is notable for his Neo-Platonic mysticism. Anselm is plainly reminiscent of Augustine,⁴ while John of Salisbury combines with his Platonism a treatment of the physiological functions and their relation to the higher activities of the soul.⁵ Alan of Lille shows a tendency to "ally Platonism with Aristotelianism and Neo-Pythagorean conceptions, transforming and colouring the whole with the spirit of Christian thought".⁶ The general trend of thought in this formative period was

¹ See Ueberweg, i. 440.

² De Wulf, 108.

³ So, e.g. Ueberweg. De Wulf, however, considers him the founder of anti-scholasticism.

⁴ *Cur Deus Homo* Migne, 158, pp. 401 f.

⁵ *Metalogicus*, iv. 20. 32 f.

⁶ De Wulf, 203.

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spiritual, but there was a counter movement, the materialism of the Cathari and the Albigenses, prevalent in the twelfth century throughout Italy and France. These sects revived the dualistic principle so prominent in Manichæism, and taught that the human spirit perishes with the body. It was in opposition to such teaching that Alan of Lille developed his spiritual emphasis.

Even in the thirteenth century the power of Augustine still revealed itself, notably in William of Auvergne and Bonaventura: but in these writers we note more definite peripatetic elements. Indeed, the thirteenth century witnessed a revival of philosophical speculation which is marked by the fuller influence of Aristotle in psychology and the consolidation of the scholastic position. Chief among the reasons for this revival was the fuller accessibility of Aristotle and a clearer understanding of his teaching. His works were produced in abundant translations, and although in some quarters at first viewed with suspicion,¹ they soon came into their own in ecclesiastical circles. Doubtless there were contributory causes to this philosophical renaissance, viz. the rise of the universities and of the mendicant orders in the Church, among whom we shall find some of the main contributors to the thought of the period, including Aquinas himself. Much of the influence of Aristotle in this period was due to the work of Arabian commentators, notably Avicenna and Averroës: it was the interpretation of these writers that called out Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas to a clearer exposition of peripatetic principles.²

¹ E.g. they were prohibited in the Paris Council of 1210.

² Averroës (of Cordova, b. 1126) held great reverence for Aristotle, but interpreted him in such a way as to lead to a cosmic dualism. He admitted only one intellect or soul which belongs in common to the whole race: this world soul becomes temporized in individuals. He interpreted Aristotle's doctrine of active and passive reason so as to exclude personal immortality. These points roused Albert and Aquinas to a clearer interpretation of Aristotle.

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2. THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE AS SEEN IN AQUINAS

McDougall has pointed out that during the long period between the great age of Greek philosophy and the renaissance of European learning, the conception of the soul was refined and developed under the influence of theological speculation until it became set over against matter as a purely spiritual principle of a radically different nature from the body, intervening in material processes with intelligent and purposive activity.¹ Our study of Augustinianism has shown the substantial truth of this statement: we should add, however, that the theological development did not proceed to a complete disparagement of the body. With the introduction of Aristotelianism in the scholastic period there came an approach to the question of man which suggested the linking together of soul and body in a closer unity. It is true that if we emphasize Aristotle's distinction between Form and Matter we may approach perilously near a dualistic tendency;² yet, from another angle, Aristotle's view suggests a unified conception of soul and body. He did not begin with the study of two separate entities, soul and body, but with a study of the living organism in which the soul is the entelechy of the body. The distinction Aristotle made between matter and form should not blind us to their connection: they are two aspects of the same biological fact, man: so much so that, as was pointed out in the Introduction, "according to Aristotle's dominant mood and his usual form of statement, the idea of a disembodied or discarnate soul seems almost a contradiction in terms".³ In his not too clear statements about immortality he apparently makes the separability of soul and body actual in the case of the active reason, but his biological approach, and his conviction as to the inseparability of soul and body at

¹ *Body and Mind*, 36.

² Cf. W. L. Davidson, in *E.R.E.*, v. 109 f.

³ Pringle Pattison, *Idea of Immortality*, 65.

least in the lower levels of experience suggest a closer approximation to the Hebrew position than we have found in the other Greek traditions.

The scholastics in general accepted the Aristotelian view of soul as form. All corporeal substances, they argued, are composed of (*a*) matter, the principle of indeterminateness, of potency, and (*b*) form, the principle of determinateness, of actuality. Matter is that necessary principle which enables anything to be at all: form is that which gives to any creature its distinctive nature. Aquinas thus had before him two points of view: (*a*) the traditional insistence on the soul as an independent spiritual entity; (*b*) the Aristotelian view that soul, as form, is inseparable from the body. These he tried to reconcile in his view of soul as the form of the body, but separable from it. Adopting the general scholastic position, he said that the soul is that which informs matter,¹ and he proceeded to enumerate a series of forms in an ascending scale. Each member of this series partakes less of materiality and more of the celestial nature than the one which precedes it. Some simple bodies manifest no qualities beyond the material: plants are higher in the scale, they are able to grow and produce their like. Higher still are the forms of brute beasts whose life includes awareness—altogether dependent on bodily sense organs. Higher still are the forms of rational beings, man being able to abstract and take knowledge of immaterial things. Higher still are the forms of angels, purely immaterial, and having no dependence on bodily organs. This is set out in *Quæstio disputata de anima, articulus*, i., and we are led at length to God, who is the absolutely simple form, pure actuality.

He thus reached the conception of the soul as the form of the body, but separable from it. Intrinsically independent of the body, the soul is yet dependent on it for its knowledge on this earthly plane. But in his system there are several indications that he regarded body as most closely connected with soul.

¹ *Sum. Theol.*, i. 76. 1, quoting as authority Aristotle, *Anima*, Bk. II.

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(a) At birth there is a close connection. We have seen that he rejected pre-existence¹ and traducianism,² arguing that the soul is created outright by God, *ex nihilo*, as soon as the body is ready for it. It is in his criticism of Origen's position that his view of the unity of soul and body appears. A part, he argues, which is separated from its whole, is imperfect. The soul, as form, is but part of the human species, and if it were to exist without the body it would be imperfect. In the natural order the imperfect cannot precede the perfect, and the soul cannot exist before its perfection in the unity of soul and body.³

(b) There is an echo of Biblical teaching in Aquinas's conception of the extension of soul through the body . . . since the soul is united with the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole and in every part of the body.⁴ The soul is in each part of the body not in totality of power, but in totality of perfection and essence.⁵

(c) Very important in Aquinas is his conception of the dependence of the soul on the body for its development. It was in this sense that mediæval writers regarded the material creation as existing for the sake of man. On the temporal plane the body is absolutely necessary for the development of the soul. Without the body, the soul would remain a potentiality: with it, the soul is enabled to develop and educate itself. Aquinas placed full reliance on the validity of sense data. The mind in its higher activities may be independent of the material world, but it cannot be forgotten that its development first began by a gathering and transmuting of sense data. Without the material realm it could have made no progress at all. It is suggestive that Aquinas occasionally uses the term "*compositum*" to indicate that it is the soul and the body together, the complete man, that feels and acts: so "*compositum igitur est videns et audiens, et omnis sentiens sed per animam.*"⁶

¹ *Sum. Theol.*, i. 47 2; *Con. Gen.* ii. 83 f.

³ *Ibid.*, ii. 83. Cf. *Sum. Theol.*, i. 90. 2 f.

⁵ *Ibid.*

² *Con. Gen.*, ii. 86.

⁴ *Sum. Theol.*, i. 76. 8.

⁶ *Quæst. de An.*, art. 19.

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(d) Aquinas argued strongly for the immortality of the soul. On this point the Aristotelian tradition was not quite clear. Some of his commentators regarded his teaching as excluding immortality altogether,¹ while others limited such immortality, if possible at all, to the active reason. But neither position satisfied Aquinas. The powers of the soul depend for their manifestation, though not for their existence, upon the body. Death, therefore, while it severs the connection of soul and body, does not destroy the soul. The disembodied state of the soul after death, however, is temporary and incomplete. In this the teaching of Aquinas was in line with the current teaching, which looked forward to a resurrection to complete the future life in its fulness. There is an interesting reference in Aquinas, which suggests that he did not regard the disembodied soul as completely man: when we invoke in prayer Holy Peter, our prayer ought properly to be directed to the *soul* of Peter. The question of resurrection Aquinas dealt with at some length.² Arguments for it he found both in Scripture and reason. He adduced three main arguments: it is against the nature of the soul to be without body, and what is against nature cannot be lasting; there is a natural desire for final perfection, and this demands soul and body in union; the second joining of soul and body is needed for proper reward and punishment, which is not effected in the earthly life.³ The restoration of the body is thus the restoration of that perfect adaptation of body and soul which was the original state, and which was lost by sin.⁴ The resurrection is to a real body, for we cannot say that the body will be transformed into spirit 5 . . . we have the suggestive sentence "oportet autem ut resurgens sit animal si sit homo".⁶ Although the body of the resurrection will be of the same species, it will be differently organized (*aliam dispositionem habebunt*). The new body will be

¹ E.g. Averroës.

² *Sum. Theol.*, iii. *Supplem. quæst.*, 75. 81; and *Con. Gen.*, iv. 79 f.

³ *Con. Gen.*, iv. 79.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iv. 81.

⁵ *Ibid.*, iv. 84.

⁶ *Ibid.*, iv. 85.

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organized as befits the soul, the perfection of the latter demanding an incorruptible body. The body will be perfectly subject to the soul, and will share the general perfection of the entire being.¹ Aquinas ventures the interesting suggestion that all must rise at the age of Christ, that being the age of perfect manhood. His vivid conceptions of purgatory and hell indicate how far he was from the idea of immortality as that of a purely spiritual order.

(e) We may notice, finally, the ethics of Aquinas. There is no doubt that he regarded the contemplative life as the highest, to be prepared for by strenuous fighting against passions and illusive worldly ambitions. He saw in the flesh and its passions something which can weigh down the soul. Matrimony, even though he allows it, and can regard it sacramentally in the sense that it is a type of the union between Christ and the Church, is a second best, ranking below the self-dedication of celibacy.² The spirit of asceticism which prevailed in ecclesiastical circles undoubtedly influenced Aquinas, but he apparently never praised or sanctioned any extreme form. There is certainly nothing of the idea that the body is inherently evil. Such a view would fit in badly with his psychology, and with his conception of the importance of the material world in the development of the soul.

The influence of Aristotle was felt much further down the centuries than this period of scholasticism, although there is no writer more typical of Aristotelian influence than Aquinas. We shall see that in the Reformation period one prominent leader, Melanchthon, found that he "could not do without the monuments of Aristotle". This would justify the inclusion of Melanchthon in the present chapter, but it is preferable to postpone the Reformation writers until the next, on account of their combination of various Greek traditions. They form a useful summary of the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions, and at the same time show the strength of the

¹ *Con. Gen.*, iv. 86.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 138.

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Hebrew view of man. We may leave the study of Aristotelian influence at this point with the reflection that its introduction into the ecclesiastical development rendered an important service: its general effect, so far as our special interest is concerned, was to counteract the dualism which was so marked in Augustine and the Platonists. Its biological approach to the study of human personality will be found to be of special significance in the light of present-day psychology.

CHAPTER VII

THE ECCLESIASTICAL LEGACY TO THE MODERN WORLD

WE have now sketched the influence of the main Greek conceptions of personality so far as they relate to the place and importance of the body in human life. We have seen the Hebrew view of man emerging into a world of clashing interests and conflicting ideas. The period through which we have come had its pitched battles, mainly about the doctrine of Christ and the truth about salvation, but there was continual skirmishing: there is hardly any part of Christian thought or practice which was not called upon to defend itself; and although in the story of these centuries historians of the Church have given the greater part of their attention to the well-known controversies and the development of the ideas of worship, organization, and ecclesiastical administration, yet we have found that the special subject of our inquiry was never far in the background. The great Church writers were more skilled in theology than in psychology. This is only to be expected, but the psychological issues were realized, and were implicit in much of the dogmatic argument. In different degrees Stoicism, Platonism, and Aristotelianism made their presence felt, and we now have to inquire what kind of teaching survived this prolonged clash. Can we say that the Hebrew idea of man was submerged in the Greek, that ecclesiasticism deserted the Palestinian shores for the attractive culture of Hellenism, or did the New Testament conception maintain its vigour in spite of all the varied process of criticism to which it was subjected? We have already suggested the persistence of the Hebrew view at various points in our survey: it now remains to gather together the various strands in the development, and to estimate the legacy bequeathed by the Patristic and Mediæval periods to the modern world. This may well be prefaced by a brief

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reference to the Reformation which, while not producing any new departure so far as our special inquiry is concerned, is interesting as gathering together in itself both main lines of Greek thought.

I. THE GREEK TRADITION AND THE REFORMATION

There were two factors which contributed to the great movement of the Protestant Reformation: (*a*) the Renaissance, distinguished by its recovery and renewed study of classical literature, and a closer study of early Christian writings, and (*b*) the personal religion we have seen so well exemplified in the mysticism of the Middle Ages. The leaders of this movement were inspired, in the main, by practical rather than theoretic considerations. The first sketch of Calvin's *Institutes*, published in 1536, was marked by an emphasis which lay less on dogma than on the basis and organization of the new life.¹ The work of Luther, also, was practical in aim, because intensely personal and called out in part by the many abuses in mediæval organization and life. We shall not expect, therefore, much detailed consideration of psychological issues in this period: this is not to say, however, that there are not definite speculative views underlying the Reformation theology. You cannot argue about predestination, for example, without entering the psychological domain: all the leaders show an acquaintance with the main philosophical positions of the Greek schools, Zwingli, for instance, drawing upon Neo-Platonism and Stoicism in defence of his doctrine.² It is interesting to note how both Aristotelianism and Platonism influenced the thought of the Reformers.

(*a*) *Melanchthon and Aristotelianism*.—The Lutheran branch of the Reformation is best studied, on its speculative side, in the writings of Melanchthon. Luther felt that philosophy, no less than religion, needed a reformation. Although for years he lectured on philosophy, he repudiated the Greeks, especially Aristotle, whose

¹ Cf. Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, 147.

² Cf. De Wulf, 480.

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naturalism and apparent denial of immortality alienated him.¹ Luther's spiritual ancestry was in Judæa rather than in Greece, but under the influence of his pupil, Melanchthon, he eventually lost much of his distaste for Greek speculation. Melanchthon's profound studies in the classics naturally led him to find an old basis for the new teaching. Of all the Greek teachers he found Aristotle most congenial. To quote Ueberweg, he found the Epicureans too atheistical, the Stoics too fatalistic in their theology and too extravagant in their ethics, Plato and Neo-Platonism either too heretical or too indefinite; so he concluded, "we cannot do without the monuments of Aristotle".² Eventually Luther followed him in this. He had said, "while Philip is alive, I desire no other Greek teacher",³ and he admitted the use of Aristotle in logical, rhetoric, and poetics. Melanchthon lacked the intense religion experience of Luther, but he was better fitted to develop the new teaching in such a way as to commend it to the educated. His main theological work, the *Loci Communes*, is chiefly valuable (for our purpose) in the section dealing with the resurrection. In the first edition (1521) there is a criticism of scholastic method, and no deep regard for Aristotle. But in his *De Anima* Melanchthon reveals his clear indebtedness to Aristotle.⁴

As there is no new contribution to our subject, we need not do more than subject these writings to a cursory survey. On many points the Greek tradition is clear. Aristotle's definition of the soul is quoted (column 12), and also the ecclesiastical definition (16). Influenced by Biblical references to "heart", especially in the prophets and Paul, Melanchthon names the heart as the seat of the soul, and he follows the Bible in viewing the soul as extended through the body (19). He accepts the general scholastic teaching on the grades in soul life, based on the Aristotelian divisions of the sensitive, vegetative, and

¹ Ueberweg, ii. 17.

² Ibid.

³ In a letter to Spalatin, quoted in P. Smith, *Life and Letters of M. Luther*, 70. The chapter is excellent on religion and culture in Luther.

⁴ Text in *Corpus Reformatorum* (Bretschneider). *Loci Communes* in vol. xxi., *De Anima* in vol. xiii. The references are to columns.

rational souls (19). Like the scholastics, he regarded the intellect as excited to activity through the senses. There is a long and interesting section devoted to an anatomical survey of the body: this is a clear following of the naturalistic interests of Aristotle, and points forward to that development in physiology which became so important in post-Reformation thought. Melanchthon's treatment of the origin of the soul can hardly be called a treatment: he mentions various arguments which support the creationist and traducianist views, but curtails the discussion and reveals his own indecision on the point (18). At this point, at least, he will not be dominated by the scholastic view.¹ In regard to the future life, in accepting the ecclesiastical definition of the soul he accepted its immortality. In the *De Anima* he gives a consideration to certain philosophical proofs offered by Plato, Zenophon, and Cicero (whose insistence on immortality was admired by Luther), but his real ground for belief in immortality is the Bible. The earlier editions of the *Loci Communes* apparently contain no references to eschatology, but the denial of the resurrection in some quarters induced him to deal with the question in later editions.² In the section "De resurrectione mortuorum" he reviews a number of passages in favour of life beyond the grave, such as Isa. xxvi. 19, lxvi. 22, lxxv. 17 f., Psal. xvi. 9 f., and in the New Testament Matt. xxv. 34, 1 Cor. xv. He reproduces an argument we have often met, that a future life is necessitated by the full reaping of rewards and punishments, but it is noteworthy that he does not emphasize the need for the bodily life in this connection as much as some who preceded him in this line of argument. His main ground of hope is Christ—a position truly Pauline (925).

(b) *Calvin and Augustinianism*.—If there is no new contribution in the Lutheran branch of the Reformation, neither is there in the Reformed. It is not by

¹ Cf. Johann Rump, *Melanchthon's Psychologie*.

² Cf. Maurice Schwab, *Étude comparative des doctrines de Melanchthon Zwingli et Calvin* (1859, p. 44).

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virtue of his originality as a thinker that Calvin has taken his high place in Protestant thought, but rather because he skilfully brought together certain conceptions derived from earlier teachers, and gave them a unity under the dominance of the idea of the sovereignty of God.¹ In his doctrine of Will he reminds us of Stoicism (though, as Fairbairn points out,² he rises far above the Greek idea in his conception of Will as personal and benevolent); in his teaching on predestination he sends us back to Augustine, whence he derived whatever speculative elements his system possesses. He stands therefore in the Platonic line rather than the Aristotelian, but throughout we note a strong reliance on Scripture. A brief survey of the relevant points will make this clear.³

There is one soul in each man, and it is created by God. His view of Adam as the depository of the endowments which God has bestowed on the human race makes the distinction between creationism and traducianism relatively unimportant for Calvin, but his declaration for creationism shows how the scholastic point of view served to outweigh the wavering of Augustine on the question. It is vain, he feels, to look to the philosophers for a definition of the soul, for only Plato definitely taught its immortality,⁴ but what cannot be found in the philosophers is plainly set forth in Scripture.⁵ The human soul is an essence distinct from the body. Calvin is strong on his insistence on this distinction: there are many qualities in man which indicate his possession of something which far transcends the body—the work of the intellect, including our knowledge of God and angels, memory, our knowledge of ideas like justice, rectitude, and honesty. The immaterial soul is diffused through the body.⁶ In regard to the faculties of the soul he is inclined to leave that to the philosophers: for himself, he considers that there are no powers of the soul which cannot be referred either

¹ Cf. *E.R.E.*, iii. 146.

² *Christ in Modern Theology*, 146.

³ *Text in Institutio Christianæ Religionis*, ed. A. Tholuck, 1846.

⁴ *Inst.*, i. xv. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, i. xv. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, i. xv. 6.

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to intellect or will.¹ He adduces many arguments to prove the immortality of the soul,² and while he feels that resurrection is not easy to substantiate, yet the Bible is strong enough on the point. He emphasizes the identity of the resurrection body with the body of this life: the substance of the body is the same, while its quality is changed.³

This may appear a somewhat inadequate treatment of one of the greatest ecclesiastical writers, but the Reformation theologians do not lend themselves to detailed treatment of the more speculative matters. In his chapter on the religious principles inspiring the Reformation, Lindsay arranges his material around the following topics: the universal priesthood of believers, justification by faith, Holy Scripture, the Person of Christ, the Church.⁴ This shows that the main interest of those stalwarts was theological rather than psychological or physiological. The larger issue was that of salvation, and the practical expression of the Christian faith. On the subject of the body in human personality there is evidence enough that the Reformation writers realized its power, especially in the corruption entailed by sin. But this is a practical matter, and the overcoming of sin by grace is more important for them than discussions of a more speculative nature. Calvin, we may note, emphasized as so many before him had done, the distinction between soul and body, but he remained true to the Biblical idea of resurrection. Thus he refused the final dualism to which the Platonic division naturally led, and in this, as we have seen, he is typical of the main trend of ecclesiastical thought.

2. THE LEGACY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE TO THE MODERN WORLD

(a) Beneath all the varied speculation of the centuries we have surveyed there lay a deep religious experience.

¹ *Inst.*, i. xv. 7.

² *Inst.*, i. xv. 2 f. Cf. *Instructio adv. Libertinos*, ix. 11. 12.

³ *Inst.*, iii. xxv. 3.

⁴ *History of the Reformation*, i. 427 f.

It was not always realized in the same degree, nor was it of the same quality, but it was always present wherever the Christian religion was more than a name or a series of dogmatic propositions. The great writers, like Augustine and Calvin, give the impression that whatever intellectual edifice they may build is built upon a foundation in their own experience. Even in the arid days, when speculation seemed to have run beyond reasonable lengths and men were in danger of reducing the religion of Christ to a mere philosophy, the undercurrent of personal religion went on flowing—there was mysticism as well as scholasticism in the Church. What was this experience? It was primarily an experience of God, made possible through the historic Jesus and the work of the Holy Spirit. God was real: that was the very essence of religion, and to know Him as real was to experience His power and, at the same time, to learn a new standard of values. Life had to be lived on the earth—not even the sublimest soarings of a pseudo-Dionysius or an Eckhart could dispute that: and it had to be lived in the body. The whole range of sensation, perception, emotion, thought, will . . . this meant life, and it was a life of fighting. There were perils without, perils that knew how to attack the susceptibilities of the flesh: and perils within, doubts and tremors which afflicted the mind. The spiritual life was a continual conflict, and the Christian writers who were given to autobiography have shown us again and again how costly was the fight. Human personality itself was a veritable battle-ground. It comprised forces both good and evil, was open to both kinds of influence, and the struggle was carried on, not merely in the serene heights of the mind, but in the everyday realm of appetite, instinct, and passion. The sphere of man's religious life, in short, was his complete personality, body as well as soul.

(b) Christian writers attempted, as we have seen, a rationale of man. They asked a series of important questions. Whence comes this being of ours that can both pray and sin? The general answer was: we come

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from God. On this point the Hebrew tradition managed to hold its own. When the Middle Ages were giving way to the modern world, the strongest view of man's origin was undoubtedly that implied in creationism. Neither pre-existence nor traducianism, in spite of very distinguished exponents, could ultimately control the thought of the Catholic Church. The Genesis account was accepted as the explanation of the beginning of the race, while in the case of each individual, God made him, both soul and body, in the great mystery of human birth. Aquinas spoke for the majority when he said that it is into the body as already organized in the womb that the soul comes by creation. The body is not an after-thought, but rather something important from the beginning. At birth the connection of soul and body is close: the relation is continued throughout life: each gains something from the other, and it is notable how often the diffusion of soul through body is mentioned in our writers.

It was realized that the body could be very troublesome. Even the ascetics, fleeing from town and city to some remote wilderness, found that "the world" was not something limited to busy and crowded centres: it had a way of following them even into solitude, was, indeed, an affair of life and not of location. The fight goes on, though there is none to behold it: wherever the body is, there is the possibility of moral conflict . . . and that, of course, means everywhere. Was the root of sinful impulse, then, to be sought in the body? For those who regarded bodily things as ultimately unreal there was an easy reply: only the good has reality; and sin, seen from the proper angle, is the privation of good. This negative view found exponents of the first order among the Christian writers. Origen could occasionally countenance it;¹ Augustine at one period held it;² Aquinas declared that evil may be regarded as permitted, by way of contrast, to show up to advantage the

¹ *De Prin.*, ii. 9. 2.

² See Loofs, *Dogmengeschichte*, 379.

good that is in life:¹ it is outside the category of being.² This position, however, was destined to give way to another. Both Augustine and Aquinas (following him) proceeded from the negative view to the conception of evil as godless willing. Not in the flesh, nor in the privation of good, is to be found the real root of sin, but in the will. We need not enter here upon the distinctions between the Eastern and Western psychology of the will; it is enough to notice that when Augustine declared "I found that (wickedness) was no substance, but a perversity of will, which turns aside from Thee, O God,"³ he was echoing the conception which Paul (and the Hebrew Scriptures) had emphasized. The Neo-Platonic philosophy did not completely capture the Christian writers.

(c) The pressing practical problem for the Christian, then, was the subjection of the lower impulses and the nourishment and fostering of the higher. The way of renunciation was tried by many: to renounce family, wealth, society, to say nothing of the normal comforts of life, was certainly to emphasize the values of the spirit, and the widespread vogue of renunciation in one form or another is ample proof of the moral earnestness of the Christian life. But, in the nature of the case, something more accessible was needed for the average Christian. It was only one here and there who could emulate an Anthony or a Francis: for the greater number the problem was how to live the Christian life under normal conditions, and amid everyday and pedestrian activities. There was, of course, the first requirement of Christian living, the life of personal prayer and devotion. But there were other aids, and as these are natural expressions of the importance of body in personality they deserve careful notice. First of all there was the Church, the society of believers, the Body of Christ. Even the most cursory glance at ecclesiastical development shows what great importance was attached to the Church, at once a spiritual society and an external

¹ *Sum. Theol.*, i. 22. 2.

² *Con. Gen.*, iii. 7.

³ *Confess.*, vii. 16.

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organization. Irenæus declared that the Church was the home of faith: ¹ Tertullian saw in her the repository of the truth, and conceived the motherhood of the Church as corresponding on earth to the Fatherhood of God in heaven: ² Origen declared that outside the Church there is no salvation, ³ though it is clear that he had in mind rather the true invisible Church, and not necessarily the organized society upon the earth: Cyprian devoted himself to the emphasis on the unity of the Church: ⁴ Cyril of Jerusalem (typical of Eastern teaching) saw in the Church a society of unrivalled power, a spiritual and ethical society endowed with gifts both for this life and the life to come: ⁵ Augustine felt that the authority of the Church was the guarantee of the truth of the Gospel, ⁶ distinguishing between the Church Visible and the Church Invisible, composed of the elect, a number known to God alone. "In this way the Church is invested with high authority, as the arbiter and director of the aims and forces of the civil society. She is the repository of all goodness and truth of life . . . for practical purposes. Infallible authority, ultimate truth, belong to her only ideally. Neither can be actually realized on earth. But such (relative) authority as is possible is to be found in the Church and nowhere else." ⁷ In the light of such teaching it is not difficult to see why Christian men should have learned to rely more on membership in the corporate society and less on the private merit of personal piety . . . a tendency which needed a Reformation to restore the balance. If in the personal sphere Christianity gave to the body an important place, in the social there was a corresponding emphasis on the corporate organization.

Further, within this Churchmanship, we detect a strong reliance on the sacraments. Whether we consider the seven sacraments of the Eastern and Roman Churches, or the two recognized by the Reformers, we cannot

¹ *Adv. Hær.*, iii. 4. 1.

² *De Orat.*, 2.

³ *Hom. iii. in Jos.* 4.

⁴ See his tract on this subject.

⁵ Cf. Bethune Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, 366 f.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 368.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 371.

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avoid the impression that here is a real means of grace to the soul, and a means that depends on physical activity. The detailed development of the sacramental idea in the Church is a special subject, and we cannot enter into it here, but any attempt to estimate the strength of Christian worship during the centuries must take account of the particularly hallowed place given to Baptism and the Lord's Supper. The Reformers did not regard the sacraments as absolutely necessary for salvation, but in pre-Reformation doctrine both Baptism and the Lord's Supper had acquired a central and vital significance. Augustine, in his later period, made baptism necessary to salvation, while the Roman Catholic doctrine was built upon the foundation he laid. The Council of Trent decreed that the guilt of original sin is removed by baptism, and that there is no salvation without it.¹ In the earliest times the Lord's Supper gathered around it very valuable ideas, such as the strengthening of the soul against sin, the commemoration of Christ's sacrifice, the unity in Him of all partakers, thankfulness for the fruits of the earth, and the hope of immortality,² but later there crept in the idea of sacrifice. To gather for the Eucharist was no longer merely to commemorate the Death of Christ: it was to partake of and experience something vital and necessary for spiritual life—as the doctrine of transubstantiation accepted by the Western, and ultimately by the Eastern Church, shows.

Christian worship, then, became far more than the mere corporate expression of private devotion: it became a means of grace which depended on definite observances. These in themselves were not only activities of the spirit, but activities involving the whole personality, and depending on an exalted conception of bodily fellowship. We are led to the same conclusion by the tremendously valuable contributions to art and music made by the Church during these centuries of

¹ See a useful summary in Maldwyn Hughes's *Christian Foundations*, 167 f.

² Didache, x. Irenæus, *Adv. Hæc.*, iv. 17. 5, etc.

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development.¹ The appeal to the senses was not despised. The protest made by certain of the Fathers against various forms of embellishment is properly understood not as a protest against the beautiful, but rather against image worship and consequent idolatry. It was generally recognized that the life of the soul could be enriched by influences of various kinds, not least by those which flowed along bodily channels.

(*d*) So much for the cultivation of the spiritual life by means of corporate worship. And what of the future? Here again, as we have seen, bodily conceptions found their place. It is remarkable how, in spite of the Hellenic spiritual ideas of immortality, the Church continued to express her hope for the future in terms of resurrection. It was felt that if there is to be life in the future state with any real meaning, the soul demands some sort of corporeal envelope: exactly what kind, the speculations of theologians had not determined, though suggestions were not wanting here and there. The important point to notice is that in their ideas of the future the conception of an appropriate organism held its place.

We may now summarize the leading ideas of personality which underlay these forms of thought and practice. The Church began with a conception of man derived from the Hebrews—man as a unity of soul and body. How persistently this Hebrew idea made its presence felt in the development we have seen—all the more remarkable because the Hebrew point of view had never been philosophically set forth. By the time that Church writers were inclined to indulge in philosophical studies of human personality there were other views in the field, and these had had the advantage of a philosophical equipment which was not conspicuous in the Biblical writers. Accordingly the Hebrew idea was constantly criticized, not always explicitly, but often by implication. Sometimes the aim was the preservation of the Greek conception, which tended always to disparage the body

¹ See *E.R.E.*, i. 845 f., ix. 19 f.

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in the interests of the soul¹; sometimes to preserve the New Testament idea itself against the encroachments of materialism. At the end of the period we may emphasize two contributions, both of which were to become very important in the modern period. First, there was the Augustinian dualism, separating soul and body as two distinct entities. Second, there was the Aristotelian corrective of this, which we have seen in the scholastic writers—a biological conception of man which could never really regard soul and body out of relation to each other.

The time was now ripe for a new approach to the subject, no longer from the standpoint of dogmatic theology, but from that of the new light which the new scientific and philosophical interests of the post-Reformation period brought to bear upon it. This new approach we have now to consider.

¹ It may, of course, be argued that this characterization of the Greek point of view ignores such prominent features of Greek civilization as athletics and appreciation of physical development and beauty. But while it is true that the ascetic view was confined to narrow circles in the Greek world, "nevertheless, as a consequence of its being embraced, deepened and spiritualized by two of the greatest thinkers of Greece, Plato and Plotinus, its influence has been enormous." (See E.R.E., ii. 87).

PART III

THE CONTRIBUTION OF MODERN THOUGHT

CHAPTER VIII

THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF MAN

THERE is a great difference between the modern approach to the study of man and that which marked the theologians we have so far considered. Referring to the Renaissance, Höffding remarks: "The justification for speaking of the Renaissance as a separate period is to be found in this, that a time came when the knowledge of nature and of human life became so rich in content that it could no longer be comprehended within the limits of theological ideas."¹ In the Middle Ages the dogmatist kept watch both over the mystic and the scientist, but in the modern period science and philosophy have shown themselves very impatient of scholastic encumbrances. The enlightened Christian thinker of to-day holds views which would hardly be recognized by the orthodox Christian of, say, the fourteenth century. Both in regard to man himself and his place in nature, Christian thought has undergone a series of profound changes. What Bishop Gore describes as a series of shocks² has compelled Christian thought to readjust itself, and the process has not been without pain. What is to-day referred to as the "conflict between religion and science" can be traced to the very beginning of modern science. "Pomponazzi dies without the consolations of the Church; Bernardino Telesio arouses the anger of the Church on behalf of its cherished Aristotelianism, and a short time after his death his books are placed on the Index; Bruno, the exponent of the philosophical implications of Copernicus, is burnt for his pains; Campanella, after twenty-seven years in prison, is detained for three more in the chambers of the Inquisition"³ . . . such was the conflict between dogmatic

¹ *History of Modern Philosophy*, i. 4.

² *Belief in God*, ch. i.

³ Chas. Singer, "Historical Relations of Religion and Science", in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, 126.

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orthodoxy and the new thought which modern science and philosophy were bringing in their train. Galileo was convicted by the Inquisition in 1632 of "believing and holding doctrines false and contrary to the Holy and Divine Scriptures," while it was not until 1835 that the epoch-making book of Copernicus was removed from the Index (and then silently). It is significant, as perhaps marking a change in the Roman point of view, that Darwin was never placed on the Index.

The post-Reformation developments in science and philosophy taught thinkers to regard man from a new angle. In the accepted doctrines of the Church not only was the earth central, with the sun revolving round it,¹ but also man himself was the central point of interest in the earth. Scholastics had realized the great services which nature renders to man, but man himself, and the earth he lived in and loved, was still the pivot, so to speak, on which the universe turned. The period on which we now enter introduced revolutionary ideas; it set the walls of the universe farther and farther back; it placed the sun in the centre of the universe; it laid down, with ever-increasing certainty, the laws which marked the life of nature; it discovered secrets in the physiological life of man himself. Thus the story of the modern movement embraces developments in physical science, physiology, biology, and, in recent times, sociology and psychology. Moreover, as it seems that scientific ideas have influenced religion mainly through philosophy, the philosophical development is of great importance in this period. It is our task therefore to survey this rich and eventful development, noting advances that are relevant to our theme, so that finally we may be able to consider the Christian view of the body not only in the light of Greek and Hebrew traditions, but also in the light of modern science and its philosophical implications. For details of this development reference must be made to the numerous histories of the subjects: all we can attempt is a broad survey

¹ See Anthony, *Relativity and Religion*, ch. 2.

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of important movements, with an estimate of the problems they raise for the student of personality. Thus in the present chapter we consider the scientific approach, and follow with a consideration of the philosophical development and the trend of modern psychology. These three sections, of course, are inter-related, but it will lend to clearness if they are treated, as far as possible, in distinct chapters.

I. THE LARGER BACKGROUND

The development of modern science has enlarged the background of knowledge as well as its sphere. The Aristotelian physics¹ regarded the earth as a sphere, as fixed as the centre of the universe, which is itself spherical: the stars were conceived to move with uniform velocity in concentric circles round the earth, and the universe was regarded as finite. In main outlines this system held the field for 2,000 years, but the Renaissance, although as Singer claims,² primarily sending men's minds back to ancient science, made possible the new spirit of scientific inquiry which has revolutionized our conceptions of the universe. Nicholas of Cusa, a trained mathematician, declared, "I have long considered that this earth is not fixed, but moves, even as do other stars. . . . To my mind, the earth turns upon its axis once in a day and a night". Copernicus, while retaining the ancient theory of the uniform circular motion of the heavenly bodies, declared that the earth moves round the sun, and gave his name to the new revolutionary view. Galileo Galilei made accessible the telescope and the microscope, and while he left the latter to the biologists, by use of the former he observed a great number of hitherto unobserved stars. In his *Dialogue on the Two Chief Systems of the World*, there is a discussion between an advocate of the Copernican doctrine and a strong upholder of the Aristotelian and

¹ Summarized by Singer in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, 101, 102.

² Ibid.

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Ptolemaic systems, with a third person who is open to conviction. In this book the Copernican doctrine is accepted: "In fact it passes far beyond Copernicus, notably in the total rejection of the idea of the stars as fixed in a crystal sphere. The stars are held to be at inconceivable but varying distance from our earth, and the absence of visible stellar parallax is considered as due to the vastness of this interval."¹ Kepler adopted the Copernican view and introduced his planetary laws.² Giordano Bruno, in incorporating the conclusions of Copernicus into his philosophy, had objected to the limitation of the sphere of the fixed stars, and had removed the boundaries of the world to an infinite distance; it was left for Descartes to give stronger philosophic support to this view, and he declared that the universe is infinite and devoid of any empty space.

It was by such daring investigation and speculation that the Aristotelian conception of the universe was discredited. Not every scientist in his revolutionary discoveries realized their implications for religion: Kepler, for example, could maintain a simple religious faith. He concludes one of his astronomical surveys with this noble prayer:

I have declared the praise of Thy works to the men who will read the evidences of it, so far as my finite spirit could comprehend them in their infinity . . . but if anything unworthy of Thee has been taught by me, do Thou teach me that I may correct it . . . and finally grant me this favour, that this work may never be injurious, but may conduce to Thy glory and the good of souls.

But there was a great challenge to accepted religious beliefs: a challenge to conceptions both of God and of man. It is with the latter that we are particularly concerned, and we note the resultant tendency to think of man not so much as a universe in himself, but as a small part of a vast and magnificent universe whose true

¹ Singer, 136.

² Planets move round the sun not in circles but in ellipses; they move not uniformly but in such a way as to sweep out equal areas about their centres in equal times; the squares of the period of revolution round the sun are proportional to the cubes of their distance.

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grandeur was slowly being revealed to the scientist. So the background of investigation was enlarged, and the field of study, now widened beyond the dreams of the typical scholastic, challenged investigation in a score of directions. There were, in addition, new means of getting to know: the telescope brought the far-off near: the microscope made the invisible visible: while various scientific apparatus provided new weapons for the scientific mind.¹ The time was now opportune for a closer examination of the wide field of Nature, including man himself; that closer examination revealed astonishing results, and still continues to yield them. Theories were formed which, in the light of newer knowledge, had to be discarded; results in the various fields had to be co-ordinated, and the total result related to the orthodox conceptions of religion.² That this process of relation is still being very vigorously pursued is in itself an indication of the far-reaching consequences of this post-Reformation development. We may now point out some important formulations which bear upon our inquiry.

2. THE REIGN OF LAW

It has always been a mark of genuine scientific investigation that it sought to observe the phenomena of natural life and of stellar movements with the intention of finding the governing laws. Kepler, for instance, had established his planetary laws, but things were happening much nearer at hand than the planets, and one of the important results of this scientific development has been the strengthening of the belief in the universal reign of law. Whitehead declares that "a brief and sufficiently accurate description of the intellectual life of the European races during the succeeding two centuries and a quarter up to our own times is that they have been living upon

¹ Whitehead considers that the recent rapid advances in physics have been made possible largely by the perfecting of scientific instruments. See *Science and the Modern World*, p. 143.

² See an interesting survey in J. Y. Simpson's *Landmarks in the struggle between Science and Religion*.

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the accumulated capital of ideas provided for them by the genius of the seventeenth century".¹ What was this accumulated capital? It included wealth derived from the fields of biology and physiology (as we shall see below), but its main content was the scientific conception of universal law. It was not enough that Kepler should formulate his planetary laws: it was required that the phenomena of organic and inorganic life upon the earth should be reduced to orderly systems, and that the terrestrial happenings thus systematized should be related to the happenings in the planetary world. In this work the brilliance of Newton was epoch-making.² He showed that the force which causes the stone to fall is the same as that which keeps the planets in their path. His law of gravitation and his laws of motion have influenced scientific research down to the present day. Comparable with these laws is the formulation (by R. Mayer and Von Helmholtz in Germany, and by Joule in England in the year 1847)³ of the law of conservation of energy. We need not at this stage consider the challenge of such formulations to the conception of man: this will call for consideration later in this chapter: but they are indications of the reduction of the varied phenomena of the universe to orderly sequence; and the achievement of this must be set down as of fundamental importance for science. More than ever we base the possibility of scientific knowledge on the reliability and trustworthiness of the universe. Whatever may be the outcome of the very technical discussion now proceeding in regard to the theory of Relativity, and however far present-day scientists may go in their criticism of the traditional Newtonian view of space and time, we still acknowledge the tremendous services of Newton and the rest in the progress of science. No more fitting tribute could be paid than by Whitehead, himself a leading exponent of the newest

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, 49.

² See Buckley, *History of Physics*, 32 f.

³ Buckley, 135 f.

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physics, who remarks concerning the Newtonian conception of the magnitude of forces that "its cumulative triumph has been the whole development of dynamical astronomy, of engineering and of physics".¹

This conception of universal law has been the charter of modern investigation.² Relying upon it, scientists have measured, weighed, and analysed the stars. They have traced the history of our earth, studied its constituents, and noted its relation to other bodies. Further, and of great importance for our special purpose, they have turned a searchlight upon man himself, seeking to analyse the constituents of his physical nature and relate him to other members of the animal series. Not only has the larger universe been discovered to be a marvel of order and intricacy: man himself has revealed the same characteristics. The heavens and the earth, and what is in or upon them, are declared to be governed by law. It will at once be realized how great is the advantage of the modern investigator as compared with the mediæval. His world is larger, more accessible and more reliable. His standards of measurement and his means of measuring are infinitely more sound. He is no longer in danger of confusing astronomy with astrology: magic, superstition, the "black arts", have given way before the clear beam of scientific learning. Man himself, as never before, is open to the inquiry of all who will acquaint themselves with the established laws of his nature. This brings us to the most important of modern advances for our purpose, that in the knowledge of man himself.

3. THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF MAN

It has been remarked that on many of the great cathedrals, theological monuments of the thirteenth

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, 57.

² Man putteth the world to scale

And weigheth out the stars;

The eternal hath lost her veil,

The infinite her bars.—SIR ROLAND ROSS.

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century, the images of men and women show fantastic ideas of anatomy. In those days the great theologians were concerned far more with the human soul than the human body. True, the great teachers, like Aristotle, had bequeathed a certain amount of physiological information, and the name of Galen stood high in these matters: but the human body was still awaiting the investigations of physiologists and biologists, and the work accomplished in the modern period in both these realms is comparable with that accomplished in the sphere of physics. We see Vesalius at work on the bodies of criminals and paupers, refusing to regard those poor worn-out bodies as the scum of the human race, but finding in them material for the proof of his view that man is a work of art with God as the Artist. In 1543 he published his *Fabric of the Human Body*, a work which placed the investigations of the human body in the position of a science. For the development of physiology we may refer to histories of the subject,¹ but we may note in passing how much of the investigation tended to a mechanical explanation of the various organic processes. So Harvey accounted for the circulation of the blood, and Franciscus Sylvius of Leyden and his pupils the phenomena of digestion, while a band of Harvey's followers explained in similar manner the process of respiration. For the moment, their explanations do not concern us: we are concerned with the progress in the knowledge of man, lifting his body into the light of science. During the nineteenth and the present century this knowledge has increased by leaps and bounds.

There was another side to the development. Vesalius had been interested in man rather as an instance of design, but there was to develop a movement which sought to interpret man in terms of his evolution. This age can still feel the effect of the shock to orthodox religion caused by the Evolution controversy, and in any historical survey of the movements which determined

¹ Such as Foster's *History of Physiology*.

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the modern approach to man the biological developments must be given an important place. The idea of evolution, of course, is an old one. In the sense of a development of the world out of primitive elements, it was present in some of the Greeks, as, e.g. Democritus. In the biological sense, applied to animal life rather than the life of planets or worlds, it was found in Aristotle who saw in Nature a struggle towards perfection—from inorganic matter through plants, zoophytes, animals to man himself, with the Efficient Cause as the principle behind it all.¹ But although the idea is an old one, when we speak of biological evolution we have in mind those advances in biological knowledge beginning with pioneers like Linnæus, and sent forth on the nineteenth-century world in such a startling fashion by Darwin and Wallace. Darwin's *Origin of Species* did much to convince the scientific world, and though his followers have modified his view in certain points, the evolutionary theory has found general acceptance not only as applied to the physical realm, but also, as we shall see, to the emergence of mind. "As held by scientists of to-day, then, biological evolution means that life has in the course of the world's ongoing sprung from simple organic forms and has developed through different stages and in different directions according to discoverable laws; and that the development from simple beginnings to complex maturity of individual organisms such as we see going on around us every day is an illustration of the more general development of species."²

It will be readily observed that these biological developments have rendered a signal service to the study of man. Not unnaturally, it has taken religious thought some time to accustom itself to the new point of view, and the difficulty here has not been lessened by the

¹ Osborn points out that the Greeks left for posterity the solution of the problem of causation: whether intelligent Design is always operating in Nature, or whether the development is due to natural causes implanted by the intelligent Design, or whether it is due to natural causes containing no evidence of design, but due to chance (*From the Greeks to Darwin*, ch. iv.).

² G. W. Cunningham, *Problems of Philosophy*, 218.

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extreme views which some of Darwin's enthusiastic supporters have adopted. But leaving for the moment the consideration of the problems which the theory raises, it cannot be doubted that the careful collection of evidence, the application of some of our keenest scientific minds to the study of animal life, has been of the greatest advantage. If we couple with this the advances in physiology and bio-chemistry we realize that modern thought has not only placed man in the centre of interest, but placed him there with a strong beam of enlightenment playing upon him. It is not without pain, and the confusion involved in the readjustment of traditional views, that man has been rescued from the mists, or, at least, the half light, of the Middle Ages. He has been given his place in the animal creation: his functions and his powers have been examined in all their intricate beauty, and the result of it all has been that the modern scientist, no less than the ancient psalmist, can cry, "We are fearfully and wonderfully made."

4. THE RESULTANT PROBLEMS

To enlarge our conception of the universe, demonstrate the universality of law, reveal the wonders of human anatomy and physiology, is to direct attention to the importance of the human body in the scheme of things; but the process has brought danger as well as advantage to the student of man. It is not to be wondered at that scientists, in the first enthusiasm of their discoveries, should allow their zeal to carry them to views which, in many cases, have had to be subsequently modified. Nothing more natural than that they should exclaim: "Now, at last, we possess the means of measuring man and placing him in his true relation to other phenomena in the universe; all that man is can now be subjected to our measurements, and the varied happenings of human life explained in terms of Scientific Knowledge." Accordingly, science went as far in one direction as orthodox theology went in the other. As

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Lord Balfour has summarized it: "In times not far distant there were men devoted to religion who blundered ignorantly into science, and men devoted to science who meddled unadvisedly with religion. Theologians found their geology in Genesis; materialists supposed that reality could be identified with the mechanism of matter."¹ To-day we have learned a wiser method of approaching the subject, but only after a struggle (now by no means concluded) between those who tended to exalt the body and those who desired to preserve the soul. Preoccupation with the powers and functions of the body rather predisposes the student to a materialistic emphasis, and one of the real tasks of the Christian thinker is to conserve for the body its full rights, while at the same time conceding to the soul its fundamental reality and value. How necessary it is to do this is shown in the history of modern thought, and particularly in the problems which the new scientific approach to man laid bare. We may illustrate this.

(a) *Science and the Origin of Man.*—We left the ecclesiastical period strong in its assertion of creationism. For the story of the beginning of things the devout Christian turned to Genesis—as a great many still turn to-day. "In a few days the universe had been prepared by God for the dwelling-place of man, with the world, his home, as its centre, and the sun and moon to give him light, and the stars to give glory to his sky and perhaps to portray his destiny; and man had been introduced in perfection and glory into his dwelling-place, to be its earthly sovereign, all within the space of a few days a few thousand years ago."² In earlier centuries of Church history there had been eminent theologians who had regarded the Genesis account as allegorical,³ but in the typical Christianity of the nine-

¹ In his Introduction to *Science, Religion, and Reality*, 18.

² Gore, *Belief in God*, 11.

³ So the Alexandrian School, see Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, ch. iv. Cf. Augustine, *De Gen. ad Lit.*, v. 5, 23. For a study of the scientific attitude of Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa, see Simpson, *Landmarks in the Struggle between Science and Religion*, ch. v.

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teenth century prior to Darwin's time simple faith asked for no other explanation than can be found in the earliest chapters of the Bible. The modern developments in astronomy, geology, and biology undermined this simple faith. They compelled the Christian thinker to place man in a new setting. The emergence of man became a matter not of days but of epochs. His physical structure now appeared not as something unique, the special work of the Creator's word, but as having marked relationship with other and lower forms of animal life. And in place of a being perfect from the start, the Church was asked to think of a gradual development through long ages to the intellectual and moral level which marks man to-day. The story is familiar, and we need not enter into its details, nor into all the problems which it raised (such as the important problem of sin). But we are concerned to note how the evolutionary view altered our conception of man, bringing both enlightenment and challenge to the traditional conceptions.

The advantages, though not at first recognized, are clear enough. Of the two methods, special creation and evolutionary development, the latter gives the nobler and richer view of life.¹ It brings man into relation with the whole earthly family. It makes the agelong life of myriad forms contribute to his development. It sets him at the crown of the development, and to regard the matter thus is to marvel more than ever at the Divine Power that guided and sustained the development on such a magnificent cosmic scale. For, it must be noted, the conception of evolution still leaves the larger question to be answered, Why this development? To declare "how" is not necessarily to state "why". Moreover, we have now learned to draw a distinction between the origin of anything and its essential value. When Aristotle remarked that the true nature of a knife is to be found

¹ To quote Darwin, "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms, or into one; and that while this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed laws of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved" (*Origin of Species*, 669).

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in the best knife we can get, he uttered a principle which has been increasingly recognized as of fundamental importance in the study of human values. Man as we know him has sides to his nature of which the value is to be estimated not in terms of any lowly origin, but by reference to a new standard of values. As we shall see in our survey of modern psychological investigation, the nature of man defies explanation in terms derived from a study of the physical development. To accept evolution as a method still leaves us with the twofold problem of relating the development (*a*) to God, and (*b*) to those spiritual factors which are now seen to be man's true glory. Among evolutionists prejudices have arisen along both lines: agnosticism has tried to eliminate God, while materialism has belittled the spiritual factors. This is the danger to be recognized and fought, but it ought not to blind us to the real value of biological evolution regarded as a description of development. The physical side of man has emerged from this scientific inquiry into its origin a much more wonderful and noble organism than ever the uncritical Middle Ages conceived it to be.

(*b*) *Science and the Mechanistic Interpretation of Life.*—One of the immediate results of the scientific approach to the study of man has been the growth of mechanistic conceptions. Here, again, it has been a very easy matter to become so enthusiastic in the support of physical law that its sphere has been extended even to the dominance of psychical life. Two examples illustrate this. A great deal has been made in the modern scientific development of the law of conservation of energy. This law has had various formulations, but it may be generally stated as holding that the total sum of the physical processes of the universe result in no change of the quantity of its physical energy. The sum total of the energy of the physical universe is a constant: there may be changes in the application of energy, but not in its quantity. McDougall¹ shows how this conception

¹ *Body and Mind*, 92 f.


 has been used to rule out psychical influence on physical processes. If the soul is to influence the body, such influence will either increase or diminish the quantity of physical energy in the universe, and so violate the law. And once the possibility of spiritual influence on physical is ruled out, we are left with a mechanistic scheme. On this point, however, two suggestions may be noted. It is important to realize what a law is, and what it is not. Even the most fundamental scientific law is an abstraction: it is a product of the mind, working upon the observed facts. The universe as a whole is something we do not know, and a law of nature is strictly true only in the special conditions in which it has been established. We may therefore challenge the materialist's right to extend a conception, which he has demonstrated as true of that part of the physical realm which he is able to examine, into another realm altogether—that of the mind. In the second place, the law of conservation itself is not quite so immovably established as was once thought. When McDougall published his *Body and Mind* in 1911, he could write "one even hears whispered doubts about the law of conservation of energy". Since that time, if we may here follow the guidance of so eminent a writer as Whitehead, the whispered doubts seem to have gathered force and have become full-voiced. The dominant note of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, he says, is that the doctrine of materialism afforded an adequate basis for the concepts of science. "The note of the present epoch is that so many complexities have developed regarding material, space, time, and energy, that the simple security of the old orthodox assumptions has vanished. It is obvious that they will not do as Newton left them, or even as Clerk Maxwell left them."¹ To enter into the details of this far-reaching modern movement in physics demands an equipment which the

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, 142 f. Cf. the remark of A. D. Ritchie (*Scientific Method*, 157), that Relativity has had a "nerve-shattering effect" on many physicists.

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present writer does not possess; but the movement is noted as suggesting that even among the scientists themselves the materialistic conception of life is no longer asserted with the boldness and certainty that marked the earlier period. We have the remark of Prof. Eddington that "it is difficult to see now any justification for the strongly rooted conviction of a deterministic system of law" (*The Nature of the Physical World*, see p. 331 f. for a summary of his argument). Indeed, as we shall see, for present-day materialism we look not so much to the physicists as to certain schools of modern psychology.

Our second example of scientific enthusiasm leading to mechanistic conceptions is found in the development of bio-chemistry. Early in the eighteenth century the physician of Frederick the Great declared, "Let us conclude boldly, then, that man is a machine, and that there is only one substance, differently modified, in the whole world. What will all the weak reeds of divinity, metaphysic, and nonsense of the schools avail against this firm and solid oak?"¹ Such a vigorous statement, of course, drew immediate replies, and ever since we may say there has been a continuous struggle between the mechanists and the vitalists. It was d'Holbach and Cabanis who declared that the brain produces thought in the same way as the stomach and intestines operate in digestion, to which we find the kind of reply made famous by Sir Thomas Browne: that if we believe this, "then let our hammers rise up and boast that they have built our houses, and our pens receive the honour of our writings".² During the nineteenth century the tide of mechanistic view continued to flow strongly. The bio-chemists declared that the body was made up of chemical compounds, that the law of conservation of energy applied to it as well as to inorganic nature, that chemical explanation was adequate for the phenomena of the human organism. "At the present time", says Needham, "the situation is in effect the complete triumph of

¹ *Julien de la Mettrie*, quoted by Needham. "Mechanistic Biology and the Religious Consciousness", in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, 231 f.

² *Religio Medici*, 28.

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mechanistic biology.”¹ He does not regard the work of neo-vitalists like Driesch and Haldane as seriously affecting this triumph;² both these investigators argued that the functions of separate organs may admit of physico-chemical description, but the body as a whole in all its efficiency of co-ordination and purposiveness cannot do so. The attack on mechanism, however, must not be from this side, but rather from the point of view that in all science there is a subjective factor. “The scientific man plays an active part in the selection of the facts before him, and his selection of these facts is determined by the construction of his mind.”³ The root criticism which Needham urges is that we cannot “extend the sway of physics and chemistry to mind. Mind, therefore, and all mental processes, cannot possibly receive explanation or description in physico-chemical terms, for this would amount to explaining something by an instrument itself the product of the thing explained.”⁴ “The legitimacy of physico-chemical explanations in the realm of physical life we have seen to be well grounded, but we have found that as far as mental life is concerned, bio-chemistry and bio-physics have no authority. The opinion, therefore, which seems to me to be most justifiable is that life in all its forms is the phenomenal disturbance created in the world of matter and energy when mind comes into it.”⁵

Needham’s treatment of the problems presented by a study of human life is most suggestive. It shows first how there is a side of human life which cannot be legitimately explained by a physico-chemical scheme, and, secondly, that if we are to explain human personality in its fulness we are compelled to institute a psychological inquiry, and, ultimately, venture into the realm of metaphysics. This illustrates the point made earlier in this chapter, that the scientific, psychological, and metaphysical approaches to the study of man cannot be kept altogether distinct.

¹ 235.

² For his careful examination of Neo-Vitalism, see 235 and 246.

³ 248.

⁴ 250.

⁵ 251.

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WE are concerned in this chapter with some of the main contacts between modern philosophy and the study of man. Into such a vast field we can only venture in a very general way within the limits of one chapter, but even this general reference may serve to show how the problems bequeathed by centuries of ecclesiastical thought were reshaped under the influence of modern philosophy. Once again the warning is to be noted, that although our treatment of the scientific, philosophical, and psychological contributions to our problem is divided into separate chapters, the various approaches cannot be kept altogether distinct. The philosophy of Descartes,¹ for instance, was influenced by the findings of Harvey in his inquiry into the circulation of the blood; at the present time, the importance of such an investigator as Lloyd Morgan is due in no small measure to his wide equipment as scientist and psychologist, as well as philosopher. Of the whole modern period, psychological as well as metaphysical, it may be said that the atmosphere of discussion is what it is by virtue of the tremendous developments in physical and biological science.

At the close of the Middle Ages two prominent conceptions of human nature held the field. There was the traditional dualism, reminiscent of Platonism, and the biological point of view of Aristotelianism. In the former we found elements somewhat subversive of the Hebrew conception of man; in the latter we noted elements which suggested a corrective of extreme dualism. The post-Reformation developments in philosophy were largely concerned with the idea of the soul and spiritual values, and although these issues must necessarily be mentioned, it will be borne in mind that our central

¹ "In considering the human body, Descartes thought with the outfit of a physicist" (Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, 182).

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concern is the bodily factor in man. We begin with Descartes in whose teaching soul and body as the two factors in human personality were regarded dualistically; we then inquire whether there was any attempt to resolve this dualism, noting natural tendencies to emphasize one factor or the other; finally, we ask whether there is anything in the present-day approach which may be regarded as substantiating the New Testament values of the body.

I. THE BODY AS A FACTOR IN A DUALISTIC VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE

In Descartes we catch an echo of the traditional Augustinian view of man. He distinguished between soul and body as two substances; the matter of the material world is *res extensa*, the soul is *res inextensa*. Soul is present only in man, and its only function is that of thought or conscious activity. All the other functions which Aristotle, and many mediæval thinkers after him had ascribed to soul, Descartes explained mechanically. The reasoning soul is of a nature wholly independent of the body and is immortal. "Material and immaterial substances, to be sure, have something in common. Both are created. Descartes admits both are substances, both endure in time; but even our imperfect knowledge is amply sufficient to recognize the utter and ineradicable disparity between them."¹ The material world and its processes are to be explained mechanically—here he is clearly influenced by the findings of Harvey. Although soul and body are so disparate, they act on each other, Descartes locating the point of interaction in the pineal gland ("an unfortunate shot in the dark", comments McDougall,² "for modern research has shown that no part of the brain is less concerned in our mental processes

¹ Laird, *The Idea of the Soul*, 21.

² Many of Descartes' disciples felt that interaction as explained by him was full of difficulties. Some said there can be no interaction between such different things as soul and body. Geulinx and Malebranche held that the correspondence

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than the pineal gland").¹ It is interesting to note that Descartes' denial of the vegetative functions to the soul contributed to the idea generally adopted in modern psychology that the soul, the ground of individual consciousness, is the thinking, feeling, willing part of man.

2. SOME ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THIS DUALISM

We may here notice two writers who attempted to resolve this Cartesian dualism. Leibnitz declared that God created an infinite number of real beings, monads, each differing from the others, each containing from the beginning the potentiality of its subsequent history, each indivisible, and save by an act of God, indestructible. The soul of every animal is a monad, but the soul of man is a monad of a higher order because of its higher psychical activities. The human body is a system of monads which belong to different levels in the scale of psychic being, and the soul of each man is the dominant monad of the system. These monads do not influence each other in any way, so whatever correspondence there may be between soul and body Leibnitz explained as due to pre-established harmony. Each substance, by merely following its own laws, is in harmony with the others, and thus soul and body may be regarded as like two clocks keeping perfect time. For interaction Leibnitz thus substitutes parallelism: On the one hand, we have the world of nature, mechanically ordered; on the other, the activity of mind which has a teleological character. There is a very interesting and important point, viz. that according to Leibnitz every soul is always associated with some body. "Neither are there souls wholly separate from bodies, nor bodiless spirits. God alone is without body . . ." ²—a passage which might have been taken as it stands from Origen.

between mind and body processes can be explained only on the assumption that God produces it. This, as Martineau said (*Types of Ethical Theory*, i. 158), is really no explanation, bringing in at every moment the miracle of a *Deus ex machina*.

¹ *Body and Mind*, 52.

² *Monadologie*, para. 72.

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Spinoza attacked the Cartesian dualism by insisting that mind and body are really the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, at another under the attribute of extension. The one real and ultimate substance is God, of whom thought and extension are but two aspects.¹ Spinoza is interesting in two ways; he sends us back to the type of speculative system we found in Eckhart, and he points us forward to the great Idealistic movement of the nineteenth century. It must be noted that while, in his spiritualistic pantheism he makes a definite attempt to bridge the gulf between soul and body, this attempt is not without its challenge to the Christian conception of individuality of personality.

3. THE ATTACK ON "SUBSTANCE"

We now note an eighteenth-century attack on a conception which had hitherto held the field without serious challenge, viz. the notion of substance. Scholastic writers, here revealing the influence of Augustine, had used the word "substance" to imply a substratum of real being which is beneath or supports the various qualities, etc., in which that substance makes itself manifest. Descartes had conceived substances of two orders; for Leibnitz all the monads were substances; while for Spinoza all substance was one only. Locke asked: How far does our knowledge of the external world and of the operations of the human mind justify us in assuming that material and immaterial substances exist? He came to the conclusion that the idea of substance is only an inference: soul and body as substances are only hypotheses of which we cannot have direct knowledge, but which we make for the better ordering of our experience. "When we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substance, as horse, stone, etc., though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities which we used to find united in the thing called "horse" or "stone",

¹ Caldecott and Mackintosh, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, 77.

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yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some common object: which support we denote by the name "substance"; though it is certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support. The same thing happens concerning the operations of the mind. . . ."¹

The importance of Locke's conclusions, particularly in regard to the soul, is illustrated by the use made of them by Pringle Pattison, who quotes his argument of the futility of such a substance as the bearer or support of conscious life during our earthly span as convincing, and as supporting his own attack on the scholastic conception of soul-substance.²

Locke's view of material substance as merely hypothetical and inferential in character opened the way for a further attack by Berkeley. He declared that we must go farther than Locke had done. It is said, he argued, that we can only suppose the existence of a material substratum to support the qualities we perceive in material things; but if this material substratum is unknown, is there any real need for it at all? Why not say that matter is really identical with those qualities we observe? Thus he is led to the view that "matter is the name which we give to the totality of objects in the physical environment, and these objects are nothing but collections of various sorts of qualities".³ Berkeley's view is best known in its further development that objects exist only in relation to a perceiving mind—*esse est percipi*. This is to deny the reality of matter altogether as an independent existent.

This was the position which confronted Hume. Locke had given to soul-substance and body-substance nothing more than a hypothetical and inferential reality, though he accepted them both as useful and reasonably probable conceptions. Berkeley denied the independent

¹ *Essay on the Human Understanding*, ii. ch. xxiii.

² *Idea of Immortality*, 74.

³ G. W. Cunningham, *Problems of Philosophy*, 168.

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reality of matter while asserting the reality of spirit. The attack which Berkeley brought to bear upon Locke's position Hume now directed against Berkeley, and the result was his demolition of spirit also. His main ground was the argument that the principle of causation, which both Locke and Berkeley had appealed to, is purely subjective. We have no ground at all, he declared, for going either beyond perceptions to an object they are supposed to represent, or to a mind which is supposed to perceive them. The mind, he said, is a bundle of different perceptions, a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance. It is clear that Hume's main criticism was directed against the idea of the soul as an unchanging unit beneath the varied life of consciousness: the effect of his attack is seen in the movement in modern psychology commonly referred to as "psychology without a soul".

4. THE KANTIAN INFLUENCE

The philosophic thought of the nineteenth century reveals two widely divergent tendencies, each of which may claim to go back to Kant's conception of the material world as merely phenomenal. His view was that the experience which confronts us does not directly lead us either to material or immaterial substances. He adopted a position which is substantially that of Hume, viz. that all we can know directly are our experiences. How are these experiences unified, as they manifestly are? Hume had replied that the various experiences any one of us may have are unified by the laws of association. Kant, however, was not satisfied with this. He felt that the laws of association presuppose factors like memory, and he concluded that experiences which are so organized that they can be called *my* experiences demand an active principle of unification in the mind, to which he gave the title "synthetic unity of apperception". The material world, he held, is phenomenal: what things are in themselves cannot be known. This conception of the phe-

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nominal character of the material world made it possible for him to accept the mechanical ordering of its life without involving himself in philosophic materialism. He could agree with chemists and physicists when they demonstrated the mechanical ordering of bodily things, but since he held that the real things behind the phenomena cannot be known, it was still possible for him to reconcile the teachings of science with an idealistic philosophy and with the values of religion. From one point of view human activities may be regarded as subject to laws of cause and effect, but from another it must be admitted that these phenomenal manifestations are far from exhausting the meaning of human life. In the words of Paulsen,¹ "The logical nature, understanding, and reason, is really the Ego itself, while on the one hand time and space belong merely to sentiency, to the sense representation of the Ego which as phenomenal can pass away at death. But there remains the Ego as a pure thinking essence, free from space and time, a spaceless and timeless pure thinking spirit". Man is a member of a world of moral relations as well as a member of a bodily universe. There are laws he must obey as a rational, responsible being, as well as laws he must obey in the sphere of cause and effect. "By his doctrine of the practical reason, he claimed to establish on the sure foundation of the moral nature of man the belief in God, freedom, and immortality."²

This attitude opened the way for two different conceptions. His sympathy with scientific investigations, and his recognition that science must proceed on the assumption that reality manifests itself in space as a body or a function of a body, opened the way for a materialistic emphasis. On the other hand, his declaration that this world, with which the scientist is concerned, is merely phenomenal, made the transition easy to the Idealism of the nineteenth century. To take the latter first: Kant had said that experience is only real because of the

¹ *Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine*, 185.

² McDougall, *Body and Mind*, 75.

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a priori forms of reason which work within it. His aim in his idealistic philosophy was "the rational articulation and valuation of the content of consciousness"—to use Troeltsch's phrase.¹ Experience of the corporeal world is possible only on the presupposition of the rational subject, and from this it is an easy transition to the view that the corporeal world is really the creation of mind. This was the characteristic view of post-Kantian idealism which rejected his *Ding an sich* and reduced the body to the level of unreality. Kant's subjective idealism soon gave way to objective idealism, where reality is derived from the absolute mind—a position characteristic of Hegel, for example, among the Germans, and of T. H. Green and the Cairds among English writers. On the other hand, the nineteenth century produced a remarkable scientific advance, and this, together with the reaction from idealistic metaphysics, gave materialism a chance to assert itself. In England this was seen in T. H. Huxley, although he sought permanent refuge in agnosticism, while the materialistic monism of Haeckel had widespread influence.

5. THE OUTLOOK TO-DAY

The student of philosophy will miss from this rapid review many important names and theories; but we are not concerned in this chapter to give the full story of the philosophic development. Our aim is merely to show how the problem, as it exists for the modern man, is rather different from that which agitated the scholastics. Not only has science altered the line of approach; philosophy also has been busy making its contribution, and the main lines are clear. We note the dualistic view and attempts to resolve the dualism. We have emphases now on this side, now on that; now an exaltation of spirit, now an enthronement of body in the affairs of man. What can we learn from this in our endeavour to estimate the place and value of the body in the scheme of things?

¹ E.R.E., vii. 93.

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It is not so very long ago since many writers joined in chorus to tell us that materialistic conceptions held the field. Fresh from the new victories of science in physics and biology, they declared that mechanism had won. We have already given some attention to this in the previous chapter. Its effect on religion was profoundly disturbing. As Dr. Raven remarks: "It seemed as if the future lay solely with the chemists and physicists, as if we should have to dismiss as illusion all save the study of the machinery of organisms, as if personality were a shadow and God the shadow of a shade."¹ This was to counter the Platonic emphasis with a vengeance! It was as far as possible from that supreme exaltation of spirit, and consequent disparagement of matter which marked the Platonic tradition through the centuries.

Happily, the story of modern developments does not end here. The nineteenth-century duel between idealism and naturalism may be said to have resulted, for the twentieth, in the overthrow of philosophic materialism. This is not to say that materialism has not still its advocates: an occasional defender arises, like Loeb, who claims that the content of human life from cradle to coffin is amenable to physico-chemical analysis, that man is a chemical mechanism,² and we shall find that present-day psychology is not without serious tendencies in the materialistic direction. But as to the undermining of the materialistic position there can be no doubt; we have it on the authority of Bertrand Russell that modern physics is becoming increasingly spiritualistic.³

The position is full of promise for any who desire to conserve the values both of body and soul in the Christian idea of man. To appreciate this, it is necessary to go back a little way in the modern development. In the reaction from the materialistic emphasis which appeared to receive such support from the Darwinians, we may note the advocacy of Animistic theories. Bergson's theory of

¹ *The Creator Spirit*, 61.

² See his essay, *The Mechanistic Conception of Life*.

³ *Analysis of Mind*.

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the *élan vital* was received with a warmth which suggests that in many quarters, and not merely religious, there was a strong desire to conserve the reality and power of mind in the evolutionary explanation of life.¹ In the psychological realm the work of McDougall is justly famous for its insistence on the mental factors in the evolutionary process. To urge these factors is to render a great service to the cause of the spirit; the main value of the animist lies in his refusal to allow human life to be summed up in terms of mechanical categories. He finds mental activity even in the life of germ-plasm, and thus denies the adequacy of evolution considered merely mechanically. But his conclusions are not free from criticism. It may be urged, for instance, that he is merely carrying back to a lower level what he knows to be true of a higher; it requires something like a venture of faith to believe that there is mental activity in the behaviour of protozoa! Further, the animistic view does not seem to escape the criticism that it is dualistic. It is true that the mental stands towards the physical in the relation of mover to moved, but we seem to be left with two series, mental and physical, about which the most that can be said is that there is interaction between them.

There is to-day a growing feeling that such a position is unsatisfactory. If we take the problem as it is presented in human life, we realize that the activity of personality is the activity of mind and body together. There is a oneness about this activity which does not seem satisfactorily preserved in a mere alliance of interacting factors. When "I" act, my activity must be regarded as that of an organism functioning as a whole. Some sides of my activity may be described in terms of physics and chemistry—so much mechanism has taught us; but other sides do not lend themselves to such explanation. Although we may distinguish between this side and

¹ Bergson's contribution will be referred to in the next chapter. Here it is sufficient to notice that McDougall classes his theory as among the animistic types, and that Bergson rejects the claims of mechanism to rule in the organic world: he assumes that consciousness exists independently of the physical world.

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that, it is to be recognized that the organism is functioning as a unit, and that the full truth about man is to be found only when we thus consider him as a soul-body organism acting as such. Eucken remarks: "Dualism with its separation between the material and the psychical worlds is particularly calculated to display the specific character of each. It may boast of the clearness and definiteness of its conceptions, but it is flatly contradicted by a craving after unity, the existence of which is shown by our immediate perception of the close connection between body and soul; by art, which joins the material and the psychical in intimate union, and uses the one to enhance the other; and by thought, which insists on the ultimate unity of the universe."¹

From various points of view, and with different philosophies in mind, this tendency away from dualism has found expression in many modern writers. It is seen in the attempt to restate the evolutionary view, especially in those writers who accept the view of emergent evolution conspicuously expressed, for example, by Lloyd Morgan. In his *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, Lloyd Morgan sets himself the task of presenting both life ("the synthetic unity of events in physical and physiological regard") and mind ("the different expression of like unity of events in mental regard") as manifestations of divine purpose, one and indivisible in God as ultimate substance.² In any organism we can tell two stories, a physical and a psychical; each must be set out in terms proper to itself, but the activity which the two describe must be regarded as coming from one indivisible source, the living organism. This world plan, which is a manifestation of divine purpose, shows emergent evolution both in the physical and the mental realms. Body and mind are to be regarded from the point of view of monistic interpretation within one realm of nature.³ "There is for me one and only one realm of reality that is both natural and spiritual, in ultimate unity of substance."⁴ There is a

¹ *The Life of the Spirit*, 186.

³ *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, 279.

² *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, 312.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 302.

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flavour of Spinoza about this, and while we are not here concerned with his special form of monism, we note with gratitude his consistent attack on essential dualism between the organic and inorganic realms. Bosanquet declares that "though we cannot see life coming out of inorganic matter, we can, every day and everywhere, see souls with full human capacities apparently being brought into existence by the fulfilment of certain very elementary conditions of cell-conjugation and division".¹ He quotes with approval the observation of Lotze that if we observed the germinating soul, its development would appear to proceed *pari passu* with the organization of the body.² "It would be something, in my judgment, to emphasize the idea of a being essentially connected with or even founded upon its environment (past as well as present) to which nevertheless or out of which it brings a principle of unity in a sense opposed to the struggling partnership of a body and a soul, isolable from the environment and from each other, as traditional popular metaphysics represents them to us." ³

Pringle Pattison also insists that while consciousness brings into view a new range of facts and values, a new order which demands its own conceptions in terms of which it may be described and systematized, "It is only in so far as we connect the physical with the vital and the conscious, as stages of a single process, that we can speak with even a show of intelligibility of the physical as containing the potentiality of all that is to follow".⁴ It is clear that Pringle Pattison is attracted by the Aristotelian idea of the soul as the entelechy of the body. "The self-conscious life is the pre-eminent reality which the body in its structure and organization exists to actualize."⁵ So far from regarding soul and body as disparate entities, he prefers to start from the idea of the living body as the embodied soul, and thus, he thinks,

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, 189.

² *Ibid.*, 191.

³ *Ibid.*, 189. Cf. the position adopted by Alexander in *Space, Time, and Deity*. "Life is not an epiphenomenon of matter, but an emergent from it." "Mind is the last empirical quality of finites that we know, and we have seen it to be an emergent from the level of living existence", vol. II. 64 and 67.

⁴ *Idea of God*, 106.

⁵ *Idea of Immortality*, 105.

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the problem of interaction ceases to exist, and laboured schemes of parallelism become unnecessary.¹ Nowhere has this tendency towards unity between soul and body been more forcibly expressed than in General Smuts's recent *Holism and Evolution*, especially in chapter X, entitled "Personality as a whole". He feels that science has rendered us a great service in restoring to the body its place of dignity in personality.² "Body and mind are not independent reals (but) have meaning and reality only as elements in the one real substantive whole of personality."³ "Disembodied mind and disminded body are both impossible concepts, as either has only meaning and function in relation to the other."⁴

¹ *Idea of Immortality*, 92.

³ 268.

² 266.

⁴ 261.

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STUDY OF MAN

IN apportioning the credit due to the modern world for its deeper knowledge of human life, not a little must be given to the psychologists. The history of psychology shows that its subject matter has been variously regarded. Long ago Aristotle attributed "soul" to all organisms which showed power of spontaneous movement and development, and he accordingly treated psychology as a branch of physics. In modern times, however, there has been a restriction of the field of study. Until comparatively recently the subject matter of psychology was limited to the thoughts and feelings of which we are fully conscious, and its main method was introspection. But now the field has been widened. The older psychology, it is felt, tended to become abstract and academic, so the psychology of to-day finds itself "compelled in an ever-increasing degree to recognize the co-operation in all mental processes of factors that are unconscious, and so cannot be introspectively observed; and though some of these may be inferred from the nature of the processes revealed by introspection, others can only be inferred from the study of movements and other bodily changes".¹ This widening process, which was characteristic of physiological psychology, has been continued and emphasized in the "New Psychology" with its attention to those non-rational processes which the older psychology tended to ignore. So, under the influence of the evolutionary conception, present-day psychology pays great attention to the biological aspects of human life.² Here, again, we note the increasing recognition of the bodily factors in the determination of human life. This biological approach may now be illustrated, and an estimate made both of its advantages and dangers.

¹ McDougall, *Physiological Psychology*, 2.

² On the general influence of Biology, see Pringle Pattison, *Idea of God*, ch. iv.

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I. THE PLACE AND POWER OF INSTINCTS

This subject is still in a somewhat fluid condition. To quote W. K. Wright: ¹ "The controversy is extremely hot. There are those who wish to abandon the conception of instincts altogether. Others, like Professor John Dewey, admit the existence of instincts but assign to them a very subordinate rôle in human conduct. Others virtually identify instincts with reflexes, and find their number legion. At the other extreme are those who would reduce all instincts to a single impulse—self-preservation, or libido, or *l'élan vital*, or what not." The question has been brought into prominence, at least as far as the general public are concerned, by attempts to explain life in terms of one instinct, sex (interpreting the term widely), attempts such as we find in the Freudian school. Some attention will be given to this school later in this chapter: here we may well take the balanced statements of McDougall, a pioneer in this branch of psychological investigation. He defines an instinct as "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive and pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such action".² Each instinct is accompanied by an appropriate emotion—flight by fear, repulsion by disgust, curiosity by wonder, and so on. Directly or indirectly, "the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from an instinct) every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along to its end, and every bodily activity is initiated or sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained . . . these impulses are the mental forces

¹ "On Certain Aspects of the Religious Sentiment", *Journal of Religion* (Chicago), September 1924.

² *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 18th ed., 29.

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that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central system of life and mind, and will".¹ Instincts, then, form the basis of moral development, and the growth of character consists in the developments of sentiments, whose organization in the growing mind is determined by the course of experience. A sentiment is defined as "an organized system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object".² Thus the interplay of instinct and experience explains the life of man. McDougall claims that the higher life of man can be explained by reference to two main factors, those innate tendencies which man shares with the lower animals, and the environment, including the effect of education on the innate tendencies. The organization of instincts, through sentiments, into character, is possible through the absorption of the more refined parts of the moral tradition, under the influence of personalities in whom it is embodied most strongly.³

We have here a view of man's life which is thoroughly evolutionary. Man is linked with lower animals, and even his higher powers are traced in their origin to tendencies which form part of his general biological inheritance. The advantage of such a view is apparent. It enables us to get rid of the unscientific attitude to instincts which was so long a feature of popular thought. We have been accustomed to regard instincts as a feature of life connected with an "animal past" over which the veil had better be drawn. The less said about them the better. But the view we are now considering restores instincts to their true place in the development: the mental, as well as the bodily life of man is seen to be continuous with the life of lower orders. Instincts, like fear and sex, are seen to play their part in the gradual determination

¹ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 18th ed, 44.

² McDougall claims that this conception has much in common with the psycho-analytical complex. Wright says that for modern psychology "sentiment" is the happier term, as "complex" connotes mental systems that are dissociated or in some other way pathological.

³ 222 f.

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of higher emotions and impulses,¹ and thus a unity is given to the bodily and the mental which is quite in accord with the Hebrew view.

We are to be on our guard, however, against tendencies which give the instincts undue preponderance in the life of man. First, it is again necessary to bear in mind that there is a distinction between origin and value. As Tansley says:² "Repugnance to the biological view-point should disappear when it is remembered that there is involved no limitation of the specific value of the human mind, no final assertion as to its possibilities, no minimizing of the heights to which it can rise." We have already observed in psychologists like McDougall a refusal to explain instincts merely mechanically. He regards instinct as a psycho-physical process which can only be properly described in terms of cognitive, conative, and affective aspects. Stout also argues that instinctive action presupposes the co-operation of intelligent consciousness, applying this view even to insects.³ Not all psychologists accept this view (we may instance the vigorous criticism by G. C. Field⁴), but it is an indication that the psychologists, even when giving full place and power to instincts, are alive to the danger of mechanical interpretation. Further, we are to be on our guard against the danger of equating the self and organized sentiments. To quote Wright again: "An organic whole is more than the sum of the parts that constitute it. The self as a whole is not a mere summation of the sentiments. A man's self does much to determine what sentiments he has, how they are inter-related, how they express themselves, to what extent and in what ways new sentiments shall be permitted to develop." This point is specially applicable to religion where we find the refining of primitive instincts like sex and fear, and where the presence of a value or end, apprehended by the rational subject, plays

¹ See Selbie, *The Psychology of Religion*, 13.

² *New Psychology*, 35.

³ *Manual of Psychology*, 3rd ed., 343.

⁴ See *Mind*, April 1922, art. on "The Psychological Accompaniments of Instinctive Action". Field is very critical of many of the concepts of the New Psychology.

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the dominant part. The term "instinct" cannot be regarded as competent to describe the higher life of man. It may help to determine the earlier stages in the development, but when we reach the higher planes of human achievement, we find factors which are non-instinctive. such as the æsthetic experiences and value judgments, Here it is the presence of value or end which is "the determining cause of the higher life as such".¹ To explain the higher life of man we are compelled to enter a sphere where the psychologist, as such, cannot finally decide. Tansley suggests that the meaning of the human soul includes problems that are ultimate, problems whose solution lies elsewhere than in psychology. We have always to bear in mind those deeper reaches of experience in which some Power higher than ourselves works within us.²

2. THE UNCONSCIOUS

An important modern application of the biological approach to the study of man is seen in the psychology of the Unconscious. It has long been recognized that the mind is something deeper than that which constitutes actual consciousness at any given moment of mental life. So long ago as 1886, according to William James, the existence of what was called the "subliminal" was recognized, and the conception has been applied not only to the explanation of psychological phenomena, but also in the interpretation of religious experience. It has even been carried farther still, as a key to the major problems of theology.³ The use which James made of the conception in the interpretation of phenomena like regeneration is well known.⁴ In the theological sphere Dr. Sanday utilized the conception of the subconscious to explain

¹ So L. A. Reid, in *British Journal of Psychology*, art. on "Instinct, Emotion, and the Higher Life". Cf. Field, in *Mind*, July 1921.

² See Rufus Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, xxiv.

³ Cf. a paper by H. R. Mackintosh, "The Subliminal Consciousness in Theology", published in his *Some Aspects of Christian Belief*, 214 f.

⁴ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 233 f.

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Divine indwelling and Divine action on the soul. Quoting mystical experience, which he found to be located in the depths of soul-life, he declared that the subconscious is the proper seat or locus of Divine indwelling. He also used the conception to illuminate the Incarnation: it was in the subliminal consciousness of Christ that the Deity dwelt.¹

In the New Psychology we have the conception elaborated still further in the theory of the Unconscious as expressed in the works of Freud, Jung, and their disciples. Freud has a threefold conception of consciousness within the continuous unity of psychic life. By consciousness he means all the mental processes of which we are aware, definitely or vaguely, at any given time. By the preconscious or foreconscious he means all the mind stuff of which at any given moment we are not necessarily aware, but which can be fairly readily recalled. By the Unconscious he means all that realm of mind which is unknown, and which cannot be spontaneously recalled by the subject, a realm which is made manifest only (and then in disguised form) in special states such as dreams, trances, fantasies, and so on. The various methods employed in curative psycho-analysis aim at locating and breaking down the resistances which prevent the unconscious factors from emerging in their true character. This conception, where it has not been definitely attacked, has been received with suspicion. In the first place there is the feeling that the main attention of psycho-analysis is directed to the abnormal, and to apply findings in the course of pathological investigations of the abnormal to the normal life of men is hardly satisfactory. Such a criticism as this is recognized by Mr. J. H. van der Hoop in his *Character and the Unconscious*. Prejudice has also been aroused, especially as against the Freudian position, by the extreme place he gives to sex in the determination of mental life, even when due allowance is made for the wide connotation of "sex" in the Freudian vocabulary. "The importance of the sexual",

¹ *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, 159.

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said W. H. R. Rivers,¹ "has been so exaggerated by its advocates that it has produced a widespread failure to recognize the undoubted merits of the Freudian psychology and of the system of psycho-therapeutics founded upon it." Criticism has come also from those who have a different explanation of the unconscious antecedents of conscious mental processes. Tansley refers to those who explain such antecedents as not mental at all, but as of the nature of purely physiological processes in the nervous tissue of the brain.² For a very vigorous criticism of the conception of the Unconscious we may refer to Mr. G. C. Field's paper in a Symposium on the subject.³ The drift of Field's view will be seen from his remark that anything in us which is neither conscious nor physical is therefore something unknowable and indescribable, or indescribable except in purely negative terms. This will indicate that, once more, we are in a very controversial area, and when we meet extreme claims by the exponents of the newer view we must make allowance for the fact that the movements of psycho-therapy are as yet, so to speak, in their infancy.

Another development in the medical application of the psychological theory of the Unconscious is seen in the work of the New Nancy School. The views put forward by the advocates of Suggestion and Auto-suggestion, while primarily of interest to medical men, have results for those whose concern is not clinical but moral. In this chapter we are not concerned with the methods of either the Vienna or the New Nancy Schools in the practical sphere. Without doubt, Psycho-analysis and Auto-suggestion as methods have achieved remarkable success, and it would be too much to expect, in works whose main interest is pathological, any detailed attention to the higher issues involved. Yet it is a fact that writers like Freud and his disciples do not hesitate to leave their pathological domain and dogmatize on issues which are

¹ *E.R.E.*, x, 436, art. on "Psycho-therapeutics."

² *New Psychology*, 49.

³ *Mind*, 1922, vol. xxxi. New Series, p. 413 f. See also chapters vii. and viii. in Campbell Garnett's *Instinct and Personality*.

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of another order. Again, therefore, while recognizing the solid service rendered by this biological investigation, we must guard against any attempt to minimize the spiritual values of life.

There is no doubt that these exponents of the New Psychology have rendered a real service—the enlargement of our ideas of human personality. As we look back to the days of Locke we can see how this conception has been gradually enlarged. From the idea of the closed personality, accessible only through the senses, it was an advance to speak of the subliminal, to recognize that subconscious influences contributed to consciousness. But these subconscious influences were generally regarded as residual traces of previous experiences, dispositions. On the Freudian view, however, mind becomes a highly organized product whose fundamental activities are non-rational and largely unconscious. Now the “deeper” the human mind can be shown to be, the more accessible to forces which cannot be comprehended within the scheme of the senses, the more grateful will the Christian thinker be, who regards the personality of man as “open”. Nor shall we feel nervous when psychologists pay detailed attention to the bodily share in the determination of the life of man. But as this latest phase of psychological investigation proceeds on its way, we shall be wise if we watch carefully two points in particular. First, there is the Freudian conception of causality. Primitive impulses are suggested as the dynamic basis of psychic life, and from that anything in the nature of freedom is to be rigorously excluded.¹ Happily, not all psycho-analysts rest in the naturalistic position which is characteristic of Freud. Jung will not admit that the causal principle, as Freud interprets it, is adequate to explain man and his achievements. It is not enough to show a sexual connection between Goethe’s infancy and his production of *Faust*. Even if we could trace music back to a sexual origin, it would be a poor generalization, he remarks, to include music in the category of

¹ *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, 87 f.

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sexuality. A similar nomenclature would lead us to classify the cathedral of Cologne as mineralogy because it is built of stones! ¹ The spiritual values of life cannot be completely explained in terms of the psycho-analytical categories. As Jung says: "Only on one side is man a Has Been, and as such subordinate to the causal principle. On the other side the mind is a Becoming that can only be grasped synthetically or constructively."² In the second place we shall be well advised to watch such conceptions as the Law of Reversed Effort. This theory of the New Nancy School seems to regard will in a manner that does not satisfy our experience. Baudouin's idea of will gives it an inadequate content, for it seems to embrace nothing more than the putting forth of effort or the inhibition of desire. But we mean by will the whole personality in decision, personality involving both intellectual and appetitive factors. We cannot here enter into the very difficult question of human freedom . . . to do that would take us into a realm where psychology as such cannot give a verdict. But we note that while we owe much to the real service rendered by the theory (it is no more) of the Unconscious, and while we welcome attention to non-rational factors in the determination of human life, we must beware lest this new enthusiasm for instinctive forces be allowed to obscure Christian values like those of the will and human freedom.

3. THE BEHAVIOURISTS

Nowhere has the biological approach yielded more extreme results than among the Behaviourists. Here we have the physiological approach carried to great lengths. Psychology has long been familiar with theories like the Epiphenomenalism of Huxley, who likened the stream of consciousness to the shadows cast by the moving parts of a machine. Every detail of the stream of consciousness was regarded as dependent on some detail

¹ *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 40.

² *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, 340.

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of the brain process . . . the rôle assigned to consciousness being therefore purely superfluous.¹ This view does not obtain much support among present-day psychologists, though we may note that, according to Pratt,² thinkers in America like Warren, Montague, Sellars, and Santayana are "attempting to breathe new life into the dry bones of the old theory". But a view which is definitely materialistic has arisen in the American school of the Behaviourists, and as this school approaches the study of man from the standpoint of the body, it deserves some attention in this chapter.

The standpoint of the Behaviourists is set out (in an extreme manner) in the writings of J. B. Watson, especially *Behaviour* and *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist*. According to this school, psychology is concerned only with behaviour, and this is the adjustment of the body to its environment. The method of introspection is ruled out. No dividing line is recognized between man and brute, and interaction and parallelism are regarded as time-honoured relics of philosophical speculation, which need not trouble the student of human behaviour any more than they concern the physicist. For Watson the goal of psychological investigation is the ascertaining of such data and such laws that, given the stimulus, psychology can predict what the response will be, or given the response, it can specify the nature of the effective stimulus, the terms "stimulus" and "response" being used in their physiological sense.³ From this point of view it makes no difference whether the organism knows or does not know what it is doing. The scientific value of the data of psychology does not depend on the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness; indeed, "the time seems to have come when psychology must discard all reference to consciousness".⁴ The

¹ See on this a paper by F. H. Bradley on "The Supposed Uselessness of the Soul", *Mind*, April 1895.

² *Matter and Spirit*. Santayana refers to consciousness as "a lyric cry in the midst of business".

³ *Behaviour*, 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

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findings of psychology become the functional correlates of structure, and lend themselves to explanation in physico-chemical terms¹—Loeb's position in the psychological sphere. It is quite true that the Behaviourists do not specifically deny the existence of conscious processes. They adopt the position of natural scientists and say that if such processes exist, they are not the concern of the scientific psychologist. "The Behaviourist does not concern himself with them", says Watson,² "because as the stream of his science broadens and deepens, such older concepts are sucked under, never to reappear". Concepts like self, will, consciousness—all of extreme importance both from the psychological as well as from the religious point of view—are declared to be (as one American writer puts it) futile verbiage.

Now anyone who ignores consciousness in this way can do so only on one of two suppositions; that such processes are inefficient, and therefore negligible; or that they are so expressed in bodily processes that what is mental can be quite adequately studied in its physical expression.³ The former supposition rules out the influence of what we call the mental in the evolutionary process, while the latter results in a mechanical view of human personality which excludes spiritual values in the religious sense. "The intimations of mechanism muffled in the older psychologies become boldly announced principles in the doctrine of the Behaviourist."⁴

The challenge presented by this type of psychology to the religious point of view is fundamental. For our purpose here we may mention three points which appear to be open to criticism. First of all we note the Behaviourist's objection to the introspective method; the utmost he will admit in this regard is, that if the method be adopted, it cannot reveal anything besides bodily

¹ *Behaviour*, 28.

² *British Journal of Psychology*, October 1920, p. 94—in a symposium on this subject.

³ Cf. the article by A. Robinson, "Is Thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanisms?" in the same symposium.

⁴ D. L. Evans, "The Reactions of a Religionist to Behaviourism", *Journal of Religion* (Chicago), July 1924.

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activity. Psychologists, of course, have something to say on this matter from the purely psychological point of view; the limitations of the introspective method are admitted, but it would be claimed (by Stout, for example), that the observation of psychical processes cannot be thus summed up in terms of bodily behaviour. Our more immediate interest, however, bids us ask the question: "Where, then, stands the voluminous literature of mystical experience?" This literature declares plainly that the method of the mystic is contemplative, introspective. He turns his gaze inwards upon himself; we can imagine Eckhart, for example, penetrating deeper and deeper into the recesses of his soul until he comes to that *funkelein* where God may truly be said to reside. But all these visions, says the Behaviourist, if they are properly understood, reveal only so many aspects of bodily activity! Stimulus and response, stimulus and response—these are the keys to unlock all life, the inner life included, and both are to be interpreted in terms of empirical science. It is surely clear from this how inadequate are the Behaviouristic categories to explain the inner side of religious experience.

Nor do we urge only the experience of the mystics as something demanding more adequate treatment than the Behaviourists would permit. Religious experience in general testifies to elements that are real in human life and that cannot be so readily summed up in terms of physical stimulus and response. During the past thirty years or so there has grown up a considerable literature on the subject of religious experience, and nothing is more clear than that the experiences collected and to some extent classified by writers like Starbuck, James, and Pratt cannot be comprehended within a scheme of mechanical stimuli and responses. "Thought", declares Watson in a characteristically frank passage,¹ "is not different in essence from tennis-playing, swimming, or any other activity except that it is hidden from ordinary observation and is more complex." The problems which

¹ *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist*, 325.

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perplex philosophers and theologians will, as we grow to understand more clearly and apply more fully the Behaviourist method, tend to become concrete problems of the laboratory. All our strivings after the ideal, our moments of inspiration, our noblest sentiments, our holiest prayers are to be measured, once we understand things aright, by the stimulus-response rule. Against such a view religious experience protests with all its might. God, Truth, Duty, Beauty, however they may be explained, are in actual fact the liberators of men from the material and mechanical level. The spiritual values of life, from the Christian point of view, are real, and awaken in human life activities which defy mechanical explanation.

The truth is that the Behaviourists, in spite of their claim to avoid metaphysics, are continually allowing their methodology to pass over into the domain of metaphysics. The Behaviourist claims that his method of approach renders the familiar problems of the soul-body relation "relics of philosophic speculation"; for him the issues between the various theories have ceased to be living. But the problems of this relation are (unfortunately) not to be dismissed in so easy a fashion. Pratt in his *Matter and Spirit* devotes one lecture to views which he groups together as the denial of the problem, and he includes Behaviourism.¹ He remarks that the fact that the Behaviourist is not interested in consciousness, nor in the mind-body problem, may be an interesting fact in his personal biography, but it has no bearing whatever on the inherent interest and importance of the problem itself. As a matter of fact, the Behaviourist does not succeed in eliminating metaphysical considerations from his system; no psychology can. When he declares that he can account for human life without resorting to the concept of consciousness, he is, for all practical purposes, denying its reality as ordinary psychologists conceive it. It is on this ground that we have treated the Behaviouristic psychology as materialistic. Not only has it no use for the soul as an entity: consciousness itself may be

¹ P. 89 f., espec. 111 f.

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dispensed with. Even as a method its tendency is mechanistic, and its philosophic presuppositions, as far as the question of the spiritual life is concerned, are subversive of the spiritual values both of the New Testament conceptions and of Christian experience. Even if this view should succeed in passing the scrutiny of traditional psychology, we are quite certain that it will never satisfy the demands of the Christian point of view.

But there is one point on which Behaviourism renders a real service, although the present writer does not know whether J. B. Watson and his school would allow this use of their view. Again and again we have noticed how much Patristic thought was influenced by the Platonic disparagement of the body, and the resultant tendency was to commence with two disparate entities, soul and body, and then proceed to discuss their relation. The Behaviourists, on the other hand, appear to the present writer to insist that the data for psychological study should be the complete organism in its whole life—a kind of Aristotelian approach. They begin with man as they observe him without any preconceptions as to his divisions. This emancipation from initial abstractions is a very salutary thing, and has much more in common with the Hebrew approach than with the Cartesian. The difficulty is, of course, that they render their conception of behaviour somewhat anæmic when they proceed to make it coterminous with what can be explained in terms of physical response and stimulus. It is a good thing to take account of actions and to classify them on any scientific principle. But the New Testament is concerned not merely with bodily actions, but with subjective states, not so much with physiological response as with the nature of the agent behind the response. This seems, from the point of view of our subject, to be the main weakness in the system. In the Christian conception man is much more than a biological product. This is a fact which we have found it constantly necessary to emphasize in considering the contribution of modern psychology.

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4. THE FUNCTION AND IMPORTANCE OF THE BODY IN PERSONALITY

We are now in a position to estimate the trend of modern psychology in relation to our special interest. In every section of this chapter we have so far found it necessary to point out that modern thought, through its biological approach, is tending to depart more and more from the Platonic tradition. It is a far cry from the Platonic disparagement of the body to the claims, for example, of the Behaviourists; the psychology of to-day, says Bertrand Russell,¹ is becoming materialistic. This we have seen, and have noted its special dangers. But the movement, in spite of its dangers, may be regarded as full of promise for those who seek a balanced view of human nature. There is no doubt that the excesses of many modern theories will right themselves as time goes on, and, ultimately, we shall find that psychology has rendered a service to our understanding of man, greater even than appears at present. There is every indication that in the coming years the main battle (for those determined to conserve religious values) will centre round the findings of the psychologists; meanwhile, out of the struggle already in progress certain helpful facts emerge. These we may now bring together in summary.

William James, who approached the study of mind from the physiological side, developed an interesting view of the function of the body in relation to consciousness. It is found in his Ingersoll Lecture on "Human Immortality" (1898), and he declared that the human brain is the ground of our psychic individuality. He conceived consciousness to exist in a kind of vast reservoir, quite independently of the world of matter. The consciousness which each person experiences is a kind of tiny stream from this cosmic reservoir, and it is the bodily organization of each individual which permits the stream to emerge in each human life. It is the body, therefore, which determines individuality. A

¹ Preface to *Analysis of Mind*.

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somewhat similar view was propounded by Bergson in his *Creative Evolution*. He described souls as "nothing else than little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity".¹ "Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrusts it into the world, will appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter. . . . At one point only it passes freely, dragging with it the obstacle which will weigh on its progress, but will not stop it. At this point is humanity; it is our privileged situation. On the other hand, this rising wave is consciousness . . . the matter that it bears along with it, and in the interstices of which it inserts itself, can alone divide it into distinct individualities."² Thus for both James and Bergson it is the body that determines individuality. As James points out, the function of brain in relation to consciousness is permissive, not productive. The implications of this view have not gone unchallenged. We may refer to McDougall's criticism of the idea of individuality as suggested by James's view,³ and as far as Bergson's view is concerned, we cannot avoid the conclusion that for him body is, from one point of view, an encumbrance carried by the soul. . . . But the view itself is interesting as giving to body a definite and important function in the life of personality. A similar emphasis is found in Pringle Pattison, who shares James's dislike of the scholastic idea of the soul, and prefers to regard the body itself as the bearer of our conscious life. "From the point of view I am at present emphasizing," he says, "we might rather say the body grows itself a soul." Neither in James nor Pringle Pattison is there any suggestion of materialism. In the former case the view was due to James's acquaintance with psycho-pathology, where it seems to be shown that the normal stream of consciousness may be divided into coexistent streams, and to his sympathy with the idea of personal conscious-

¹ *Creative Evolution*, 283 f.

² *Ibid.* 284.

³ *Body and Mind*, ch. xxvi.

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ness becoming merged in some larger consciousness; in the latter it was due to his sympathy with the Aristotelian approach to man as an organic unity.

It will be seen that such views as these are wrapped up with definite conceptions of the soul—a study into which we cannot go within the limits of this treatment. If they are taken together with the movement away from dualism, which we have already observed in writers like Lloyd Morgan, they suggest a psychological approach which is very promising. Hoernlé has referred to this “synoptic” tendency, as he calls it.¹ Instead of beginning with the body as something quite distinct from the soul, and the soul’s inevitable enemy, much present-day thought prefers to begin with man as a single organism, a body-mind. We cannot express this better than in the words of T. P. Nunn:² “Upon this view man is not to be conceived as Descartes conceived him, namely, as an automaton plus a soul, or, with Epictetus, as a ghost bearing a corpse. He is, through and through, a single organism, a body-mind, the latest term of an evolutionary process in which living substance has developed ever higher and more subtle functions. This view is as remote as possible from materialism; for though it invites the physicist to push as far as he can his physico-chemical analysis, it refuses to regard perception and thought, feeling and will, as superfluous additions to a machine that would be complete without them. It preserves to the psychical all that ethics and religion require. It spiritualizes the body; it does not materialize the soul . . . starting from the position that there is more than physics and chemistry in even the humblest animal, it comes to view the history of life as a striving towards the individuality which is expressed most clearly and richly in man’s conscious nature, and finds, therefore, in that goal towards which the whole creation moves the true interpretation of its earlier efforts.” Professor Nunn makes this

¹ *Matter, Mind, Life, and God*, Lecture IV.

² *Education; Its Data and First Principles*, 21. Cf. Smuts’s *Holism and Evolution*. Campbell Garnett, *Instinct and Personality*.

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fine statement in presenting his view of an urge or drive which manifests itself throughout life . . . a view which finds favour among many psychologists, and which is often spoken of as the "hormic" theory.

It will be apparent that this biological approach to the study of man contains much that, both in method and results, is suggestive of the Hebrew conception of personality.

This completes our rapid review of the main factors which have to be taken into account in estimating the modern Christian idea of man. It may be well to summarize the stages in our review. We began by showing that the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, although quite "unscientific" in their treatment of the issues, had a definite idea of man in which the body was regarded as important. We then showed how this view had varied fortunes in the history of ecclesiastical thought, and how, in spite of the essential spiritual emphasis of Christian teaching, the representative Christian writers were never able to forget the value attaching to the body. Then we found ourselves in a modern world, a new world both in its range of investigation and its more scientific attention to the problems of human life. The development of modern science, we saw, encouraged us to do justice to the biological factors in man, while both philosophy and psychology, influenced by the biological approach, show a tendency to discount any initial pre-conception of dualism as between soul and body.

We may claim, therefore, that the trend of modern thought commits us to a very careful attention to the bodily factors in human life. We cannot dismiss them as of no account. Their claim upon our attention is not only urgent as a matter of practical experience: it is no less urgent from the speculative side. Both Christian practice and Christian theory demand some attention to the physical life. In the light of the historical development, and of the modern tendencies, we may now attempt to outline a Christian view of life which may claim to be

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at once ancient and modern: ancient in that it accords with the essential New Testament view of man; modern in that it welcomes those far-reaching investigations which have brought man into the very centre of human interest.

PART IV

THE LIFE WE LIVE IN A MATERIAL WORLD.
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHRISTIAN FAITH
AND PRACTICE

THE CULTURE OF THE BODY

IT will not be disputed that one of the most hopeful features of our twentieth-century civilization is its growing attention to physical well-being. This attention is in marked contrast with the habits and customs of bygone ages. Historians of European social life have pointed out that amid the magnificence which so often accompanied social life in the higher circles there was only a rudimentary conception of the laws of bodily health. A tourist may wander with pleasure through the stately palaces of Europe, admiring the gilded splendour of bedrooms and banqueting halls, but he will observe, in too many cases, that little attention was paid to mundane but important matters like sanitation. He will get the impression that, in those days, it was more important to have a window richly stained in colours than a window which could be opened to admit the air. Nobles could spend fortunes in gilding furniture, and never worry about the insanitary conditions under which their food was prepared. In Tudor England silver dishes for the serving of food were common enough—but you had to eat with your fingers. We must set it down to the credit of Charles II that he introduced a “politer way of living”, but we have the complaint of Pepys, who was vexed because at a Lord Mayor’s dinner there were no napkins and no change of trenchers! Such illustrations as these, trivial as they may be in themselves, are important as indicating a general lack of attention to matters which are now seen to be important. They suggest a hygienic standard which, from our present-day standpoint, leaves much to be desired. And if these conditions marked the rich, what of the poor? We know the terrible conditions under which they lived, and it is not surprising that great plagues, when they came, could sweep through the hovels of Europe like a gale of death, and number their victims by thousands.

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We are apt, nowadays, to congratulate ourselves on the vast improvements which have been effected, but we cannot help lamenting the slowness of the change and the fact that even so recently as the last century so much remained to be done. In England, while we exult about the scientific and commercial advancement which the Industrial revolution brought in its train, we regret the social evils which were its accompaniment. A hundred years ago one of the most insulting epithets which could be applied to a girl was "factory girl"—and that because the factory system was often exploited by traffickers who cared nothing for child welfare, health, or morals. To feed upon the coarsest food, to sleep by turns and in relays in filthy beds which were never cool, to pass their stunted days and nights in conditions where there was no discrimination of the sexes—this was the lot of thousands under the evils of the apprentice system. To correspond with this, the crowded towns completely failed to grapple with the question of public health. What, it may be asked, was religion doing? It must be confessed that the economic policy of *laissez faire* had extended its influence beyond the borders of economics and deadened the minds even of religious leaders. True, here and there a voice arose, but it was like a voice crying in the wilderness, and religion, the Church as a whole, had not realized all the implications of her Gospel. As a slight but surely significant symptom of the times we may adduce the fact that many of the religious buildings erected in the nineteenth century were constructed so that not one window could be opened! We are not without sympathy for the critic who is reported to have said, referring to the practice of much nineteenth-century church-going, that this effort after consecration carried with it the danger of suffocation!

Happily, this is now changed; not altogether, for much remains to be done; but the general improvement is so marked as to arouse profound thanksgiving. In the main this improvement is due to a clearer understanding and wider application of scientific principles,

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but the point to be noted is that for all this attention to bodily well-being there is definite religious sanction. If the Church has been slow to realize this, the fault lies in herself, and not in the Gospel committed to her charge. That Gospel, from the first, looked for the redeeming of the whole man.

We may now note some prominent features of this modern attention to bodily health, indicating their relation to Christian faith and practice.

I. CHILD WELFARE

It has become a slogan in modern movements for reform to "begin with the child". Certainly it is with the child we must begin if we are to guide bodily powers into mature development. In this matter the social conscience has been aroused as never before. What a change has been effected even during the present century! Not only do we live in an era of educational opportunity; it is an education that realizes the place and power of the body in the scheme of things.¹ From the day-school clinic to the children's hospital there is an organized attention to the health of childhood. No educationist to-day expects a child to learn if he is hungry, and the care of the teeth, for example, is seen to be a useful supplement to lessons in arithmetic and geography. Now that the Freudians (in spite of their excesses) have convinced us that childhood's tender years are full of significance for maturity, we are beginning to place our most efficient teachers in charge of the earliest classes. No longer do we regard it as satisfactory to put anyone in charge of the infants, or regard these lower grades in the school as good "practising ground" for unfledged teachers. A wise understanding of child life is a necessity in all who would train the young, an understanding not of the mind only, but also of the physical conditions under which the mind can hope to develop. With this end in view it is a great

¹ For details see *The Health of the Nation*, Freemantle, ch. viii.

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step to include courses in physiology and hygiene among the varied curricula of teacher training.

This advance in educational method has had an important influence on Sunday School principles and practice. The principle of grading, as applied to Sunday Schools, is based not merely on deeper acquaintance with the laws of mind, but also on a fuller recognition of the facts of physiology. Ever since the days when psychologists like William James assured us of the close relation between physiological developments and religious experience, Sunday School experts have tried to look at the problem of the child broadly, in such a manner as to comprehend his special conditions arising from physical causes. Play centres and organized games, even under the roof of the Sunday School building, now seek to establish a contact with and approach to the child that the earlier methods did not achieve. Much of this, it must be confessed, appears strange to the advocates of the older methods. "Is it not enough", they ask, "to teach the definite religious lesson?" The reply is that we cannot properly separate in anybody, least of all in a child, what in many older methods were separated, viz. the spiritual and the material. To observe bodily cleanliness, to play a game, to say one's prayers, are activities which bear a relation to each other.

This attention to the culture of childhood has, of course, strong New Testament sanction. Humanitarian sentiments in themselves would urge upon us this duty; to put it at the very lowest, we should feel impelled to safeguard childhood for the sake of the future of the human race. The Christian religion supplements, or rather deepens, humanitarian considerations by pointing to the value of personality in itself. This is one of the characteristic contributions of the New Testament ethic as shown in the teaching of Jesus. "Every reader of the Gospels has marked the sympathy of Jesus with children. How He watched their games! How angry He was with His disciples for belittling them! How He used to warn men, whatever they did, never to hurt a little

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child! How grateful were the children's praises when all others had turned against Him. One is apt to admire the beautiful sentiment, and to forget that children were more to Jesus than helpless gentle creatures to be loved and protected. They were His chief parable of the Kingdom of Heaven. . . . According to Jesus, a well-conditioned child illustrates better than anything else on earth the distinctive features of Christian character."¹ And as Jesus was ever a healer of men's bodies as well as the teacher of their minds, we can see how close to the Gospel spirit is the culture of child-life which embraces body as well as mind.

2. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

A second sphere in which this Christian exaltation of the physical life finds a natural expression is in attention to the physical environment of human life. This comprehends, broadly, (*a*) the home, (*b*) the environment in which the economic activities of life are carried out. In both spheres our modern times have witnessed improvements. The home, by virtue of its importance in the social scheme, ought to receive careful attention, not only by sociologists, but also by religious teachers. It gathers into itself various forces and ideals. It is the meeting-point of two great instincts, the sex and the herd; it is the embodiment of two great spiritual values, parentage and kinship; it is the symbol of two complementary divine truths, the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. It is not too much to claim for the home, at least in Christian lands, that it has been a nursery of religion and a safeguard of public morals. The difference between a house and a home is one of spiritual values, but the essential spirituality of the true home ought not to blind us to the material conditions on which it is reared. There is a type of mind which can spurn these material conditions as of subsidiary importance; indeed, in the story of the Christian Church, some of the most

¹ John Watson, quoted in Marchant's *Anthology of Jesus*.

interesting passages deal with a monastic withdrawal from all that home implies. Some Christian saints went so far as to declare that home was a circle of danger, that the physical relationships on which it is based were the enemy of the spiritual life. "Marriage", said Martin, "belongs to those things which are excused, but virginity points to glory." Of early Church writers in general we may say that, from Tertullian onwards, in any discussion as to the relative merits of marriage and celibacy the verdict leans to celibacy. Behind this ascetic tendency there lay an individualism as well as an aversion to all things material. As Workman says: ¹ "The social instinct, social claims, that larger altruism which forms to-day the hope of the age, seems altogether wanting." Such an attitude as this could never become general, because the deeply rooted instincts of human life will always, in the end, prove stronger than merely speculative conceptions; moreover, as we have seen, it does not accord with the real teaching of the Gospel. The physical conditions of home life, so far from being necessarily a "delusion and a snare", are the necessary foundation on which a structure of noble ideals may be built.

The care of the home, therefore, becomes a religious duty. On this point the Christian conscience has been awakened especially in recent years. It is generally recognized that we cannot expect to cultivate the graces of Christian character amid the deplorable conditions of our crowded slum areas. Here and there a stronger spirit may rise above the environment, but, for the majority, crowded tenements and sunless alleys mean the stunting of soul as well as body. The problem has been attacked from two sides. First, we are now witnessing an attempt (though, it is feared, on too small a scale) to deal with the housing problem. Many slum areas have been cleared, and local authorities receive Government help in the provision of better accommodation for the workers. It is a sign of the times that various Church assemblies have included this question in their discussions:

¹ *Evolution of the Monastic Ideal*, 58

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in some districts churches have organized public sentiment on the question of housing, and many of the more vigorous among them have even advocated practical measures by the churches themselves. Where such practical measures have been advocated, the criticism has usually arisen that such matters are not really the concern of the churches. There is point in this criticism, but it is quite certain that the *stimulation of public sentiment* on these matters is a vital concern of the churches. It is not our duty to provide porcelain baths for the people, but it is our duty so to spread the ideals of general health that the provision of baths becomes a pressing concern. In the second place the problem has been attacked from the human side. Improved conditions of life, greater facilities for health within the home, must be accompanied by a raising of our ideals of health. It is now a national concern that the mothers of our land (whose influence in these matters is paramount) should be animated by informed and noble purpose, and definite steps are taken both to supply necessary information and to give sympathetic encouragement. As an example of this we may mention the numerous welfare clinics open to all, and the work of nearly four thousand health visitors engaged whole or part time in visitation. All such steps are a genuine expression of the Gospel.

Of equal importance is the modern attention to health in industry. The conditions in which men and women work are as important as those of school or home. "The tables of occupational mortality in 1910-12 showed that, if the average death rate of males be taken as 100, the corresponding mortality of clergy was 56, of lawyers 79, of medical men 88; and whereas the mortality of gardeners was only 51 and coal miners 92, that of the cotton trade was 103, potters 151, costermongers 191, and tin miners 200."¹ It is common knowledge that the expansion of the textile industry in the eighteenth century led to unspeakable conditions, and since that time a succession of Factory Acts and other

¹ Freemantle, *Health of the Nation*, 132.

legislation have sought to improve the general conditions of labour.¹ In this respect great credit is due to the commissions appointed by the League of Nations. When the total benefits to mankind from the League come to be estimated, an important place will have to be given to the raising of international standards of health in industry.² All this may seem somewhat remote from the problems which normally occupy our attention in cathedral or chapel, but in reality the relation is very close. The fight for the Kingdom demands a fight for the clean and healthy life, wherever it is lived.

3. RECREATION

Herbert Spencer has somewhere said that "one of the first conditions of success in life is to be a good animal", and whatever else our modern world may be failing to do, it cannot be said that we are failing here. "Abroad, the madness of Englishmen used to be demonstrated by their insistence on the morning tub, and their imperilling of their necks in impossible Alpine situations. To-day, not only in our own land, but in all civilized countries, physical training has become a science."³ Although the great development of athletics has taken place in modern times, it must be understood as an expression of a very primitive instinct, the instinct to play. Its advantages are obvious. They are not only physical, contributing to the general health of a nation, but also moral. They play their part in the development of character. "To play the game" though arising mainly from physical activities has now connotations of a higher order. Moreover, recreation has its social value, and organized games among the nations are now seen to have a value in promoting international friendship. Ruskin's standard—"where men are rightly occupied, their amusements grow out of

¹ See Freemantle, ch. xv.

² For an excellent summary of this, see C. W. Hutt, *International Hygiene*, especially chaps. ix. and xi.

³ J. Brierley, *The Common Life*, 298.

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their work"—is probably a counsel of perfection; most would say that for effective recreation they must go as far as possible away from work! There is no need, to-day, to emphasize this aspect of the healthy life. Games are encouraged by governments, recreation is now part of the general welfare organization in most industries, while the modern Church usually finds some form of recreation among its activities, especially for the young.

This last point suggests a consideration that is of special importance for our purpose in these chapters, the religious aspects of recreation. No one who reads the history of the subject can doubt that in very early times games had a ceremonial significance. We find the Zuni, inhabitants of an arid tract in New Mexico, playing their games that rain may be induced to come . . . symbolic magic, perhaps, rather than religion. A tribe on the Red River in Oklahoma played a game which represented the contest of winter and spring.¹ To some games a Divine origin was ascribed—as in the cases of the Olympic games in Greece and those played by the North American tribes. This combination of physical exercise and religious ritual is significant as containing a truth of permanent value, which is not always recognized in religious circles. The influence of Puritanism has had much to do with this. We look back to the seventeenth century and note the somewhat sombre and austere attitude which religion often adopted then. For many minds the term "Puritan" connotes a person who looks with disfavour on recreation as something not merely unnecessary, but harmful. But let us be fair to the Puritans. They did raise their voice against much of the recreation of their time; but the condemnation was against the sinful accompaniments of recreation rather than against recreation itself. How, for instance, could a seventeenth-century Puritan do anything else than condemn the stage of his day? It was the evil associations of amusement which were primarily responsible for their austere attitude. This attitude tended to persist, and still tends to

¹ See art. "Games", in *E.R.E.*, vol. vi.

persist, even when the evil associations have been removed. It is a wrong attitude. We are to be strong in condemnation of all that degrades, but we cannot be satisfied with any conception of life which ignores the instinct for play and the natural demands of man for enjoyment.

Religion as organized to-day realizes the importance of this. We have already mentioned such activities as play hours in play centres as part of our Sunday School activities; to this must be added the attempt to cater for organized games for young people. The dangers of this are obvious. It is always easy to forget the subsidiary place which all such activities must occupy in the rightly ordered church. Physical activities, however beneficial, must never be allowed to obscure the main function of the Church in her spiritual mission. And we shall look in vain if we expect any such activities to yield spiritual results of permanent value. The games-room was never an effective porch to the church. If we cater for these recreational demands of youth it must be from another motive. There is no substitute of any kind for the appeal to conscience and the definite teaching of religious truth; but human nature is a broad thing, embracing within it needs of various orders and grades. Among these are the needs of the bodily life, and the New Testament conception of man commits us to a policy which will regard life in its fulness. We are to recognize the importance of recreation in the true culture of life, and if religion can wisely encourage amusements which have the right tone, it will be performing its proper function and not stepping one step beyond the limits of its proper sphere. A wise word from Cicero may not be out of place even in modern times: "Sport and merriment are at times allowable; but we must enjoy them, as we enjoy sleep and other kinds of repose, when we have performed our weighty and important affairs."¹ It will probably be urged that our age is consumed by a passion for amusement. This is undoubtedly true; much of the recrea-

¹ *De Officiis*, i. 29. 103.

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tion of to-day is an obstacle to the culture of the higher life. But what is the remedy? Not, we may be sure, in a complete disparagement of recreation, but rather the relating of it to its true place in human life. If we can give to it a religious sanction, we can also give to it religious guidance and wise control. We can place mind and body in true relationship as partners in the achievement of life, and in the name of the Gospel can call upon mankind to render their bodies as well as their minds "a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God". It is our reasonable service.

4. THE MEDICAL MISSION

There is one branch of Christian activity which has always kept in mind the importance of physical health in general well-being, viz. the medical mission. Doubtless in the early stages of missionary propaganda the work of medical missions was regarded as subsidiary to spiritual aims, but modern missionary ideals are concerned with healing as something worth while in itself. In the words of Dr. Fletcher Moorshead:¹ "There is nothing in what we have seen of the Way of a Doctor which lends support to the too-current view that medical missions are only concerned with pioneering a way for the Gospel. Such a view is totally inadequate, and reveals an entire misapprehension of the character of the service rendered by medical missions in the work of the Church overseas . . . a ministry of this kind is essential to the full presentation and understanding of the Christian way of life, and as such it has an abiding function to discharge in the mission of the Church." From this point of view, a close link should bind medicine to the Gospel.

We have the strongest precedent in the ministry of Jesus. The three years of His active ministry reveal, as far as the records go, twenty-six miracles of healing, and the number is greater in the third than in the first year of His ministry. They deal with cases of different social standing, from the son of a nobleman to a blind beggar.

¹ *The Way of the Doctor*, 10.

His work was not marked by the slightest trace of ostentation; we do not get the impression that He was working for effect. In some cases He performed cures with apparently no other end in mind than the restoration of physical health. Great multitudes followed Him, and He did not suffer them to go away disappointed. The impression we gather is that the mere presence of bodily ailments was enough to open up the flood-gates of His compassion. It is true that He never allowed the need for bodily healing to obscure the deeper needs of the spirit, and that He often "rounded off" his cures by a challenge to purity and service,¹ but we are justified in concluding that His reaction to bodily weakness was that of Divine love towards men and women for whose complete happiness He was prepared to go great lengths. He did not confuse the relative importance of physical and spiritual peace—we are to fear not so much those things that destroy the body but rather those that kill the soul. But knowing each side for what it was worth, He linked body and spirit together in the truly harmonious life.

This idea gripped the early Church, for the story recorded in the Acts of the Apostles abounds in cases of physical healing, though here the emphasis falls on faith in the Name. And so it followed that in the history of the Church the influence of the Gospel was felt in the realm of medicine. "It was a Christian woman, Fabiola, who established the first hospital that was ever founded in the Western world; a Christian bishop, Basil of Cæsarea, who established the first leper asylum; a Christian monk, Thalasius, who started the first asylum for the blind; and a Christian merchant, Apollonius, who founded the first free dispensary."² Not the least of the many services rendered by the followers of Francis and Dominic was their help in times of pestilence, so common in those days of primitive sanitation. In France alone the number of leper hospitals increased to over two thousand—an indication of the spirit of love and service fostered

¹ See Fletcher Moorshead, *Way of the Doctor*, ch. ii.

² Lecky, quoted by Fletcher Moorshead.

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by the Friars.¹ To-day there is a widespread organization for Christian medical work. Most, if not all, missionary societies have found the medical mission a very appealing side of their work, while in the countries at home dispensaries and medical missions in the slums are doing a service that is increasingly recognized. We may well pray for the prosperity of all such agencies, for not only are they beneficial, judged by the common standards of humanity, they are in direct accord with the very spirit of the Gospel as revealed in the New Testament.

¹ See ch. iv. in the author's *The Master and His Men*.

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WE have now considered in outline the general attention to the culture of the body which is so pleasing a feature of life to-day. We have seen that there is a strong Christian sanction for this: no interpretation of the Gospel can be considered as in line with the New Testament which ignores this aspect of human life. It is now necessary to relate this bodily culture to the larger question of personality. Personality is something to be achieved. Bosanquet somewhere quotes Keats's phrase descriptive of life as a "vale of soul culture". It is a good description, for the idea of the "vale" suggests the element of difficulty and disappointment normally present somewhere in every life; but "soul culture" needs to be understood in a wide sense as embracing the whole being of man. Personality is not something given to us ready-made at the start. It is something to be won, and in the winning of it the whole range of human experience plays its part. Such a view as this gives meaning to life, and brings the full range of human experience into a realm that transcends the values of the body: we are lifted into a realm where the true standards are seen to be the values of God. Our purpose in this chapter is to consider personality in its mysterious beginnings, noting the conditions under which its development proceeds, and suggesting the Christian ideal both of progress and achievement.

I. BEGINNINGS

We have seen that neither the Old nor the New Testament is interested in speculative questions concerning the origin of life. It was enough for the Hebrew to reflect that both soul and body owe their origin to God. It was by divine inbreathing that man became a living soul, and that was quite sufficient for the practical

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religious interest of Biblical writers. We noted, however, that from the Hebrew standpoint we must pay attention to the organization of the body which the soul is to animate. Ecclesiastical thought, when it began to consider these matters more carefully, found itself undecided before the claims of various theories. Pre-existence, so strongly asserted in Greek writers, failed to secure a permanent place in the mind of the Church. It had no warrant in Biblical teaching (in spite of Origen's claims), and its emphasis on individualism made it unsatisfactory to Christian writers who were anxious to do justice to the solidarity of humanity. The conception of the corporate unity of the race they could find in the Bible: it was clear both in Old and New Testaments, and this was calculated to outweigh whatever influence Alexandrian Judaism may have had, particularly when the issue came to be entangled with theological questions of sin and grace. The theory, of course, hardly admits of proof, but we may notice the verdict of a recent writer:¹ "None of the arguments advanced is convincing, and the phenomena observed can be better accounted for on other grounds." A serious criticism of the view is that it does not regard the body as a real constituent of human nature, though this is probably less true of Origen's form of the doctrine than of the general Platonic belief.² As far as modern versions are concerned, whether the soul be considered as pre-existent in the Deity (as in Spinoza and Hegel), or pre-existent with its own individuality as a distinct entity, the fact that such views tend to make the soul the real man to the exclusion of the body renders it unconvincing as a theory of the origin of the soul.

The other rival theories, creationism and traducianism, found advocates in the Church. The former was the favourite scholastic conception. "The traditional philosophy of the Church", says a Roman Catholic writer,³ "holds that the rational soul is created at the

¹ R. Moore, in *E.R.E.*, x. 238 f.

² See above, p. 94 f.

³ *Cath. Encl.*, iv. 475 f.

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moment when it is infused into the new organism." Aquinas, he says, taught that the rational soul is created when the antecedent principles of life have rendered the foetus an appropriate organism for rational life. Neo-scholastics, for the most part, urge that the soul is infused into the incipient human being at the moment of conception. Thus there is a continual creative activity on the part of God, while the bodily organism, propagated in the ordinary course of physical generation, carries us back to the bodies of the first parents, and thus, on that side, ensures physical solidarity to the race. Such a view of this is open to certain dangers. There is the danger of regarding the soul as an independent entity, complete from the start; this danger has been criticized by Pringle Pattison,¹ who thinks it makes the whole process of spiritual experience superfluous. But whatever creationism may mean in the unreflective popular view, it did not mean this for Aquinas. He was most careful to point out that the soul is created as a potentiality, to be realized into full actuality by commerce with the growing body. Bethune Baker has pointed out another danger.² Since the spiritual part of man is a new divine act, it must therefore be pure; evil must thus have its seat in the body. This objection was raised by Augustine. But it does not seem to follow, necessarily. Suppose that the soul begins in each case as a system of potentialities which are developed in commerce with the body. Suppose that among these possibilities there is the power of choice, that the course of experience is in some measure determined by the exercise of freedom, could not moral evil be attributed to the soul as will? The soul, created as a system of potentialities, would be regarded at the start as morally neutral, just as the instincts, deeply rooted in the physical beginnings of man, are themselves morally neutral. As Selbie says,³ "They are themselves, as it were, merely raw material, and it is the use of them that counts."

¹ *Idea of Immortality*, 70.

² *Introduction to Christian Doctrine*, 303 f.

³ *Psychology of Religion*, 13.

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To say that the new spiritual part is a divine gift, and must therefore be free from stain, is not to exclude the possibility that what begins as morally neutral may, in the course of its development, take steps to what is morally wrong. Bethune Baker's difficulty does not appear insuperable. A stronger objection is the individualism of the creationist view. The heritage we all share is not physical only, but moral and spiritual. We are all heirs of a spiritual past, and hand on to our descendants spiritual legacies. The ethical value of universal brotherhood involves some such idea, as do all the values which form the basis of altruistic ethics. Both science and religion demand this spiritual solidarity: science applies evolution to the mental as well as to the physical, while the religious conception of the Kingdom emphasizes the social relationships of the truly spiritual life.

From the point of view of modern biology there is no doubt that the traducian theory has most to commend it. It avoids the difficulty of the creationist view, the conception of continuous and special creations of souls by God, which makes man a creature of special divine intervention. "Mind", in rudimentary forms, is found in the lower orders of organic life, but no one will care to assert that whatever degree of "mind" is present is specially infused in each case. On the evolutionary view, the emergence of mind as we know it would be explained as the emergence of certain factors at a certain point of organic development. Why not go the farther step and say that at a still higher level, viz. that characterized by the human nervous system, there appears a system of capacities (to use McDougall's term) which in their mature development we call soul? This view has the advantage of giving a unity to the whole creation, and has a cosmic grandeur about it. It is a stately and coherent view that by the processes which are the expression of God's will both soul and body come into being together in the normal process of development. Such a view does not necessarily endanger spiritual

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values, for we have now learned to make a real distinction between origin and value; nor does it necessarily materialize the soul, for the accepted principle of evolution to-day admits the emergence of *qualitatively* new factors.

Investigate as we will, we cannot eliminate the element of mystery from the life of man. Both in his entry into and in his exit from this plane he baffles our most acute investigation. No one will wisely attempt a definite pronouncement on this difficult question, but in the light of what psychology and biology say, the view that soul and body begin together in the line of natural development has much to commend it. It opens the way for our acceptance of careful scientific pronouncements on subjects like heredity, while at the same time it conserves the Christian values of the soul. It is a view which, when adopted, solemnizes the process of reproduction, and bids us regard such processes as containing elements of a higher order than the physical. It opens the way to a sacramental view of marriage. The Bible, as we have seen, does not enter either scientifically or philosophically into these realms, and perhaps in this we have the reminder that, after all, our main concern is with the practical aspects of personality as they are shown in experience. This experience we have now to consider.

2. THE STRUGGLE

The most common of all human struggles is that between body and mind. This may assume various forms, and be experienced in various degrees of intensity, but whether it be the struggle of an Anthony, a Luther, or a Bunyan, or just the average temptation of the normal life, it seems to arise from the fact that man possesses, as Fairbairn put it,¹ a spiritual outfit and a material outfit. The assumption in this statement is that the spiritual and the material have a real effect on each

¹ *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, ch. vi.

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other. J. A. Hadfield has drawn attention to several interesting ways in which mind is influenced by body.¹ Some of the glandular secretions of the body, the thyroid, for instance, and the ovarian, have a marked effect on the mind. There is a form of idiocy in children which is due to lack of thyroid secretion. Some forms of insanity, such as melancholia, seem to be determined by physical conditions. Probably a good deal of what we call "temperament" is due to secretions and toxins which circulate in the human system.² Psychical qualities may be lost with injury to parts of the brain. Actions like clenching the hand and setting the jaw have a tendency to produce the emotions with which they are associated. On the other hand, the influence of mind on matter is no less marked. Mental states find a bodily expression—on this point the practice of hypnotism is significant. As Pratt says:³ "So far, then, as I am aware, there is absolutely no experimental or empirical evidence of any kind which gives any support whatever to the denial of the mind's power to modify the workings of the laws of physics and chemistry. On the other hand, we have the unhesitating and universal testimony of every unspoiled individual consciousness, and the equally unquestionable evidence of everyday experience, that mind can and does determine conduct." We are not here concerned with the problem of this interaction which still interests the psychologists; our concern is with the reality of experience, that experience of struggle which marks every life in its striving after the good.

Selbie remarks that "it is a fundamental assumption that flesh and spirit are in absolute antagonism, that the one is a clog and hindrance to the other, and must be effectively repressed if touch with the spiritual world is to be maintained".⁴ Here he appears to overstate the antagonism, for his statement of the conflict savours of

¹ Essay on "The Mind and the Brain" in Streeter's *Immortality*, 26 f.

² But we are to beware of the extreme claims of those who make character dependent on endocrine secretions. On this see Adler, *Understanding Human Nature*, Book II, ch. i. sect. 5.

³ *Matter and Spirit*, 156.

⁴ *Psychology of Religion*, 257.

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a dualism which hardly accords with the Biblical view, but as to the fact of conflict there can be no doubt. This note rings out clearly in the New Testament. Paul knew what it was to have to watch his body, subduing it after the manner of athletes. Christian experience in every age knows something of this, for it does not matter where we turn, the records of spiritual achievement read like the story of a battle. In addition to the conflict which is fought out on the broad field of the world with its many allurements, there is that more personal struggle within the confines of the individual life. Appetites which demand satisfaction, and which have a natural right to be satisfied, have a way of carrying us beyond their healthy satisfaction. The passions associated with the flesh are real enough, as all of us know; while even in the innermost realm of the spirit we are not free from subtle temptations which bid us take the line of least resistance, or encourage us to selfishness. It is upon this real basis in experience that the true theology of sin is reared. The physical environment of life supplies many powers and pleasures, but they are supplied in close conjunction with risks, so that the same material which supplies the possibility of virtue opens up, at the same time, a very broad way to vice. Our practical problem is how to deal with these physical factors, and to bring them into proper relationship with the spiritual, so that harmony and unity of life may help us in the achievement of personality.

Our concern here is not with the attainment of the unified self in the sense in which psychologists like William James have given so much useful advice: this, of course, is very important, and is the aim of much applied psychology to-day. Our immediate concern is the resolving of that antagonism between the soul and the body, which always hinders the attainment of peace. Historically, and in most religions, this attempt has been prominent in various forms of asceticism. With this we have already dealt, and it need not concern us further than to state that however noble the attempt to

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exalt the soul may be, its true exaltation can never be (according to the Christian ethic) by the complete disparagement of the body. Self-denial, the repression of this or that bodily desire, or, better still (to use the modern term) the sublimation of it into a higher form, are always necessary. But as our ideal is the harmonious relating of the body to the soul, we must find some other way than the practice of the hermit or the isolated rigorist. Many modern forms of soul culture proceed on the assumption that the body is unreal. Christian Science, for example, is very definite on this point. This movement has been in existence long enough to demonstrate the real and permanent effect of mind-emphasis, and we shall do well to recognize the practical value of this and like forms of mental healing. But with the *underlying claims* of Christian Science we cannot be in full agreement. The philosophical basis of the movement will be clear from the following quotations:¹

There is no life, truth, intelligence, nor substance in matter. All is infinite Mind and its infinite manifestation, for God is all-in-all. Spirit is immortal truth; matter is mortal error. Spirit is the real and eternal; matter is the unreal and the temporal. Spirit is God, and man is His image and likeness. Therefore man is not material, he is spiritual.

The doctrine that matter is unreal because it does not originate in God who is spirit [says a Christian Science writer]² may seem startling to this age; but Mrs. Eddy maintains that it is in strict accord with the teaching of Jesus Christ and His apostles, and that it underlies all the miracles in the Bible. During the brief period of His earthly ministry Jesus broke all the laws of matter; He constantly threw contempt upon all material things . . . the same teaching runs through the Epistles where matter, or the flesh, is constantly taken as a type of all that is opposed to God.

It is here that we join issue, for, clearly, the spiritual ancestry of this movement is in Greece rather than Judæa. The difficulty we feel in regard to Christian Science as a philosophy (rather than a practice of mind culture) illustrates the difficulty in many modern applications of therapy. As to the practical benefit derived,

¹ *Science and Health*, 468.

² *E.R.E.*, iii. 578.

there can be no doubt. But when Freud, for example, equates religion with superstition, when Jung argues that God is "a mere psychological function of an irrational nature", when Coué subordinates will to imagination, and when Mrs. Eddy encourages the view that Jesus threw contempt upon material things, we find ourselves longing for a practice of mind culture which is based on a more balanced philosophy. After all, we have to live our life amid material things. A great proportion of our time must of necessity be spent in catering for the needs of the physical life. Why, then, cannot we have a rationale of human life which can attend to the spiritual life without dismissing the material as unreal? That is to say, we are seeking a practice which does not proceed in direct opposition to the unspoiled intuitions of the average man, for we believe, on the authority of our Biblical investigation earlier in this book, that the common idea of the material world is sound. We prefer to regard the physical universe as something noble, an expression of the Mind and Power of God. We are never able to forget that God's supreme revelation of Himself was through a life lived on the human plane, a life which always appreciated the common things of the field and hedgerow. In a word, we want to gather up the material into a bigger and all-embracing scheme, rather than spurn it as something unreal or necessarily evil.

On this point there are few saner words than those written by Baron von Hügel:¹ "The fact is that here, as practically at every chief turning point in ethical and religious philosophy, the movement of the specifically Christian life and conviction is not a circle round a single centre, but an ellipse round two centres." On the one hand, the Christian ideal calls us away from the material and the visible, that the soul may be reharmonized according to the ideals of the spirit. On the other hand, we are called to renewed immersion in the visible, that we may gain fresh stimulation and content

¹ *Mystical Element in Religion*, vol. ii. 127. Von Hügel here acknowledging his indebtedness to Troeltsch.

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for the spiritual life. "The completeness and culmination of Christianity consists in these two movements together." Thus both factors play their part. The disciples cannot linger on the Mount of Transfiguration, for the plain below, with its pressing problems, calls for their ministry. From this point of view the warfare itself may prove a blessing: it is in the play and interplay of spiritual and material that we have the possibility of true achievement.

3. ADVANCEMENT

What, we may now ask, are the steps by which we may progress in this advancement? We may consider, first of all, what may be called individual culture. It is not long, of course, before all human culture in the true sense becomes social, and is possible only through social values. But there is something which the individual has to do for himself, a kind of private equipping for the tasks of life. The Christian religion bids us take care both in the life of the body and the life of the spirit. In the last chapter we saw how important is attention to physical well-being. Men often show this attention for the sake of physical peace—the uninterrupted functioning of physical powers. Some do it for excellence in sports or for rewards of one kind or another. Here we urge that it should be done on the very highest of all grounds, viz. our duty to the God who gave us being, and to the organism itself conceived as important in the full life. In the highest sense, no one has a right to do as he likes with his body. Misuse or abuse of physiological functions is not merely a danger to health, but also sacrilege in the temple, to use Paul's noble metaphor for the body. The marvellous intricacy of the human frame, so beautiful in its adaptation to its proper ends, should inspire a reverence that even daily familiarity cannot destroy. Not the least of God's gifts to us is the body itself, a great empire, small in expanse but beautiful in its correlation. There is no finer or more

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delicate system of communication in the physical realm than that within the human body. Hands are common enough, but they may become willing servants responding to the imperious summons of the mind; eyes and ears common also, but gateways to beauties of colour and harmonies of sound that carry us at once into the heavenly realm. A physical organ is to be measured not by its length or area but by its adjustments both to the spiritual values within and without. The care, nourishment, and exercise of bodily powers are seen to be important when these powers are estimated in terms of the high values they make possible.

On the other side we have the necessary culture of the spirit. Usually a stronger motive is required for this than for the culture of the body. Neglect of the latter has more immediate and painful effects than neglect of the former; but although they are more immediate, they are not more devastating. We need not search far for a strong motive, for as soon as we begin to glory in the supremacy of man over other levels of animal life, we find that supremacy to lie in the life of mind. Greater than to possess an intricate and beautifully harmonized body is to be conscious of this, to realize that here is an empire which is "mine". To think at all, to form abstract notions, to conceive ideals, to be able to rise at will to a realm that far transcends the levels of the earth . . . this is to possess a power than which no greater can be found in the world we know. While to be able to pray, surely this is the high-water mark of human powers. These powers, like all that is important in human life, are given to us in the first place as capacities, and it is the careful exercise of them that counts. So our Christian duty bids us attend to the inner culture. We read of the student steeping his mind in the ideas of the ages; of the artist sitting at the feet of the great masters; of a theologian like Aquinas praying between the composition of the various parts of his great *Summa*; of Jesus, retiring apart in the early hours to the mountain-side; and we realize that here is true culture. A busy

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age is apt to forget this. The commercial standards of to-day seem to put all such affairs at a discount, but we know that in the eye of God—*sub specie æternitatis*—these spiritual exercises of the soul are of supreme value: nothing can take their place. Ignatius Loyola underwent protracted spiritual struggles, but he emerged from them with an idea which became the dominating idea of his movement—the idea of spiritual exercises.¹ His scheme was perhaps mechanical, and much of his practice we should now describe as pathological, but the idea itself is a great one. If it is important to exercise the body, it is all the more important to exercise the soul, and the practice of Christian devotion through many centuries supplies ample guidance.

It has already been suggested that true culture is a social affair: it is possible only through the intercourse of mind with mind, and this, in turn, is possible only through that bodily life which is the basis of all social relationships. No man can hope to achieve the fulness of personality without that larger life that society makes possible. We sing the praises of solitude, and realize the value of the retiring, contemplative life, responding to the mood of Wordsworth when he sang of

that inward eye,
Which is the bliss of solitude.

But we know that the value here lies in the *occasional* retirement and not in *persistent* seclusion from the world. There is a truth underlying Bulwer Lytton's remark that "it is from dissipation that we learn to enjoy solitude, and from solitude dissipation". Solitude as a permanent thing is unhealthy: to neglect natural social intercourse is to stultify what may be called an original endowment of man. Among his instincts, that of the herd is very strong.

The Christian religion from the first took a strong line on this point. In the teaching of Jesus the idea of the Kingdom of God is always the complement of

¹ See Lindsay's *History of the Reformation*, ii, 538 f.

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personal piety. Indeed, as we have seen, Jesus came preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom. The idea of a Kingdom was fundamental in the Old Testament, where all matters of the soul tended to be regarded from the corporate side, the conception of corporate personality being very strong and only at a late period giving way to suggestions of individualism. In the teaching of Jesus we have set before us the ideal of a commonwealth—"the reign of divine love exercised by God in His grace over human hearts believing in His love, and constrained thereby to yield Him grateful affection and devoted service".¹ Religion cannot be other than social. What has this meant in practice? Fellowship everywhere, beginning with the band of disciples centred upon Jesus, continuing in the greater companies who went forth, two by two, to speak of Him and His message, developing in the small communities scattered about Asia Minor, and issuing finally in the Church, spread over the earth and embracing all types of nationality and point of view. We may carry this idea farther, as many of the Church Fathers were fond of doing, to include the Church visible and invisible, a vast assemblage such as that visioned by the inspired seer in the Apocalypse.

The idea of the social expression of religion is the natural outcome of man's nature, and is made possible by the fact that man has a body as well as a spirit. We are taking natural and reasonable steps, therefore, when we seek to supplement the exercise of personal religion with public worship, and, between the two, family worship. The age in which we live does not seem to recognize the need or the value of public worship. This is not because our age is un-social: on the contrary, the social expression of life was never more pronounced. The call of the crowd, whether it be in a restaurant or a concert or a football match, is very strong to-day, and we must set down the modern decline in church attendance not to any un-social development, but to the

¹ Bruce, *Kingdom of God*, 46.

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materialistic practice of our time and to a certain dissatisfaction with traditional organized forms of worship. The danger is that in the lack of sympathy with organized forms of religion the world should forget that *some kind of* organized social expression is a deep necessity of life. One of the great tasks of our time is the restoration of public worship to a position of attraction, so that it may really meet the needs (often inarticulate) of the human soul. It is not necessary to apologize for public worship. Once the religious idea is accepted, then on psychological grounds the corporate expression of it becomes an essential part of life. Every great religion in its development has found three things necessary: a personality, a library of inspired literature, and a church; the last is by no means least in importance.

The Christian idea, therefore, prompts us to utilize every helpful form of worship. The exact degree of reliance on external forms will always be a matter of temperament, varying from the simplicities of the Quaker to the organized elaboration of the Roman Catholic. But there is no doubt that, speaking for the mass of men, visible aids to worship are necessary, and we may well call upon beauty and harmony to aid our souls in their quest of perfection. This, of course, raises the problem of the place and meaning of sacramentalism in worship, but this must be left for our closing chapter.

Finally, the whole question of spiritual development must be related to what is perhaps the greatest idea in the Christian religion, viz. the reality and work of the Spirit of God. This Spirit "does not disdain to enter into our little lives, shaping itself to our pattern, rippling its way into the tiny pools, lifting the pink shells and floating the fronds of weeds; nothing is too small for the dynamic activities of the Spirit, as nothing is too great. When the Christian truths are baptized into the consciousness of this, they become what the Gospel is meant to be: the *dunamis* of God unto salvation".¹ It is the great contribution of the Old Testament that it not

¹ Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Experience of the Holy Spirit*, 287.

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only relates soul to body in a functional unity, but also opens up the human personality to the Divine. Without this, the Pauline theology would lack its essential thought. It is the Spirit of God, graciously operative in a human life, that makes possible the achievement of character. When we have taken all the steps we can think of for the development of our higher life, we are thrown back on the truth which transformed all things for Paul: peace and power come in the opening of the soul to God. So we reach the apparent paradox that what we have to win can come to us only as a gift, and whether we receive it or not depends on whether we are willing or not. It is recorded of a mediæval saint that he was accustomed to leave his monastery and seek solitude on the hill-side. There he would prostrate himself and cry simply, "God, God!" John Oxenham¹ pictures the young Jesus on the hill-top, gazing up into the infinity of space. What are these attitudes if not the inclining of the soul towards God that He may enter in? In the midst of our busy modern life we do well to remember this. In the mystery of our being there is a way through which the Spirit may enter and enrich our life. It is our duty to keep this way open. Every man will find out for himself the means that best attain this attitude, and every man *must* find the way appropriate to himself. The great word of all religion is fellowship: it is in fellowship with the active Spirit of God that the possibility of achievement lies.

¹ In *The Hidden Years*, 14.

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THE real test of any serious view of life is its view of death. We may proceed quite happily along the way of life, sorting out and classifying our experiences, framing our philosophies for the daily duties, but there comes a time when we are brought up sharp against this grim fact. It is only the minority, we imagine, who contemplate death from afar. After all, it is a topic rather remote from the problems that fill our busy days, and the majority are chiefly concerned to

fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty seconds' worth of distance run.

But sometimes the edifice of life comes tumbling in upon us, as it did to Job. Or we are brought suddenly face to face with the bleak negation of all life's happiness, just as there came to Ezekiel the message, "Son of man, behold I take away the desire of thine eyes at a stroke; yet neither shalt thou weep, nor let the tears run down. So I preached unto the people in the morning: and in the evening my wife died."¹ It is at these moments that our faith is put to the test. Death is one of the most familiar human facts, and yet for each of us it is the least familiar of all experiences. From the very beginnings of speculation mankind has been perplexed as to what it means: we can see this in the varied conceptions which have held the field, from the hopeless annihilationism—

One thing is certain, and the rest is lies,
The flower that once is blown for ever dies—

to such elaborate ideas of the world to come as are found, for example, as the Egyptian Book of the Dead. It is very interesting, some one will say, to speak about the culture of the body and the achievement of personality: but what happens when the body, to all appearance, ceases to function and its noble members

¹ Ezek. xxiv. 15 f.

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crumble into dust? This question is challenging for all religions, but it is exceptionally challenging to such a view as we have propounded in these pages. Does not the inevitable fate of the body seem to mock our assertion of its essential importance? Important enough, yet only for a brief span, soon to sink into its original elements and mock us with the futility of human effort. It is clear, therefore, that we must face this issue. What can we say about life beyond the grave?

I. NATURAL OR CONDITIONAL IMMORTALITY?

There is considerable variety of opinion among Christian writers as to what the Christian teaching on the future life really is. This is not surprising when we remember the difficulty of the eschatological problem in the Gospels, and the highly speculative nature of the whole subject. Discussion has arisen around two main points: Is the soul immortal in its own nature, or must immortality be regarded as conditional? Is the future life to be regarded as that of soul freed from bodily encumbrance, or has the idea of the resurrection any permanent contribution to make? In the ecclesiastical development, as we have seen, Christian writers in the main regarded the soul as naturally immortal, Arnobius and Lactantius being on this point outside the main stream of thought. From the fourth century until the nineteenth the Platonic conception of the soul as inherently immortal held the field, with an occasional writer here and there on the other side. Among these writers may be named Hobbes,¹ Locke,² Isaac Watts,³ Spinoza,⁴ Henry Dodwell.⁵ In the latter part of the nineteenth century the question came into prominence, and several writers (of whom we may mention Edward White⁶ as typical) expressed what they considered to be great difficulties in the way of the tradi-

¹ *Leviathan*, iii. 38.

² *Reasonableness of Christianity*, i.

³ *Ruin and Recovery of Mankind*, xi.

⁴ *Ethics*, Book V. prop. xlii.

⁵ An epistolary discourse proving from the Scriptures and the First Fathers that the soul is a principle naturally mortal, etc.

⁶ *Life in Christ*. For fuller references, cf. *E.R.E.*, iii. 822 f.

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tional view. The argument was "not put in the same form by these writers. But they are at one in the fundamental principle that man is not immortal in virtue of his original constitution, but is made immortal by a special act or gift of grace".¹ In the present century Conditionalism has taken its place as a strongly supported theory. Prof. J. Y. Simpson claims that the Conditional view is in line with the general method of evolution: "On the Conditional view all men are immortal—potentially immortal; whether that characteristic is developed and attained is a matter of moral relationship to God."² Pringle Pattison says: "It does not follow that we are to think of personal immortality as an inherent possession of every human soul, or a talismanic gift conferred indiscriminately on every being born in human shape." "Why should the universe be permanently burdened by the continued existence of those who made no use of life while they had it?"³ Strong arguments are adduced by the supporters of this view. Passages are quoted from the Old Testament and the New Testament to prove that immortality is the attribute of God only, and that man obtains it as a gift. Such are the references to Christ "who only hath immortality, dwelling in light unapproachable" (1 Tim. xi. 16), and the passage in Romans "for the wages of sin is death; but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord" (vi. 23).⁴ It is urged that such a view avoids the difficulties of the older eschatology, with its eternity of sin and suffering, while at the same time it does justice to the doom which Christ pronounced on the impenitent. Further, it harmonizes with the findings of science, for Conditionalism is really the doctrine of the survival of the fittest transferred to the spiritual world. Faith in immortality is based, not on the supposition of its inherent possession by every man, but on

¹ Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, 477 f.

² *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*, 294 f.

³ *Idea of Immortality*, 195 f.

⁴ For a full list, see H. W. Fulford's art. in *E.R.E.*, iii. 822 f. Fulford is sympathetic towards the Conditional view, but realizes the difficulties.

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moral and religious grounds. This, it is said, has more in common with the Biblical view than has the Greek notion. The attack on the "Conditional" view is equally strong, Salmond's treatment being particularly vigorous.¹ He disagrees with the Conditionalist exegesis of Biblical passages. Their interpretation of words like "life" and "death", giving them a literal significance only, is inadequate. In a good many passages it is clear that the word "life", e.g., means something more than mere existence. He adduces certain New Testament passages which are at variance with the Conditionalist view, such as, "And these shall go away into eternal punishment: but the righteous into eternal life" (Matt. xxv. 46); "but whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin" (Mk. iii. 29; cf. John iii. 36, Acts i. 25). Further objections are that this view divides mankind into two distinct classes, and involves conceptions of man's nature and of Christ's work which are inadequate and unreasonable. "Surely it is more reasonable, more Scriptural, more reverent, either to hope that God will find some better way of using sinful souls than to extinguish them, or else to believe that man is so great a work of God, a being endowed with capacities so vast, that no limit can be put to the possibilities of his resistance of the Divine will, and therefore none to the continuance of the penalties of resistance."²

Thus strong considerations may be adduced on either side of the argument, and, whatever view be adopted, there are still great difficulties. But the older view of natural immortality, in addition to having the weight of ecclesiastical tradition on its side, fits in well with those human sentiments and desires which have always impelled man to overleap the chasm of death and anticipate a hereafter. It does justice to what is an important note in the Gospel conception of man, viz. the tremendous worth of personality, while, if we consider the Divine Love which is the very genesis of the Gospel, we cannot

¹ *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, 5th ed., 473 f.

² *Ibid.*, 499.

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find it easy to believe in annihilation. As Mackintosh says, "Belief in annihilation can be tolerable only to a lover of the race if the very thought of its particular application be kept away. In evangelism, at all events, we must operate with some other view".¹

2. PSYCHOLOGY AND SURVIVAL

We may now ask, Is there anything in the modern psychological outlook which encourages the belief in the soul's survival of the death of the body? We are now long past the time when a blatant materialism could step in and declare the whole conception of survival to be a fancy. Where present-day psychology has a materialistic trend, its advocates prefer to relegate questions of the Before and After to metaphysics and religion. But the outlook, even from the standpoint of psychology, is not without hope. It might, of course, be urged that our insistence on the close connection between soul and body endangers the idea of spiritual survival. "Since soul and body are so intimately connected," it might be argued, "is it not at least likely that the death of the one means the death of the other?" Such a conclusion seems a likely one when we remember how slight an injury to the brain is sufficient to interrupt the normal working of mind. But as a matter of fact, the tendency in much psychological writing is to deny this conclusion. One way for such denial, as we have seen, was opened by the theory of James and Bergson that the brain's function in regard to consciousness is not productive but permissive or transmissive. We have the declaration of William Brown that the theory of interaction allows the possibility of immortality.² There is not the slightest evidence of such a thing as death happening to the mind. "The whole centre of gravity lies, even on the level of psychology, in the affirmation and not in the nega-

¹ *Immortality and the Future*, 224.

² *King's College Lectures on Immortality*, 145.

tion of the continuity of life after death.”¹ Although we have no scientific proof of the existence of a disembodied soul,² the idea that the mind survives the destruction of the body is not contradictory to the trend of present-day science, which points to the supremacy and liberation of mind as the only goal to which nature is working. “It is only reasonable to assume that the process which has been at work through the whole biological history will be continued to its logical conclusion.”³ Whether this logical conclusion, the complete liberation of mind from body, is one which will exactly meet the needs of a Christian conception of the future life is a matter that needs discussion; but for the moment we note the verdict of these psychologists that there is certainly the possibility of immortality from the psychological point of view.

The same general conclusion seems to be indicated by the results of Psychical Research. It is not easy, in the present stage of this movement, to decide how far the conclusions may be held to be valid, for with the genuine scientific attention to the phenomena of spiritism there is bound up a certain amount of interest which is neither genuine nor scientific. Selbie is careful and discriminating on this point.⁴ “While it is hardly possible for a dispassionate observer to conclude that they have proved their whole case, they have, I believe, done enough greatly to strengthen the presumption on empirical grounds of a spiritual life independent of the body, and on the negative side they have adduced evidence of a kind which makes a merely mechanistic explanation of the universe impossible. For example, they have proved up to the hilt the case for what is generally known as telepathy; this does not amount to proof of the soul’s independence or survival of the body, but it does establish that view of life and of the universe on which alone such a survival becomes possible.”

¹ Tudor Jones, *Metaphysics of Life and Death*, 186.

² Hadfield, in his essay in *Immortality*, 20.

³ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁴ *Psychology of Religion*, 278 f.

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Perhaps Selbie's verdict needs to be supplemented a little by the inclusion of the need for some kind of organism on the other side. To quote a very balanced exponent of Spiritism: "The thought invariably arises, as we have seen in dealing with Fechner's *With What Body Do They Come?*, and spiritualistic teaching on this head seems to be on the line of the Pauline spiritual body. There is a spiritual counterpart of the material body, but a so-to-speak improved version which arises from the physical form at death."¹

It would be unwise to place too much reliance at the present time on the findings of investigators in a field so hazy, difficult, and controversial. In any case, the Christian view of the future life does not rely on considerations such as the foregoing, for we look to the character of God as revealed in Jesus, and to considerations of spiritual values, for our final assurance. Yet it is interesting to notice how the Christian hope of survival is supported by these various writers.

3. WITH WHAT BODY DO THEY COME?

We are led to the larger question, "With what body do they come?", and so there arises the important question of the possibility and meaning of the resurrection. We saw that the remarkable feature of the ecclesiastical development was the tenacity with which writers clung to the idea of the resurrection, even in such cases as that of Origen, whose general Greek affinities might have been expected to lead him to a different conclusion. For a modern thinker it is doubtless much easier to emphasize a purely spiritual immortality after the manner of Plato than to assert the doctrine of the resurrection, and this is largely because the latter is so easily misrepresented, and lends itself to expression in crude terms. Speaking of this doctrine, C. C. J. Webb writes:

Of all the traditional doctrines of the Christian Church none is less congenial to the *Weltanschauung* of modern science

¹ J. Arthur Hill, *Spiritualism: Its History, Phenomena, and Doctrine*, 240 f.

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than this. It is intimately bound up with imagery belonging to that great cosmological and eschatological scheme which it is now the fashion to regard as of Babylonian origin . . . professing to relate to our material frames . . . the doctrine of the resurrection of the body seems altogether at odds with what observation and experience teach us concerning them. Hence it cannot be denied that it is apt to be retained by educated Christians in modern times, if at all, only in a form widely variant from that which the phraseology literally suggests, and often much in the background, as it were, of their religious consciousness.¹

Selbie says :

The conventional and quasi-material representations of heaven and hell which took so strong a hold of the Mediæval Church, and persist in so many quarters even to-day, are gradually giving way before the more spiritual and really religious view of the future which alone is justifiably called Christian.²

These remarks on material and quasi-material conceptions will arouse cordial agreement, but it is possible to allow the crude interpretation of the doctrine to obscure a real value which the doctrine, properly interpreted, contains.

We may, of course, at once rule out any such spectacular conceptions as that of the sea giving up its dead. No terms or pictures suggested by our experience of present life can hope to convey the true meaning of what, in the nature of the case, evades our full comprehension. The resurrection of the fleshy organism, the revivifying of the physical remains that are deposited in the tomb, is, as Galloway says,³ a conception full of difficulties, and one which was expressly rejected by S. Paul. Various suggestions appeared in the ecclesiastical writers, such as: the body itself contains a germ which itself contains something of the Eternal (Æneas of Gaza); the soul has power to find again those particles which belonged to the body (Gregory of Nyssa); to which may be added the suggestion that the development of the soul includes the gathering up into itself of the essential powers of the body, so that under the new

¹ *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, 261.

² *Psychology of Religion*, 275.

³ *Idea of Immortality*, 222 f.

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conditions it has power to express itself in an organism fitted for the new level of existence. "The notion of a transfigured organism can be brought into intimate relation with the speculative idea of the soul as the central and constitutive principle which forms for itself a higher kind of body to be its organ in the life hereafter. From this standpoint, the transcendent kingdom of transfigured persons would constantly be in process of being realized."¹ All such considerations are, of course, purely speculative, but in the face of our increasing knowledge of the power of the human mind he would be a brave man who would limit the range of operation of spiritual forces. W. Adams Brown says: "When we seek to make real to ourselves the conditions of existence in the undiscovered country, we are involved in all the difficulties which we have already noted. How shall we conceive the spiritual body of which Paul speaks? How can we picture an existence which is definite and real, and yet which has left behind all that we associate with this present body of flesh and blood? Has matter wider possibilities than our senses have yet been able to discover, and must we conceive of the new body as physical, though of an organization as much finer than that of the present body as that of the air is than the liquid into which extreme cold is able to precipitate it? . . . Here is a field fascinating in its invitation to the imagination, but in which we lack the solid framework of assured fact."² In deciding the issue we are called upon, not to assert this or that scientific claim in support of this or that view, but rather to consider which of the alternatives best meets the needs of the higher life. It might be claimed (as Webb actually does claim³) that the doctrine of the resurrection "implies a conviction, however strangely expressed, of the intimate connection of soul and body, of the indispensableness of the body to the fulness of human nature, which is quite at variance with Orphic or Platonic notions

¹ Galloway, *Idea of Immortality*, 222 f.

² *The Christian Hope*, 172 f.

³ *Op. cit.*, 261.

of the body as the temporary tomb of the soul, and much more in harmony than they with the convictions of modern science". In our experience in this life the body serves the double purpose of expressing our own purposes and of enabling us to enter into social relationships with others. The view of the future life as involving an appropriate organism (however its origin and nature may be conceived) does seem to supply the possibility of personal identity, of communication between and expression of personalities, all of which are important elements in the Christian view. If it be asserted that we cannot produce a scientific demonstration of this, we reply that in the nature of the case that is impossible, and that, further, our concern is not to satisfy the standards of a chemist or a physicist, but to present a spiritual dynamic, and to preserve the real values of personality as we know it. Whatever may hold true of the life to come, it is morally certain that its standards will be in line with the highest spiritual standards we reach here, or else the meaning of life becomes confused and hopeless.

Thus, in spite of the crude forms in which the idea of resurrection has sometimes been expressed, it may be regarded as supplying a fuller conception of the future life than its main rival, the Platonic view. The New Testament bids us look forward not to the rather bare and cold persistence of a thinking principle, but to the fulness of a holy fellowship. "In My Father's House are many mansions": we may improve upon this as a rendering, or dismiss it as merely pictorial; but underneath the picture, who can doubt that there is the true suggestion of *life* in a full and rich sense? R. H. Charles's suggestion has much to commend it, that in the true Pauline doctrine resurrection occurs immediately upon death. If this view be accepted, we have the thought of a real continuity in the life of the individual. The difficulty in many of the traditional conceptions of the resurrection lies in this, that they seem to make a break in the full personal life. In this life the

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soul and the body are always associated, and in a most intimate manner. Then, it is held, death breaks the union, and one partner, the spiritual, is left in unaccustomed isolation until, at some future time, there is a miraculous joining. Then we have to introduce some sort of life for the intervening period: hence ideas of purgatory, and so on. The view we are propounding here seems to have many advantages over the traditional view. On the one hand, just as our idea of soul-body unity in the normal life corrects that dualism which refused to recognize the body as a partner, so, on the other, our conception of the future as the life of soul, plus appropriate organism, corrects what is a false dualism between this life and the life to come. No one can doubt that there is the principle of continuity in the New Testament idea of eternal life. For the true Christian it may begin, in all essentials, *here*—this is the strong feature of the Johannine interpretation of the teaching of Jesus. The transforming experience of fellowship with Christ lifts the Christian out of the realm of breaks and curtailments and places him on the plane of the spiritual and the permanent. It is not difficult to see how the ascetics, rigorously spurning the flesh in every way, had fallen into a dualism not only as regards this present life, but also as between this life and the life to come. *Here* life became a very subordinate affair, to be contrasted with life *there*, and the result was an “other-worldliness” which did less than justice to what life here below might really mean. There are two ways of ennobling the future life; we may do it either by disparaging the present, and thus exalting the future by contrast, or we may recognize the limitations of the present and regard the future as fulfilment. The latter is the better way. It is better not only in theory, in that it links the present and the future together in continuity, but also in practice, for it supplies the strongest possible motive for the present dedication of *all* our powers. The glory of Heaven compared with the sombre grey of earth may be as the splendour of the Temple com-

pared with the simplicity of the porch; yet it is well to remember that the porch is part of the Temple. Its pillars may be small as compared with the towering columns which support the dome, but they are real pillars after all, and the same Architect laid them in place. No metaphor, of course, can do justice to our views of the life to come, but we are to beware of exalting the future by belittling the present.

And so the Christian view of life, as based on the Hebrew attitude to human personality, is singularly wholesome. "He who sows corn sows holiness." We may reverently thank God for all the powers of human life, physical as well as material. We may enter with delight into all the healthy human relationships, knowing that thus we are fulfilling a divine purpose. We know that the physical environment supplies the possibility of achievement, and in this even temptation supplies its contribution. And when, at last, there comes the inevitable challenge, when the strength of the body has waned and the organism can no longer keep step with the soul, we look with confidence to the opening of the gate to the Other Side, where soul and its fitting organism may continue their progress in the nearer presence of God. It is thus not merely in metaphor that we can speak of the Gates of Death.

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THE course of this inquiry has carried us occasionally into the realm of speculation, but our aim throughout has been to arrive at a view of human life which might be both sound (as judged by New Testament values and the modern approach) and practicable. Such a view is greatly needed to-day. The average man may not class himself among the philosophers: he may even disclaim any sort of connection with the "theorists", priding himself on his everyday concern with everyday realities; but it is none the less true that he cannot live without some sort of working philosophy. The most untutored mind must react in some way to the facts of experience. Even the "man in the street", usually critical of most theories, betrays in his casual judgments a point of view which is his own. It is his way of looking out upon life, and although he may not be able to formulate it in the manner of the schools, or may not be conscious that he has an outlook at all, it has a certain dynamic value for him. He may think rightly or wrongly about the situations which confront him, but the way he thinks determines the way he acts. A sound view of life, then, is a necessity for all, and at no time has it been more necessary than to-day. The youth of this age is apt to be bewildered by the discordant voices which break in upon it. Here, in the field of physical science, is the confusion resulting from the revolutionary conceptions of our modern physicists; there, in the field of religion, is the difficulty of weighing the rival claims of this or that interpretation. "Give me a view of life", says the inquiring youth of to-day, "which will enable me to realize my place in the scheme of things, and help me to achieve what I was meant to achieve." This is a fair demand, and at the back of it there lies a desire for a scheme of life which embraces three factors—God, the world, the self. To leave out God is to be irreligious,

and this is by no means the real mood of to-day; to leave out the self is to be irrational; to leave out the world is to take refuge in remoteness and to reduce life to a pale shadow. Can we present a scheme of human life which will bring these three factors into vital relationship?

The line of thought we have followed in these chapters suggests that we can.

1. *We may regard the material world as a revelation of God.*

There is very little satisfaction in the pessimistic view of the material world which marked so many forms of Oriental religion and philosophy. It is not a happy thing to have to live in the midst of a physical environment which has a curse upon it. Life may go hard with a man, and he may grow into a mild form of pessimism, thinking the world an unresponsive place where there is little chance for him. We can understand this; it is a mood which afflicts most of us at one time or another. But it is a different thing to formulate a reasoned and definite philosophy of pessimism, a view which can see nothing in the world but illusion and worthlessness. Doubtless environment has something to do with this attitude. A writer on Indian life remarks: "Nature here displays herself in her more ruthless moods—torrential rains at one season, scorching heat at another, hailstorms or earthquakes, outbreaks of disease the dangers of which are intensified by the neglect of sanitary precautions habitual to the people . . . this condition of things encourages a pessimistic mode of belief, an apathetic submission to the spirits, mostly malignant, which are believed to control human life."¹ There is not much encouragement in this view. If you regard life as a weary round, where is the incentive to live it? The great deeds of history, for the most part, are based on the assumption that life and the world in which it is lived are worth while. So one writer gives his opinion that early India wrote no history because it had no incentive

¹ W. Crooke, *Natives of Northern India*, 14 f.

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to make any: "The Brahmans had early embraced the doctrine that all action and existence are a positive evil and could therefore have felt but little inclination to chronicle historical events."¹ There are some lengthy chronicles in the Hebrew literature, and we may infer that the writers thought it worth while to set down the records. There is a pessimistic note occasionally, as in Ecclesiastes, but the main note of Hebrew teaching is that life is worth while. It could not be otherwise, for was not life in its every detail linked on to God? This, we may be sure, is the truer attitude. Modern science has taught us to appreciate the beauty of the physical world, and in this its emphasis is clearly Christian. It has unveiled for us the intricacies of design and the majesty of creation as a whole. "The common things on which the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind—the sea and the morning, the wild goats of the rock, the horse that mocketh at fear, and the eagle that beholdeth from afar—all these are no more than the surface of a mighty structure of seeming power and wisdom which grows more marvellous with every year's discoveries . . . there is beauty running through Nature, from the purple clouds of evening to the iridescent colours that flash like jewels from a beetle's wing-case. The petals of a lily are more gorgeous than the robes of Solomon; and even the tiger's beauty is not more terrible than a spider's eyes, gleaming out like four gigantic pearls."² It is one of the services rendered by Science that it helps us to appreciate these things as facts; the philosophy of emergent evolution bids us regard these things as expressions of Divine activity; the Bible sums up the matter by saying that God made all things, and all that He made is good. True, sin may mar the fair face of Nature, but God made it fair, and meant it to be fair.

This view has many advantages. It corrects the deistic separation of God from the world, for God is brought very near to us, even in the processes that go on in the

¹ Macdonell, *History of Sanscrit Literature*, II. Quoted in *E.R.E.*, ix. 813.

² Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, 52 f.

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little garden behind our house. It has a value that pantheism cannot attain, for Nature is the *expression* of God, and not God. It resolves that bitter dualism between man and his world which was responsible for ascetic extremes. With this outlook a man may face life hopefully. The seasons become his friends, for they minister to his life. The sunshine and the rain are kindly to the corn, and thus are kindly to man as well. Nature's produce supports his life, her beauty charms his eye, her voice speaks to him of the heavenly life. The world becomes *his* world ministering to his needs and, if he has the sensitive spirit, prompting his aspirations. He cannot find in Nature all that he wants to know about God, but at least, with S. Paul, he can find a clearly marked testimony to eternal power and divinity.

There is a further sense in which the material world may be regarded as the expression of God, viz. in that it was the scene of God's greater revelation. The Old Testament came into being mainly to record the dealings of God with a small nation, that through these dealings the whole world might learn of Him. The well-known story, from the earliest migrations of tribes to the sad fate of a nation in exile, means that God is speaking to men through human history. All history may be regarded as revelation, but in a special sense the history of the Hebrew peoples made its distinctive contribution of ethical religion. Palestine is a small country, but it has become a very hallowed one. Tourists who visit the scenes of Bible stories feel like taking their shoes from off their feet: the place they stand on is holy ground. The prosaic mind may scoff at this; "all ground is the same", it says; but it is not so. Religion for the Hebrews was so vital that places and things could become sacred, as well as personalities—trees, fountains, wells. Jerusalem was the holy city. The Hebrew nation was right in so regarding it, and not even the sordid disputes which have in more modern times desecrated its sites can dim our remembrance of what the city meant to a religious

people. It meant God, His worship, His law. The people "went up" to Jerusalem spiritually as well as geographically. Its Temple stood for all that was most hallowed in their experience. Times and places became sanctified because God used them for the unfolding of His purpose.

The climax of this unfolding was in the Incarnation. Dualists have always had difficulties with this. It was abhorrent to them that the Christian religion dealt with a life lived in the body and along the ordinary highways of Palestine. So they had to resort to various kinds of docetism to explain it away. Christ had not a real human body at all: He could not really have suffered as the Gospel represents him. But all this, in addition to misrepresenting the facts of the Gospel story, misconceives the essential principle of the Incarnation. "The Word became flesh" is essential to the meaning of the Gospel. In this lies its very charm. As we have seen, Christ's attitude to the normal life was very genial, and quite in keeping with the Hebrew tradition; but more than His attitude, His very presence was an indication of the part that the material environment may play in the unfolding of Divine purpose. To be there at all, partaking human life, sharing the common lot of man—this at once raises the plane of human life and gives to it a sacramental value. He came not to present to the world a second code, a kind of up-to-date version of the Decalogue, but to present *Himself* as Teacher and Redeemer. His Person was the revelation, and we cannot ignore the fact that His Person, whatever its ultimate nature, partook of the life of the body and the material world. Thus we may say that human life, environment, experience, were the channels through which God revealed those values of the spirit which are basic in the Christian religion.

Objections may be raised to the wisdom of including a reference to the Incarnation in a section which deals with the material world as the expression of God. It is urged that we cannot thus sum up the Incarnation. This,

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of course, is admitted. The Incarnation brings to us a supremely spiritual Personality who cannot be summed up in any terms of our devising: He is difficult to classify in any scheme save that of the Godhead. But surely it is an advantage to regard the Incarnation, not in isolation, but in conjunction with earlier and different revealings of God. The author of Hebrews does not detract from the supreme glory of the Son by placing Him at the crown of revelation: the "sundry times" and "divers manners" of divine revelation are truly seen when seen as pointing to their fulfilment in Christ. So we gain a broad perspective of the divine process of unfolding. We learn to regard the universe as full of meaning: as Paul said: "The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made." There is a sense in which the modern scientist accepts this. He is aware, from his careful observation, of the manifold beauties of the universe, and these are outward signs to lead him to the underlying conception of immaterial purpose and agency, of which natural phenomena are the expression. Although as a scientist his special concern is with facts rather than philosophies, he cannot refrain from the impulse to seek meanings in the facts. The varied phenomena of Nature have a meaning, although it is very difficult, indeed impossible, to express that meaning in the language of the laboratory. Religion, however, has its terms ready; and when Archbishop Temple calls the universe "a divine utterance, a form of speech",¹ the best thought of modern science will not raise objections. So let us think of the world, as we know it, as the medium through which the spiritual purposes of God are revealed. "God moves in a continuum, not in a series of jerks which we can label as chaos, creation, ruin, Incarnation . . . but in a constant wisdom and in a flowing will to declare Himself to that which shall know Him, and in the desire of an everlasting love for that which shall love

¹ See *The Pilgrim*, 1921, "The Sacramental Principle."

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Him.”¹ On this view life in the world will not mean the fruitless battling of spirit against dead and unresponsive matter, but rather a process of learning in which the movements of Nature, the movements of man—all the varied life of experience—are our instructors. If we learn most from God’s self-revealing in Christ, it is because in Him we have *the* revelation which arouses the best within us. But the whole process, as the unfolding of God, is a process which utilizes, and at the same time exalts, the natural order in which we live.

2. *We may regard the material world, further, as a medium for human expression.*

Since we cannot choose whether we will live in a material environment, but are compelled to pass our days in constant contact with bodily affairs, it becomes a very practical question what use we can make of this manifold of sense which surrounds us. In point of fact, we begin to make a very good use of the material world long before we are able to frame conceptions about it. Leaving out of the question the normal developments of the physical life, we may instance the use of language. The child becomes vocal long before he knows anything about the connection between thought or desire and their expression. Thought demands some medium of expression, and through social co-operation we have the development of language. But this is an affair of vocal chords and movements of the tongue and lips . . . a use of the physical equipment with which we set out on the journey of life. In its developed form as shown in singer or orator this use of physical media for the expression of ideas achieves great results. We listen to an orator: both in his speaking and our listening there is a use of physical organs, but the result cannot be measured physically. There is, in the first place, the communication of ideas from his mind to ours, and

¹ Wotherspoon, *Religious Values in the Sacraments*, 9. Cf. the same author’s remark, “The Incarnation in fact is not an isolated phenomenon; it is the fulfilment of a principle which is at the secret heart of what we call creation, and is the satisfaction of an Eternal and Divine impulse.”

his words may lead us to a high realm of lofty inspiration and noble impulse. In the case of a singer, the power of music may produce a similar effect. It is interesting to reflect, as we listen to the clear tones, superbly produced, of a prima donna, that a very slight accident to the throat would destroy all this. Few experiences are finer than the enjoyment of good music, and yet it all depends on delicate physiological adjustments. It is apparent, then, how in the matter of speech and music we make use of the material equipment for the production of spiritual effects. A further prominent illustration of this is in the work of the artist. What beauty is there in a block of marble or a lump of clay? Yet under the inspired workmanship of the sculptor both are transformed into things of beauty. G. K. Chesterton tells of an occasion when he set out to enjoy the countryside and sat down to draw the landscape. He had with him a piece of brown paper and several coloured chalks. All went well with the drawing until he came to the clouds, and then he discovered that he lacked white chalk. For a time he was nonplussed, but at last, to his amusement, he found that there was a wealth of chalk around him; all he needed to do was to break off a clean piece from the limestone ridge on which he was seated, and use that for the cloud effects. Chesterton draws his own moral, but we may be permitted to draw ours . . . the picture is completed, the true artistic effect achieved, through the use of a piece of chalk from the ground. It is so in many of the achievements of beauty. The dye-stuffs in use at the present day are derived from the animal, mineral, and vegetable kingdoms, but some of the most brilliant colours are derived from the unattractive coal-tar, a by-product formed in the distillation of coal. The achievements of man are largely due to the growing power he shows of utilizing the products of the material world for the achievement of beauty and harmony. In all likelihood there were sheep grazing on Mr. Chesterton's landscape: he might have reflected that a musician "by the vibrations which he scrapes from the sinews

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of a sheep can lift us into a world of emotion and of knowledge which lies about the feet of God".¹ So for craftsman, artist, poet, there is a wealth of material waiting to be used in the embodiment of spiritual purpose and the achievement of spiritual values.

It is important to realize this, for thus to regard life is to find opportunities everywhere for the attainment of the higher life. We are in a wrong mood if we despise the material environment as of no value. It is far better to seek to realize the value of material things and powers in themselves, and then their value as stepping-stones to higher things. As an example of the unhappiness which often arises from a failure to assess physical matters at their true value we may instance the many cases of unhappiness in marriage. The ease with which the marriage tie is both formed and broken is a conspicuous feature of modern social life. There is a world of difference between the ecclesiastical conception of marriage as a sacrament, and the modern idea as that of an alliance which can easily be severed. In this matter it is not only mental factors which are to be considered. Dr. McDougall has spent a third of a century, he tells us,² in the endeavour to acquire some useful conception of the raw material of human nature. Few men are so competent as he to speak upon the psychology of our social life, and this is what he writes on the question of the physical basis of marriage: "The physical basis of marriage is all-important. . . . If it is all awry, the most fortunate constitutions, the most delicate sentiments, the strongest characters, the most generous and well-informed deliberations will hardly succeed in making the marriage a happy one; and it is much if they can prevent it from going to pieces on the rocks."³ Thus in the normal experiences of life it is required of us to look carefully at all sides of the human problem. If we despise the bodily aspect of life, or ignore it, we do so at our peril. On the other hand, the peril is equally

¹ Dearmer, *Body and Soul*, 14.

² *Character and the Conduct of Life*, Preface.

³ 225.

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great if we linger on this aspect, and forget the higher and spiritual. McDougall thinks that modern youth is somewhat prone to this latter danger: they are in danger of allowing themselves to fall victims to the "sterilizing influence of universal mechanization". The only safeguard is a fair assessment of soul and body as partners in the great adventure. The things of the spirit are the highest known to our experience; and we may not ignore the profound truth that many of these high values are attainable only (so far as our experience goes) through an enlightened use of physical powers.

3. *The true sacramentalism.*

1. To this general conception of life which has just been outlined we may give the name "sacramentalism". The term "sacrament" is historic, and around it many of the ecclesiastical battles have been fought. This is not surprising, for there is a sense in which the interpretation of the Christian Sacraments gathers into itself the essential spiritual truths both of the Divine and the human spirits. The very fact that Christian history has given such an important place to the Sacraments, and that at the present time the subject is a burning one, shows that we are here at the centre, and not at the periphery, of Christian experience. From whatever angle they are regarded, the Sacraments are a test of our Christian conceptions: we may approach religious experience from the angle of the human spirit, or (since the Sacraments involve acts and words) from the angle of the human body, or from the angle of the Spirit of God. Three lines of thought thus converge on the interpretation of the Sacraments, and any theory of their significance and value will have to declare itself on all three points. To treat of these issues adequately we should require a special volume, and for detailed attention to the problems we must refer to recent studies in this special subject.¹ But some reference here is

¹ See, e.g., Canon Quick's *The Christian Sacraments*. For the sacraments and the Holy Spirit, see the chapter in Wheeler Robinson's *Christian Experience of the Holy Spirit*.

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necessary, and we shall first illustrate our view of human nature by reference to the Christian Sacraments, and then proceed to the broader sacramentalism which may be taken to embrace a wider field than Christian worship.

"The Sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper are, then, the combination of *things* possessing a suggestive symbolism of their own—water, bread, and wine—with *words* assumed to have divine authority, which bring the sacramental *acts* into relation to the Christian Gospel, and so enable them to mediate the Christian fellowship with God."¹ Things, words, and acts: here, obviously, we are in the realm of the body, and, as we have already pointed out, this very fact is an indication of the importance of the body in Christian thought and practice. How are these things, words, and acts conceived to mediate divine grace, and thus possess value for the worshipper? This, as is well known, is a matter of acute controversy, and has long divided Christendom. In answering the question from the special point of view adopted in this book two ideas need to be emphasized.

(a) We cannot regard soul and body out of relation to each other. In human activity it is the soul-body combination which functions. This joint functioning is necessary in sacramental worship. This means that we cannot rely on things, words, or acts in themselves to bring to us an experience of divine grace, but on these as linked to spiritual conditions of which they are the expression. To take the example of baptism: the significance cannot be held to lie in the water (much or little), or in the physical experience of the body. The other factor is necessary, the spiritual attitude of the candidate. This view, of course, is not accepted by large sections of the Christian Church. The practice of infant baptism, it is admitted, can hardly be said to include a spiritual attitude on the part of the infant. Other values are adduced for this baptism—as an act of "dedi-

¹ Wheeler Robinson, 190.

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cation by believers, who thereby offer themselves to become a 'means of grace' to the growing child". The special value of this must always be recognized: it is not for nothing that the Church takes upon herself in a very special manner the fostering of a tender child in the things of God. But with all this, it can hardly be claimed that infant baptism has as rich and full a significance as a similar rite performed upon (and with the conscious dedication of) a "believer". Many affirm frankly that the long practice of the Church is enough to justify the practice of infant baptism. But for those who see in an act of dedication a *conscious* dedication, the practice appears to lack that full expression of personality that is necessary in any sacramental act. There is no doubt that these divergent views will continue to attract various types of mind, according to the angle from which they approach baptism. But for us, accepting the psychological view of man propounded in this book, it seems necessary to emphasize the need for the co-operation of spiritual attitude and outward symbolic forms. A similar requirement is seen to be necessary in the other great historic Sacrament, the Communion of the Lord's Supper. Once again, to place reliance upon things, words, or acts, *out of relation to personal spirituality*, is to lay this sacramental practice open to the charge of externality. And, as the history of the Church shows, external rites lend themselves easily to magical conceptions. As far as the human side of the Sacrament is concerned, its efficacy can never be considered out of relation to the spiritual inclination of the communicant. Bread and wine are holy symbols, but there is no real symbolism unless the facts beneath those symbols are consciously apprehended by the worshipper. Always the psychological conditions are necessary for any real participation in a symbolic act. To communicate is to join soul with bodily activities: take away either, and the Sacrament ceases to be real.

(b) But so far we have considered the Christian Sacraments only from the human side. The vital point,

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however, is not the conditions of human receptivity, but the idea we hold as to the efficacy of the Sacraments as channels of divine grace. In reality this follows from the principle stated above. There is a way, in man's own nature, by which God can come into his life. This was the really significant contribution of Hebrew thought—seen in the connotation of *ruach*. The soul-body organism which is man is not a closed being to whose inner life the only gateways are the senses. There are depths in his personality which even the most modern of our psychologies cannot plumb, and we know from experience that God can reach us there. This is the real meaning of Christian experience. God desires to enrich our lives by His Spirit, and it is only required of us that we permit Him. There is no dispute on this point. But the question arises, Is there any real need for *special* openings of our life to divine grace and power? Cannot a Christian man live in the closest fellowship with God by the communion which is open to him in so many ways, both in private and public devotion, without resorting to special means of grace like the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper? Two widely different answers are given. On the one side we have the answer of Quakerism, which rejects the special Sacraments, preferring to regard all human experience of God as sacramental. On the other there is the answer of those who find a special Presence in the consecrated elements. On both sides we have Christian devotion and practice which are of the very highest order, so it behoves us not to belittle any conception reverently held by bodies of earnest Christians. But, we may ask, why proceed to extremes on either side? The Roman Catholic view rightly gives a special place to the special Sacraments: have they not a hallowed place as connected with the earthly ministry of our Lord? ¹ But in attributing efficacy to the consecrated elements, this view

¹ On this point we hold that the central place they have occupied in ecclesiastical practice serves to outweigh the critical attack on Christ's institution of the Lord's Supper.

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fails sufficiently to safeguard the psychological conditions of effective symbolism. The Quaker view rightly stresses the spiritual factors in any act of communion, but does not sufficiently recognize that all fellowship (in our experience) has a concrete side to it. We cannot fully abstract ourselves from acts and institutions. Whatever experience we have is mediated somehow, and we may well believe that mediation of a special degree, if not of a special kind, is open to us through reverent participation in the Communion of the Lord's Supper. It may be that this special degree of fellowship is due to the associations of its origin, and its particularly hallowed place in centuries of Christian practice. The Lord's Supper attracts us because it does combine spiritual experience and material symbolism, a combination which we have seen to be essential in the full life of man. If the Romanist could give a larger place to the psychological factors, and the Quaker could assent to the large place of the body in all life, we might witness a nearer approach of these two rival theories. It is quite certain that if we adopt the view of the body in personality which we have developed in this book, we cannot ignore the power of the Sacraments as channels of divine grace.

2. This, however, is to treat of Sacraments in the special ecclesiastical sense, and we must proceed to that broader sacramentalism which expresses the Christian attitude to life in general. Many will share the mood of Pope when he wrote of the man

Slave to no sect, who takes no private road,
But looks through Nature up to Nature's God.¹

This sentiment has obvious limitations, for if we are to find the God who can satisfy all our needs we shall have to look farther than Nature. Still, to "look through Nature up to Nature's God" is to adopt an attitude essentially religious. It is all to the good if we broaden our conception of the range of our Christian outlook.

¹ *Essay on Man*, ep. iv.

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Some of the narrower sects in the Christian Church have been in danger of limiting the operation of the Christian principle to a very small area. Their church fellowship became a "garden walled around"; their idea of Christian practice did not extend beyond the confines of what they termed the spiritual life. The outer world, with its duties and problems, was not really the concern of a Christian man, they thought: that must be left to the "world" as distinct from the Church. Doubtless behind all this there was a praiseworthy intensity of conviction, a determination to attend to the really vital matters, whatever happened to the other affairs of life. But the outlook was too narrow. If the Christian religion means anything, it means everything, and that in every sphere where men live. It is a false antithesis which separates faith and works; they do not admit of separation in the correctly poised life. The world is the sphere of my Christian life just as much as the Church fellowship, and viewed from the highest standpoint Sunday is not the only holy day in the week. We have no difficulty in agreeing with Emerson when he writes: "To the poet, the philosopher, the saint, all things are friendly and sacred, all events profitable, all days holy, all men divine."¹

"To the poet, the philosopher, the saint", says Emerson. But why not to the average man as well? There is a certain area in England known as "Constable's Country". In a peculiar sense it is his because his genius penetrated its beauty and presented that beauty to the world. But is there any reason why that same country should not be mine as well as Constable's? I have not his artistic genius, but I may walk along the leafy lanes and see the glorious landscapes: it is all a matter of attuning my soul to catch the message. "All things are yours," said Paul, "for ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's." This is the secret. The way of Christ should enable us to possess the beauty and harmony of life wherever it is to be found. Flowers may mean as much to us as to Words-

¹ *Essay on History.*

THE UNITY OF BODY AND SOUL

worth or Tennyson, although we cannot express our admiration of them in equally musical language. Why not, with Shakespeare, find sermons in stones, books in the running brooks, and good in everything? It is an exalted mood that can catch these divine messages, but it is the mood we are to cultivate if we are truly Christian.

So man may take stock of himself and the environment in which he lives his life. He will find in all directions an incentive to achievement. What appears dead will take on new life, what is inert will be revealed as full of meaning for progress. He will no longer mourn that he is incarcerated in a fleshy prison, but will accept his bodily life as a rich endowment without which he could not achieve at all. He will no longer feel hemmed in by the outer world, as if it were a tyrant pressing in upon him. He will find it full of meaning, his friendly ally, if he reacts to it in the proper way. He will learn to link together the here and the there, the temporal and the eternal, finding elements of both in his own nature, and knowing that God is in all. Thus will he discover a kinship between God, the world, and himself. If he speaks of it, he will find himself echoing the "Galilean accent". Such an attitude is not only Christian: it has the merit of supplying both purpose and power for the winning of life's greatest prizes.

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
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